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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I provide an account of the unpleasantness of pain. In doing this, I shed light 
on the nature of pain and unpleasantness. I propose to understand the unpleasantness of 
pain based on the determinable-determinate distinction. Unpleasantness is a determinable 
phenomenal property of mental states that entails badness. I propose that an unpleasant 
pain experience has two phenomenal properties: i) the phenomenal property of being a 
pain, and ii) a phenomenal determinate property (u1, u2, u3, etc.) of the unpleasantness 
determinable. According to this theory unpleasant pains feel bad, and this explains why 
we are motivated and justified in avoiding them. This explains, for example, why we are 
motivated and justified to take painkillers. This theory allows us to account for the 
heterogeneity of unpleasantness, i.e., we can explain how different unpleasant experiences 
feel unpleasant even if they feel so different.  
The thesis is organised into seven chapters and divided by three main themes: i) what the 
unpleasantness of pain consists in, ii) how we can account for the great phenomenal 
diversity among experiences of unpleasantness, and iii) which cases suggest that there 
could be pains that are not unpleasant. Broadly, the first two chapters deal with the first 
theme, where I analyse two reductive accounts of unpleasantness: the content theories and 
the desire theories. I deal with the second theme in the third and fourth chapter, where I 
analyse different theories that try to account for the phenomenal property of 
unpleasantness. In the fifth and sixth chapter, I focus on the third theme, where I consider 
different cases that suggest the existence of pains that are not unpleasant. In the final 
chapter, I offer a conclusion of the three main themes by providing my own view on the 
unpleasantness of pain.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Pain is unpleasant. Given that pain is the paradigmatic example of an unpleasant 
experience, I aim to shed light on what pain and unpleasantness are by trying to 
understand what it means for a pain to be unpleasant, what the structure of unpleasantness 
is, and by tackling several problematic aspects of the relation between pain and 
unpleasantness. By doing this, I will also provide a general account of what it means for 
an experience that might not be a pain to be unpleasant. Here are some of the main 
questions that I address regarding pain and its unpleasantness: 
• What does pain consist in? 
• What does it mean for pain to be unpleasant? 
• How can we account for the diversity of unpleasant experiences? 
• How can we explain that the unpleasantness of pain motivates action? 
• How can we explain that the unpleasantness of pain justifies action?  
• Why do we sometimes seek out pain experiences? 
• Is pain always unpleasant? 
 
All of these questions regarding the nature of pain and unpleasantness will be developed 
and answered in detail. To this end, the thesis is organised into seven chapters and divided 
by three main themes: i) what the unpleasantness of pain consists in, ii) how we can 
account for the great phenomenal diversity among experiences of unpleasantness, and iii) 
which cases suggest that there could be pains that are not unpleasant. Broadly, the first 
two chapters deal with the first theme, the third and fourth chapter with the second theme, 
and the fifth and sixth chapter focus on the third theme. In the final chapter I offer a 
conclusion of the three main themes by providing my own view on the unpleasantness of 
pain. According to this account, an unpleasant experience is something felt, it is a 
phenomenal property of mental states, and this property should be understood using the 
determinable-determinate distinction. Here is a general description of the content of each 
of the chapters. 
In the first chapter I explain the content theories. This approach appeals to the notion of 
mental content in order to account for the phenomenology of the unpleasantness of pain. 
Given the explicative power of this approach, it is not a surprise that content theories have 
given an account of pain and its unpleasantness. I explain the development of content 
theories and discuss the two main and more successful accounts that attempt an 
	 10	
explanation of pain’s unpleasantness in terms of mental content: i) representationalism, 
and ii) imperativism. Whereas the first view focuses on indicative content, with a special 
emphasis on evaluative content, the latter focuses on imperative content. These theories 
argue that we can explain pain’s unpleasantness by appealing to the type of mental content 
that constitutes the experience. 
The main problem for content theories is the messenger-shooting problem. If we accept 
that the unpleasantness of pain is bad in itself, content theories are unable to explain this 
feature by appealing to the mental content that constitutes such unpleasantness. In other 
words, content theories cannot explain why we have good reasons (i.e., why we are 
justified, why it is rational, why it is desirable) to perform certain actions when we 
experience unpleasant pains in virtue of such unpleasantness. Content theories cannot 
explain why we have good reasons to perform actions directed at the unpleasantness of 
pain itself. To put it simply, content theories cannot explain why it is rational, for 
example, to take painkillers. Whereas it is rational to take painkillers - it is desirable to do 
something to stop feeling an unpleasant pain in virtue of such unpleasantness - content 
theories are committed to saying that taking painkillers is non-rational, i.e., content 
theories are committed to saying that the content of our unpleasant pain does not provide a 
good non-instrumental reason to take a painkiller. 
In Chapter Two I focus on desire theories. According to these, the unpleasantness of pain 
consists in having an intrinsic desire directed at a pain sensation, where this sensation is 
neither pleasant nor unpleasant in itself, i.e., it is non-hedonic. This desire is for the pain 
sensation not to be occurring. This desire is a mental state distinct from the pain sensation. 
This desire, in opposition to other mental states such as beliefs, has satisfaction conditions 
and a mind-to-world direction of fit. Broadly, a desire is satisfied once the world changes 
in such a way that it fits with the content of the desire. When the desire does not match the 
world, it is the world that ought to change. In a nutshell, according to desire theories a 
pain is unpleasant not because it feels unpleasant; rather, what it means to be unpleasant is 
that we desire not to have it. One of the important virtues of desire theories is that they can 
account for the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences without claiming that there is a 
unitary feeling that all and only unpleasant experiences share.  
The main problem for desire theories comes in the form of a Euthyphro dilemma. That is, 
there is a question with two possible answers and whereas one of these options is 
unavailable for desire theorists, the other is problematic to their own account. The 
dilemma is the following: do we desire a pain sensation not to occur because it is 
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unpleasant, or is the pain sensation unpleasant because we desire it not to occur? I will 
explain why this is a dilemma for desire theories and analyse what I consider to be the 
best possible solution that this approach can offer the dilemma. I will argue that the best 
way to deal with the dilemma is to argue that the property of being unpleasant is applied 
to the compound of the pain sensation and the desire, instead of such property only 
applying to the pain sensation. However, I will argue that the desire theories are unable to 
give a proper account for the desire that constitutes an unpleasant experience.  
In Chapter Three I analyse the distinctive feeling theory. This view has a more intuitive 
and simpler answer to the Euthyphro dilemma. This theory accounts for the 
unpleasantness of pain by claiming that such unpleasantness is qualitative, a feeling, and a 
phenomenal aspect of experience. In other words, unpleasantness is a phenomenal 
property. According to the distinctive feeling view, we can explain that we desire a pain 
not to be occurring because it is unpleasant. However, this view has one important 
problem: the heterogeneity problem. The problem is that whereas this theory claims that 
there is a unitary feeling of unpleasantness in virtue of which unpleasant experiences 
qualify as such, there seems to be no unitary feeling of unpleasantness after careful 
introspection. I will show how the heterogeneity problem is fundamental for the 
distinctive feeling theory.  
In Chapter Four, I analyse two theories that rely on the notion of dimension in order to 
account for the heterogeneity of unpleasantness. I call these the dimensional theories of 
unpleasantness. There is a way we could try to deal with the heterogeneity problem, while 
also thinking that unpleasantness is a phenomenal property. This solution relies on 
understanding the variability of unpleasantness in terms of the determinable-determinate 
distinction. This is a different attempt to deal with the heterogeneity problem, one that is 
different from that provided by desire theories. I think this solution is better than the one 
that desire theories can offer, since, in contrast to desire theories’ solution, we can 
maintain the strong intuition that unpleasantness is something felt. In this view, being a 
pain entails being unpleasant. However, this solution has a fundamental problem: 
accounting for cases of non-unpleasant pains. 
In Chapter Five I analyse potential cases of non-unpleasant pains. There is an intriguing 
issue regarding the existence of pains that are not unpleasant. In this chapter, I consider 
various cases that suggest that pain is not always unpleasant. I focus on two different types 
of cases that raise doubt about the idea that pains are always unpleasant: i) pain 
insensitivity and ii) pain indifference. If pain is the paradigmatic example of an unpleasant 
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experience, it seems odd to think that pain might not be unpleasant. However, various 
philosophers think that there are concrete cases where people do have pains that are not 
hedonic, where pain asymbolia seems to be the strongest candidate. In contrast to this 
current general consensus, I deny that there is strong enough evidence to conclude that 
people might experience pains that are not hedonic, i.e., experiences that are neither 
pleasant nor unpleasant.  
In Chapter Six, I discuss another intriguing case that suggests the existence of non-
unpleasant pains: masochism. Masochism might even suggest that pain is pleasant rather 
than unpleasant. I delineate different scenarios and reasons why people would seek out 
pain experiences. I categorise three different scenarios in which people might interact with 
pain: i) means-end masochism, ii) side effect pains, and iii) end-in-itself masochism. I 
propose that the unifying feature among cases of masochism is that people seek out pain. 
However, when people interact with an unpleasant pain experience sometimes they do it 
despite the unpleasantness of the pain, and sometimes they do it because of such 
unpleasantness. Even if pleasure might be involved in masochism, I conclude that there is 
no evidence of non-unpleasant pains.  
In Chapter Seven I propose the hedonic determinable-determinate theory (HDDT). Even if 
there are no concrete cases of non-unpleasant pains, the discussion around such cases 
shows that we should have a theory of unpleasantness that allows the possibility of non-
unpleasant pains. HDDT is also based on the determinable-determinate distinction and it 
accounts for the possibility of non-unpleasant pains. In this chapter I explain how the 
unpleasantness of pain should be understood based on the determinable-determinate 
distinction. Based on this distinction we can account for the variety of many different 
ways of being unpleasant. In a nutshell, I propose that unpleasantness should be 
understood as a phenomenal determinable property with different determinates u1, u2, u3, 
etc. I defend this approach and argue that it is better than any other theory from the 
previous chapters.  
Before developing these ideas, there are two more things that I think should be mentioned: 
i) the motivation of this project, i.e., why I chose to write a thesis about pain and 
unpleasantness, why this subject is important in the philosophical debate, and ii) a 
preliminary understanding of the explanadum, i.e., I think that it will be useful to have an 
idea of the type of phenomena that are supposed to be explained. My initial interest came 
from wanting to understand sadness. More precisely, I wanted to understand why it felt 
bad to be sad or, in other words, what made this experience unpleasant. In order to try to 
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understand this unpleasant character, I started first by trying to engage with what we often 
refer to as ‘physical pain’, which seemed more accessible to study than the fuzzy and 
volatile ‘emotional pain’. I now think that this distinction between physical and emotional 
is not very clear or useful. At the end, I think we can explain in a quite similar fashion in 
what consists for many different experiences to be unpleasant.  
Another question that has particularly motivated me to examine the nature of pain and 
unpleasantness is what I discovered to be the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. 
That is to say, how to explain that many different unpleasant experiences are unpleasant 
but, at the same time, are so diverse and feel so different. To what could we appeal to 
explain the diversity within the unity of unpleasant experiences? It can be unpleasant to 
feel rejected by our colleagues, our friends, or our family. It can also be unpleasant when 
we cut or burn ourselves. It is unpleasant to be hungry or thirsty too. How can we explain 
what unifies all these divergent experiences? This question is key throughout this thesis, 
and I now have an answer for it. 
The reasons to engage in understanding the nature of pain and unpleasantness are not only 
personal or biographical, of course. In recent years important attention has been given to 
pain and unpleasantness. Aydede’s (2006) and Corns’ (2017) compilations on the nature 
of pain are clear examples of the relevance of this subject. Moreover, the Value of 
Suffering project, which I was lucky to be part of, is another prominent example of the 
current interest in pain, unpleasantness, and affective experience in general, i.e., 
experiences that are pleasant or unpleasant. Moreover, pain and unpleasantness are very 
relevant in different aspects of our lives: when we go to the doctor, the hospital, the 
drugstore, etc. it is often because we are trying to find a way of getting rid of an 
unpleasant experience such as pain.  
This connects with clarifying the explananda of this thesis. One of the main aims of this 
thesis is to explain what the unpleasantness of pain is in order to shed light on the nature 
of pain and unpleasantness. I think that we are relatively well acquainted with different 
unpleasant pain experiences such as the one that we get when we are burned, cut, 
generally injured, or when we have a headache. These are the kinds of experiences that I 
will shed light on. I account for the fact that such experiences are unpleasant, that they 
hurt. When you open and close your eyes there is some qualitative difference for you, 
there is something phenomenal that changes when your eyes are open that is different 
when your eyes are closed. However, the experiential changes that you have while 
opening and closing your eyes do not hurt. These visual experiences do not seem to be 
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unpleasant in themselves. In contrast, the sensation that you have when you pinch yourself 
is unpleasant. It is that unpleasantness that will be clarified in this thesis. 
I focus on the unpleasantness of pain, although there are many more experiences that are 
unpleasant. There are other bodily experiences that are unpleasant even if they are not 
normally considered as a pain: hunger, thirst, nausea, itchiness, etc. There are other 
unpleasant experiences that have a bodily aspect, since they are felt somewhere in the guts 
or in the chest, that are emotional: grief, sadness, anxiety, disappointment, etc. Even if 
most of the discussion is centred on pain and its particular unpleasantness, the discussion 
inevitably touches upon many forms of unpleasant experiences. Moreover, by talking 
about unpleasantness, I also deal with many aspects of pleasure, or pleasantness. As you 
will see, many of the central authors that I discuss talk about pleasure and pleasant 
experiences rather that unpleasantness. I will show how these are mirror discussions to a 
large extent.  
I provide a detailed analysis of the most prominent contemporary theories that try to 
account for the unpleasantness of pain. I explain which are the current most prominent 
candidates and point out their main difficulties. I consider various empirical cases and 
show that it seems that all pain experiences that people have are, in fact, unpleasant. I 
show that even if unpleasant experiences are bad in themselves, there are many different 
reasons why we might seek out unpleasant pain experiences. Finally, I propose my own 
account of unpleasantness, which is based on the determinable-determinate distinction. 
This theory can explain how unpleasantness is something felt while explaining how so 
many diverse unpleasant experiences all feel unpleasant.  By doing all of this, this thesis 
will provide a detailed understanding of the nature of pain and unpleasantness. 
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CHAPTER 1: CONTENT THEORIES 
 
1.0 Introduction 
In this first chapter I will explain and analyse the theories according to which the notion of 
mental content can arguably account for the unpleasantness of pain. I will analyse the 
content theories of pain. The notion of mental content might seem very fruitful to 
elucidate many aspects of mental states, especially to give a naturalistic account of the 
phenomenology of experiences, so it is natural to begin this journey by exploring how 
such a notion can be used to explain pain and its unpleasantness. In this chapter I will 
tackle the main theories that account for pain and unpleasantness in terms of mental 
content. I will show, however, that content views face a fundamental problem. In order to 
do this, I have divided the chapter into four main sections.  
The subject of the first section is representational content views. I start by clarifying how 
to understand what mental content is and how mental content is supposed to account for 
pain and its unpleasantness. I will focus on two representational accounts. I will refer to 
the first representational account as the damage account of pain (DAP). To put it simply, 
according to this approach the experience of an unpleasant pain consists in having a 
mental state that represents some form of bodily damage. I will show that this account is 
unsuccessful, and that the methodology lacks a very important feature. That is, it can’t 
explain the unpleasantness of pain by appealing to such representation of bodily damage. 
The main problem is that the representation of damage, where damage is understood as 
bodily disturbances, cannot explain how unpleasant pains are motivational states. Given 
that DAP faces this difficulty, I move into exploring a second representational alternative. 
The second view I will focus on is Bain’s (2012) proposal. I will call this approach Bain’s 
account of pain (BAP), also known as evaluativism. This is still a representational account 
but it adds an important feature. Namely, according to BAP an unpleasant pain consists in 
the experiential representation of a bodily disturbance as being bad for the subject. It is 
similar to DAP in the sense that an unpleasant pain is explained as a mental state that 
represents something, but according to this view in the case of an unpleasant pain this 
particular experience consists in representing something in an evaluative way. An 
unpleasant pain involves the representation of something as being bad for oneself. The 
fact that something is represented as being bad is meant to account for the fact that such 
experience is unpleasant. Hence this view is called evaluativism. BAP has important 
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problems, however. Among these, there is a salient difficulty: to explain how such 
representational content, even if it is evaluative, can in itself explain how an unpleasant 
pain motivates action. In order to tackle this, and other difficulties for the representational 
approach, I turn to different types of content theories that are meant to give a 
straightforward explanation for unpleasant pains being motivational.  
The second section of this chapter discusses imperative content views, also referred to as 
imperativism. This is an alternative view that also explains unpleasant pains in terms of 
mental content. In contrast to the previous approach, however, this view explains the 
unpleasantness of pain as being constituted by imperative mental content, rather than  
purely representational content, as DAP and BAP propose. Here I am using 
“representational” to mean mental states with accuracy conditions, as opposed to 
satisfaction conditions. To put it simply, in the same way that we accept the difference 
between descriptive and imperative sentences, this approach considers that a similar 
distinction can be made for mental content. In contrast to the two representational 
accounts, in this case it is in virtue of the content of an unpleasant pain being imperative 
that we can account for unpleasant pains being motivational.  
I will explain two different versions of imperativism. I will refer to the first one as 
Martínez’ view of pain (MAP). This is defended by Martínez (2011, 2015). I propose that 
the strongest way of understanding MAP is that an unpleasant pain is a mental state 
constituted of a composite mental content, part of it is indicative and part imperative. The 
indicative part represents that you are having a bodily disturbance, and the imperative is 
ordering you to stop such disturbance. I will argue that this version is problematic since it 
is incapable of accounting for certain aspects of the unpleasantness of pain. Given these 
difficulties, I analyse a different imperative account. Klein (2007, 2012, 2015b) defends a 
different imperative approach, and I will refer to this version as Klein’s account of pain 
(KAP).1 According to this view an unpleasant pain is constituted of two different 
imperative commands: a command that orders you to maintain your body in a certain state 
and another command directed at the first command. However, KAP and MAP, as well as 
DAP and BAP, share the same difficulty: the messenger-shooting problem.  
In the third section of the chapter I will focus on what I take to be the main problem for 
content theories in any of their versions. All content theories must confront the messenger-
shooting problem. That is, beyond the particular difficulties that each type of content 																																																								1 For a development of this theory regarding pain’s intensity see Klein and Martínez (forthcoming), and for 
the imperative account in terms of pain signals see Martínez and Klein (2016).  
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theory has, one issue unites them all. These theories cannot offer an explanation of the 
non-instrumental badness of pain’s unpleasantness. In other words, content theories 
cannot account for the fact that experiencing pain is bad in itself. These theories are able 
to explain various aspects of pain: they can explain, for example, why we perform certain 
actions when we experience pain. However, all content theories fail to clarify a crucial 
feature of an unpleasant pain by appealing to the content that is supposed to constitute 
these experiences: an unpleasant pain experience is bad in itself and that felt 
unpleasantness provides us with a good reason to act in order to stop experiencing it. It is 
because of this felt unpleasantness that we are justified in taking painkillers, for example. 
It is rational to take a painkiller because a pain is unpleasant. However, content theorists 
are committed to saying that it is non-rational to take painkillers, that a pain being 
unpleasant is not a good reason to take a painkiller.  
Finally, in the fourth section, I will consider two solutions to the messenger-shooting 
objection. The first explains that it is rational to take painkillers based on instrumental 
reasons. The second accounts for the non-instrumental badness of pain by appealing to 
other mental states such as negative emotion or an aversion. I will show that the best 
strategy available to content theorists for dealing with the messenger-shooting problem is 
to appeal to aversion understood as a con-attitude, as desire for the pain not to occur. As a 
result, content theories are unable to account for the nature of an unpleasant pain by 
appealing to mental content; these theories have to renounce to the idea that content alone 
accounts for the unpleasantness of pain, and for the badness of such unpleasantness, in 
particular. Desire theories seem to be a better strategy for accounting for the badness of 
the unpleasantness of pain. I will explain this alternative account and its problems in 
Chapter Two. 
 
1.1 Representational theories 
The representationalist approach can be very useful for understanding various aspects of 
the mind. The discussion around representationalism is vast, but there are two central 
ideas that are worth pointing out: i) representational states are about something and ii) 
representational states have accuracy conditions. Let me explain what these two features 
mean before I move into explaining how we can try to understand an unpleasant pain 
experience in representational terms.  
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First, representations are about something. This is closely connected to the idea that 
mental states have content. In order to illustrate this, think of a thermometer. This 
mechanism represents something, i.e., it is about something; it is about the temperature in 
a certain place. Similarly, according to representationalism, we can understand certain 
mental states as representing something. Your beliefs, for instance, are about something. 
When you believe that you have a red apple in front of you, your belief is, roughly 
speaking, about a red apple. Other mental states can also be representational. We can also 
understand our sensory experience in this way. Vision, we could say, is about objects in 
the world. Vision informs us about the external world by representing it. You can have a 
visual experience about a red apple. This means that you are representing a red apple as 
being in front of you. Vision, in this way, is a way of representing objects. In other words, 
vision is a mode of representation.  
Second, representations can be accurate or inaccurate. The thermometer may inaccurately 
indicate that it is 30 degrees Celsius even if the temperature is actually 35 degrees Celsius. 
Vision can also represent accurately or inaccurately. There are two main ways in which 
vision, and sensory experiences, may misrepresent. First, by misrepresenting a feature of 
an object; for example, you might have the experience of a red apple, but the apple is 
actually green; this is what is often referred to as an illusion. Second, by misrepresenting 
the presence of an object; for example you might have the experience of an apple, but 
there is no apple that is causing you to have such an experience; this is often understood as 
a hallucination. 
It is also worth noting that there might be veridical hallucinations, i.e., a hallucination 
where what you are representing matches with an external object, but the causal chain 
between the experience of representation and the world is inadequate for the experience to 
count as a perceiving of the object. For example, you have the experience of a red apple in 
front of you because you took ayahuasca, a hallucinatory brew that induces you to have 
the experience of a red apple as if there was one in front of you. It happens to be the case 
that there is a red apple in front of you, but your experience of a red apple is not caused by 
that red apple. This would count as a type of veridical hallucination. Even if there is an 
important discussion about more details regarding these two aspects of representation, i.e., 
intentionality and accuracy conditions, I think that having this in mind will serve us to try 
to understand how we can account for unpleasant pains in representational terms. 
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1.1.1 Damage account of pain (DAP) 
When we think of pain we often think of bodily damage. If we want to give an account of 
pain, it might be sensible to think that pain is strongly related to some form of bodily 
damage. When we cut, burn, or scrape our skin we often experience an unpleasant pain, 
for instance. Moreover, if we take into consideration some standard definition of pain such 
as the one provided by the International Association of Pain (IASP), there is a 
straightforward reference to damage. Pain, they say, is “an unpleasant sensory and 
emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in 
terms of such damage” (my emphasis). It is unsurprising then that an initial 
representational account of pain will also refer to damage. Pain can be understood as the 
representation of bodily damage. However, before we enter into the details of this account, 
I propose that we need to be more explicit about the type of representational theory we 
will be dealing with. 
We are dealing with a strong version of representational content account. In this strong 
version of representational content we assume two important features: i) the mental state 
that we are dealing with is purely representational, i.e., that the mental state’s content 
constitutes all aspects of the phenomenal character of the mental state, and ii) all aspects 
of the mental state that we are trying to understand can be explained, clarified, 
illuminated, etc. merely in virtue of such content. This means, for example, that if we try 
to explain the phenomenal character of vision in terms of this sort of strong 
representational account, all aspects of what it is like for one to have a visual experience 
are representational, and that everything that there is to explain about vision’s 
phenomenology can be clarified by appealing to the representational content that 
constitutes such visual experiences. The phenomenal character of experiences consists in 
their mental content.2  
To illustrate this, let’s consider what happens when we are having the experience of seeing 
a red apple. If we account for this according to the strong version of the representational 
approach, then everything there is to be illuminated about the phenomenology of this 
mental state is exhausted by its representational content. The phenomenology of the 
experience consists in having such representational content. This phenomenology is also 
sometimes referred to as the what-it-is-like of undergoing such visual experience.3 The 																																																								2 For a discussion on various aspects of representationalism in relation to phenomenal experience see Lycan 
(2015). 3 See Nagel (1974). 
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subjective aspect of seeing a red apple is nothing beyond what that experience represents. 
That is, we should be able to understand what it is to have this sort of visual experience in 
reference to the experience’s content, what the experience is made of, as it were. If we 
want to understand what it means to have an experience of seeing a red apple, we should 
understand what the content of this experience is. If we want to account for such content, 
we must account for what the experience represents. When we have the experience of 
seeing a red apple, there is a phenomenal property, which is an aspect of the visual 
experience and this consists in a specific representational content. 
To put it simply, having a conscious qualitative experience of a red apple means that one 
is having a mental state representing an object as being red. Another way of trying to 
make sense of this is to put it in terms of properties or information; namely, having a 
visual experience of a red apple consists in representing an object as having certain 
properties such as being red, or representing certain information such as an object being 
red. There are, of course, many more details about the explicative power and 
complications of the representational approach in order to explain these and other mental 
states — Drestke (1995) offers what I take to be clear analysis of this type of 
representationalist view of the mind. However, given the subject matter of this chapter and 
thesis, I propose that we jump straight into analysing the strong representational approach 
for pain. I will refer to this strong version of representationalism simply as 
“representationalism” from now on. 
How can we account for an unpleasant pain according to representationalism? What are 
unpleasant pain experiences representing? According to this view an unpleasant pain 
experience is representing bodily damage. Tye initially defended a view along these lines. 
He tell us that: i) “pains are sensory representations of bodily damage or disorder” (Tye, 
1995, p.116), and ii) that in his view “pain experiences have a distinctive representational 
content and that this content is their phenomenal character” (Tye, 2006, p.99). Even if 
Tye’s view on pain has evolved and changed from these two points, they are helpful to 
summarize the initial idea of explaining pain in terms of bodily damage.4 Since Tye 
modified this view on the content of pain, I will refer to this approach not as his, but as a 
more general damage account of pain. This is the proposal:  
																																																								4 Tye has changed his view; he turned to defend a form of evaluativism (Cutter & Tye, 2014). 
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Damage account of pain (DAP) 
An unpleasant pain is a mental experience constituted by the representation of 
part of one’s own body as being damaged. 
Let me explain what this proposal implies. First, it means that we can explain what an 
unpleasant pain is by referring to what this mental state is. An unpleasant pain is the 
representation of your own body as being damaged. To be in pain, and for pain to be felt 
the way it does, is to represent something as being a bodily part of yourself that is 
damaged, to receive information of your own body. If we want to explain why an 
unpleasant pain feels the way it does, for example, we should appeal to this content. In the 
same way that having an experience of something being red consists in representing an 
object as being red, to have an unpleasant pain is to represent something as being your 
own body and being damaged. This is what an experience of pain is supposed to be about, 
this is its content, and this content should capture the phenomenology of an unpleasant 
pain.  
According to DAP, then, the content that constitutes an unpleasant pain may be accurate 
or inaccurate. Notice that this allows representationalism to elucidate cases such as the 
phantom limb phenomenon. “Almost everyone who has a limb amputated will experience 
a phantom limb — the vivid impression that the limb is not only still present, but in some 
cases, painful.” (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998, p. 1603) People sometimes experience 
unpleasant pain as being in parts of their bodies, even if these bodily parts have been 
amputated. How can we explain that someone feels pain in a missing part of his or her 
body? DAP could explain phantom limb pain as a hallucination. You have a pain 
experience as being in your hand because you represent your hand as being damaged, but, 
since you have no hand, there is actually no damage in your hand. To put it simply, the 
fact that you represent a part of your body as being damaged does not imply that such a 
body part is actually damaged. A pain illusion, for example, would occur when you 
represent your hand as damaged and you do have a hand, but it is not really damaged. 
Your experience is still of a bodily damage of your own, but you are misrepresenting the 
object of experience. A pain hallucination, as I just said, could occur if you have that same 
representational content of your own hand as being damaged, but you do not have a hand. 
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Your experience is representing something, a part of your body as damaged, even if there 
is no such thing, since that part has been amputated.5  
If this is correct, the representationalist could say that vision and pain are analogous. 
When you have a visual hallucination, there is something visual about your experience, 
but you are not really seeing things in the sense that your visual experience is 
misrepresenting. A visual hallucination is experienced as visual because what it means to 
have a visual experience is to represent an object as having certain properties such as 
colour, and the representational view can explain how, even if you do have a visual 
experience, the content of this experience might be inaccurate. Similarly, when someone 
has a phantom limb pain experience, there is something pain-like, in the sense that it feels 
like you are having an unpleasant pain, but this does not mean you are experiencing pain 
in the sense that you are accurately representing bodily damage. Pain hallucinations feel 
like they do by virtue of being representations of bodily damage, not because there is 
actual damage. You are really having a pain experience, i.e. you really are in pain, but the 
pain experience is hallucinatory. It does not count as a perceiving of a body part. 
This gives a clearer understanding of how to understand what an unpleasant pain might 
be. However, this approach has some issues. Let me discuss two important ones, and 
propose that DAP is only able to give a solution to the former. The first issue is that the 
DAP proposal may seem insufficient to account for what constitutes an unpleasant pain. 
That is, we could have a mental experience with exactly the same content without the 
experience being an unpleasant pain. If the DAP definition were correct, this would mean 
that any mental state that represents your own body as being damaged should be an 
unpleasant pain. This, however, does not seem to be the case. There are other mental states 
that could represent such bodily damage without being an unpleasant pain. For example, 
you might have a visual experience with that same content; you might represent through 
vision that your body is damaged. For instance, you might see that you cut yourself. This, 
I take it, would not be an unpleasant pain experience. A visual representation of bodily 
damage is not an unpleasant pain. It does not hurt. If an unpleasant pain is nothing but the 
representation of your own bodily damage, then any representation of your own body as 
being damaged should be experienced as an unpleasant pain. This is not the case: some 
other mental states may also represent a part of your own body as damaged without 
constituting unpleasant pain experiences.  																																																								5 One might also have veridical pain hallucinations. For example, one might represent one’s own hand as 
being damaged, one’s hand might be damaged, but the cause of one representing one’s own hand as being 
damaged is not one’s own hand being damaged. 
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This problem has a solution. The DAP defender could argue that an unpleasant pain, in 
contrast to other types of mental experiences, gives us a different mode of presentation of 
one’s own bodily damage.6 This mode of presentation is constitutive of the content of the 
experience, while the mode of presentation is the way the content is. So, strictly speaking, 
a visual representation of your own body damage is not constituted by exactly the same 
content as an unpleasant pain. This idea of mode of presentation is useful to explain how 
two different mental states can be about the same thing and yet be different experiences. 
For example, you might represent an object as having a given shape either through vision 
or touch. The content of these two experiences is about the same thing: both the visual and 
the tactile experience are representing the same shape, a cube. However, seeing or 
touching a cube are qualitatively very different types of experiences. One way to account 
for this difference is to say that these different senses can provide the same content with 
two distinct modes of presentation. They are representing an object as having the property 
of being a cube in a visual and a tactile presentation. Similarly, one could argue, when in 
pain we represent bodily damage in a different way than when we see that our body is 
damaged. This explains why pain feels different from vision; pain provides a different 
mode of presentation than vision. 
However, there is another problem for DAP. It cannot explain why unpleasant pains are 
motivational in themselves, why we are motivated to perform certain actions by appealing 
to the content that is meant to constitute unpleasant pain experiences. There are many 
types of behaviours that an unpleasant pain itself motivates, i.e., many actions that we can 
render intelligible in virtue of an unpleasant pain. What motivates action is not some 
additional state, e.g., a desire not to be damaged, or a desire not to have an unpleasant 
pain, but the unpleasant pain itself. Let us focus for the moment on bodily-directed 
behaviour: you approach your finger to a candle flame, you feel a burning feeling, and so 
you quickly draw your hand back. If DAP is correct, then we should be able to explain 
why feeling a burn makes us act in virtue of the experience’s representational content, in 
virtue of what an unpleasant pain ultimately is. We should be able to explain that an 
unpleasant pain makes us act in virtue of it being the representation of our own body as 
being damaged. However, the representation of our own bodily damage does not entail 
action. We cannot explain why we act merely in virtue of an unpleasant pain being the 
representation of our own bodily damage. Let me now explain why this is. 
																																																								6 The notion of mode of presentation could also be understood, I think, in terms of experiential attitudes (see 
Siegel, 2016, p. 15-18). 
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According to DAP, vision and pain are quite similar: they are mental experiences 
constituted by representational content and it is in virtue of their content that we can 
explain all of their features, e.g., why these experiences are qualitatively experienced they 
way they are. Vision represents information about objects: for example, it might represent 
the colour and shape of a red apple. However, representing colour or shape in itself does 
not entail that you will have any motivation to do something about these representations. 
Merely representing something that is either accurate or not, does not entail motivation for 
action. You might be motivated to do something about the apple, you may want to eat it if 
you are hungry, but this action is not explained solely in virtue of the representational 
features of your visual experience.  
If this is correct, and pain is also explained based on the same representational approach, 
we still cannot explain why an unpleasant burn makes us withdraw from a flame. If an 
unpleasant pain is nothing but the representation of something that might be accurate or 
not, then there is nothing that explains why pain makes us act. The DAP supporter might 
argue that an unpleasant pain is motivational precisely because it represents damage. 
However, if according to DAP the representational content of an unpleasant pain is 
analogous to the content of a visual experience, except for the fact that they are different 
modes of presentation, then saying that the representation is about damage does not make 
any substantial difference. That is to say, if damage is representational, then it is nothing 
but the representation of a body part as being in certain conditions. Representing damage 
is, in this view, the representation of your own body as being in a certain way. Just 
representing your own body as being in a certain condition does not entail in itself that 
you act regarding such representation. 
Let me illustrate this. You can look at your hand and have a visual experience of your 
hand. As you move your hand closer to the flame of a candle, you can see how you hand 
looks brighter. That is, you have a visual representation. This change can be understood as 
representing changing conditions about the light illuminating your hand in different ways 
as your hand gets closer to the source of light, as the flame becomes nearer. This 
representational content, which can be accurate or not, does not seem to be sufficient in 
itself to explain your actions, e.g., that you keep on moving your hand closer to the flame. 
We can explain why you continue moving your hand, but we cannot explain it by merely 
referring to the representational content that constitutes your visual experience. As an 
analogy, when you represent that your own finger is damaged, since this means that you 
represent that the condition of your skin is changing, it does not seem to be enough to 
account for your motivation to withdraw your hand from the flame. The fact that pain is 
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meant to represent damage as bodily changes is insufficient in itself to account for your 
withdrawal action. DAP is meant to explain what pain is and all aspects of pain, but DAP 
cannot account for this simple withdrawal action. The question left for the DAP supporter 
is: how to account for this motivational feature of an unpleasant pain while remaining a 
representationalist?  
 
1.1.2 Bain’s account of pain (BAP) 
There is a quite straightforward solution for DAP. It consists in adding an evaluative 
component to the content that constitutes an unpleasant pain. It is in virtue of this content 
being evaluative that we are supposed to explain what makes the experience unpleasant 
and motivational. This approach is also referred as evaluativism. I take Bain (2012) to be 
the paradigmatic defender of evaluativism.7 Here is his proposal: 
Bain’s account of pain (BAP) 
A subject’s being in an unpleasant pain consists in her (i) undergoing an 
experience (the pain) that represents a disturbance of a certain sort, and (ii) 
that same experience additionally representing the disturbance as bad for her 
in the bodily sense. 
This evaluative twist is meant to explain, among other things, why unpleasant pains are 
unpleasant and thus motivate action. An unpleasant pain is not only representing neutral 
information that might be accurate or not. An unpleasant pain is constituted by the 
representation of evaluative information, an unpleasant pain conveys information about 
evaluative facts, i.e., an unpleasant pain represents objects as being bad. In this case, an 
unpleasant pain is the representation of a bodily disturbance that is represented as bad for 
oneself. Remember that in content theories we explain the various aspects of the 
phenomenology of experiences by appealing to their content. An unpleasant pain feels 
unpleasant, the fact that the bodily disturbance is represented as bad is meant to explain 
why the experience feels bad, and why it is motivational in virtue of feeling the way it 
does. An unpleasant pain is also meant to motivate because it feels unpleasant, so the 
evaluative content should explain why an unpleasant pain is motivational insofar as it is 
unpleasant. We do things when we feel pain in virtue of how an unpleasant pain feels, and 																																																								7 Bain is not the first to propose a form of evaluativism. See Helm (2001, 2002), for example. However, I 
take Bain’s to be the clearest and paradigmatic version of evaluativism.  
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this experience feels in the way it does in virtue of its content. After all, what it is about 
pain that motivates is, arguably, the way it feels, so if the content does not explain the 
motivation, it has not explained the feel. According to BAP, your motivation to act when 
you experience an unpleasant pain is explained in virtue of the evaluative aspect of the 
representational content.  
We need now to say a few things about motivation and normativity. In order to better 
grasp how the represented badness of a bodily disturbance accounts for our motivation to 
act, we need to clarify what we mean by motivation. Given that we need to introduce a 
more careful understanding of motivation, it is a good moment to also say a few things 
about normativity. The distinction between these two things will also be important for the 
1.3 section of this chapter, when I explain the messenger-shooting objection, which I take 
to be the main problem for content theories. The following is a good way of distinguishing 
between motivation and normativity:  
Motivating and normative reasons do have something in common in virtue of 
which they both count as reasons. For citing either would allow us to render 
an agent’s actions intelligible. This is essential. For there is a priori 
connection between citing an agent’s reason for acting in a certain way and 
making her acting in that way intelligible: that is, specifying what is to be said 
for acting in the way in question. In virtue of their differences, however, 
motivating and normative reasons make actions intelligible for quite different 
reasons … By contrast with normative reasons, then, which seem to be truths 
of the form ‘It is required or desirable that I Φ’, motivating reasons would 
seem to be psychological states, states that play a certain explanatory role in 
producing action. (Smith, 1995, p. 94-96)  
One important thing to point out is that when we talk about motivation and normativity we 
often talk about motivational and normative reasons. In this sense, an unpleasant pain 
might be a motivation or a justification for acting. Let us focus first on motivating reason. 
A motivating reason can be understood as a psychological state, a mental state, in virtue 
of which an action is intelligible. In this way, having an unpleasant pain may be a 
motivating reason since we can explain an action, render the action intelligible, by 
referring to the unpleasant pain. For example, why did you withdraw you hand from the 
fire? The answer could be that it was because you had an unpleasant pain. More precisely, 
the unpleasant experience of being burned, which is a psychological state, renders your 
withdrawal action intelligible. The unpleasant pain itself is motivational because, the idea 
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goes, we explain the action by referring to this experience solely, without needing to 
explain the action in relation to other mental states such as desires. In more detail, 
according to BAP the unpleasantness of your burning experience, which is constituted by 
the representation of the bodily state of your hand as being bad, is what renders your 
withdrawing of your hand intelligible. The difference and advantage of BAP over DAP is 
the following: whereas DAP cannot render actions intelligible by merely referring to the 
representation of bodily damage understood as bodily disturbances, BAP can do so by 
referring to the representation of bodily disturbances as being bad for oneself.  
This will become clearer if we take into account an evaluative judgment. Let us consider 
an evaluative judgment that appears particularly uncontroversial, such as that killing is 
bad. Suppose that you take killing to be bad or, in other words, you represent killing as 
being bad. If this is the case, we should be able to render some of your actions intelligible 
by referring to your psychological states, e.g. to your judgement of killing as being bad. 
According to motivational judgement internalism, there is a conceptual or necessary 
connection between making some evaluative judgements and being motivated to act 
accordingly. It is a classical conception about motivation that there is an entailment 
between certain mental states, motivation, and action. Davidson (1963) offers a 
paradigmatic description of this entailment: 
R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the 
description d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent toward actions 
with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the description 
d, has that property. (Davidson, 1963, p. 687)  
In other words, a primary reason is the combination of two mental states: a pro-attitude, 
such as a desire, and a belief. These reasons are explanatory since they render actions 
intelligible. If we take these explanatory mental states as motivating reasons, this means 
that experiencing such mental states entails motivation for action. Such mental states are 
motivating reasons, and by having such reasons we are motivated to act accordingly. For 
example, you might not kill someone, among many reasons, because you represent killing 
as being bad, you have such a belief, and because you desire to do what you think is right. 
Even if you are very angry with someone, you might still represent killing that person as 
bad, and you desire to act in accordance to your beliefs of what is bad. The combination of 
this belief and desire render your controlled behaviour intelligible. These mental states are 
	 28	
your reasons not to kill someone, which means that such mental states motivate you not to 
kill.8 
Many other actions can be explained in virtue of your evaluative judgement. For instance, 
your vegetarian eating habits - the fact that you do not eat any animals - might be at least 
partially explained by referring to your judgement that killing is bad. In this case, the 
notion of killing is applied not only to people but also to sentient beings in general. The 
fact that you don’t eat animals is a way of avoiding something that you take to be bad, that 
is, the killing of animals. There are, of course, many subtleties to how evaluative judgment 
motivates action. For example, the judgement alone might not be sufficient to be 
motivational, since it might need a relevant desire about wanting to not kill animals. 
Moreover, this is an oversimplification given that actions are often motivated by many 
reasons and in relation to competing reasons.9 We might also think that what really 
motivates is not the desire and the belief themselves, but the acknowledgement that we 
have them. That is, we might think that a rational agent is necessarily motivated by the 
recognition of her reasons (Finlay, 2007). The necessary entailment between motivation 
and action is given by the recognition of reason, not by the reasons themselves.  
However, beyond these and other subtleties about motivation, this should clarify how the 
evaluative twist of BAP is put forward to help us understand what makes an unpleasant 
pain motivational. That is, if we can render actions intelligible solely by appealing to the 
experience of an unpleasant pain, this means that such experience is motivational in virtue 
of its feeling. This feeling is explained by the fact that the bodily disturbance is 
represented as being bad, and this should explain why feeling an unpleasant burn is a 
motivating reason to withdraw our hand from a flame. However, there is a problem for 
accounting for motivation in terms of evaluative content, you might think: representing 
something in evaluative terms (i.e., as being good or bad) does not really entail 
motivation. In other words, an evaluative representation does not entail that it is a 
motivating reason, i.e., we might not be able to render an action intelligible by referring 
solely to such evaluative representation. 
Let us illustrate this. Your judgment tells you that killing is bad in itself. You truly believe 
this and, as a consequence, you also think that we should avoid all forms of killing. This 																																																								8 There is a debate about whether the motivational reason is the mental state itself, or the fact that one has 
such a mental state (see Alvarez, 2016). However, given that both views have limitations, I opt to stick to 
the standard version and take the mental states themselves to be motivating reason for actions.  9 See Ruben (2009) for a discussion of competing reason or “con-reasons”. 
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alone, however, might not be enough to explain any action. As Davidson’s model 
proposes, we might also need a pro-attitude, such as a desire, in order to explain an action 
and, therefore, to account for the motivating reasons of an action. For instance, you might 
truly believe that killing animals is bad, but still have no motivation to do anything about 
it. If this is possible, you have an evaluative judgment that does not serve to render any 
action intelligible, the evaluative representation in itself does not entail motivation. If this 
can be the case, then it is problematic for BAP. This is because according to BAP, 
unpleasant pain’s phenomenology is constituted by an evaluative representation, and if 
this feeling is in itself motivational, then the evaluative representation should be a 
motivating reason in itself. However, as it happens with evaluative judgment, it does not 
seem that evaluative representations entail motivation because we cannot explain action 
by referring solely to such evaluative representations. A mental state might be constituted 
by a representation of something as being bad, and still not be an explanation for action. 
I can see two ways in which BAP can offer a solution to this. First, a BAP supporter could 
argue that the connection between an evaluative representation and motivation is 
defeasible. That is to say, that you will be motivated to act if you have a reason only if you 
are rational. For example, Smith (1995) proposes this kind of model in relation to reason:  
[T]here is an analytic connection between the desirability of an agent's acting 
in a certain way in certain circumstances and her having a desire to act in that 
way in those circumstances if she were fully rational… If claims about what 
we have reason to do are equivalent to, or are in some way entailed by, claims 
about what it is desirable for us to do… then it follows that there is a 
plausible analytic connection between what we have reason to do in certain 
circumstances and what we would desire to do in those circumstances if we 
were fully rational. (Smith, 1995 p. 109, my emphasis) 
That is to say, this means that an evaluative judgment would be a reason for action if our 
fully rational selves would have a desire to act in accordance to such evaluative 
judgement. If this happened, then the combination of such judgement plus the desire to act 
in accordance to the judgment would constitute a reason for action. However, this 
connection between rationality and desirability will not be useful for BAP in order to 
account for motivational reasons. This is so for two main reasons. First, Smith is giving 
criteria for normative reason. That is, the element of rationality is meant to explain when 
an evaluative judgment is desirable, i.e., when such judgment entails a normative reason. 
For the moment we are only concerned with an unpleasant pain being a motivating reason. 
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Second, even if Smith’s requirement of desirability is about normative reason, we might 
argue that the evaluative judgment alone is not sufficient to give us a reason for action, 
since it also needs a desire for acting in accordance with the evaluative judgement in order 
for these mental states to count as a normative reason for action. Going back to the 
previous example, your judgement about killing animals as being bad is not a normative 
reason for action in itself, not even when you are fully rational. You need also a desire to 
act in accordance to that judgement, for it to be a normative reason not to kill animals.  
What happens when we try to argue something similar for unpleasant pain as being a 
motivating reason, in the light of BAP? This strategy is not going to work. That is, we 
could try to argue that an unpleasant pain is only a reason for action if we are rational. 
This appears strange, however. This is because we are confusing motivational reason and 
normative reason. Smith claims that a normative reason requires some form of rationality. 
In contrast, being motivated when one feels an unpleasant pain does not seem to be the 
kind of situation where one has to be rational. This is because the unpleasant feeling of 
pain in itself seems to motivate action, beyond the fact that it also justifies action. 
However, BAP does not seem to capture this motivational feature of an unpleasant pain by 
claiming that the content of such pain is evaluative. Discussing rationality does not serve 
BAP when trying to explain how an unpleasant pain is a motivating reason. In the same 
say that an evaluative judgment in itself does not seem to entail motivation, the evaluative 
content of pain in itself does not seem to entail motivation either. However, such content 
should entail motivation if we accept that the unpleasant feeling of pain is in itself 
motivational, i.e., that we can render actions intelligible in virtue of this unpleasant 
experience. This is a major problem for BAP. 
There are additional problems for evaluativism. The first one is that BAP might be too 
demanding if we are to account for an unpleasant pain. Some may mistakenly think that 
the BAP proposal is that pain’s unpleasantness consists in an evaluative judgment, which 
requires sophisticated mental states that not all creatures that experience unpleasant pains 
have. A BAP supporter has a straightforward answer for this: pain does not consist in an 
evaluative judgment. An unpleasant pain is a perceptual experience; it is a perception of 
evaluative states. In the same way that we represent killing as being bad where badness is 
predicated of killing, when we experience an unpleasant pain, there is a bodily disturbance 
that is represented as being bad, where badness is predicated of the bodily disturbance. We 
might worry, nonetheless, that perceiving something as being bad is much more 
sophisticated than perceiving other qualities of objects such as colour, size, location, etc. 
One might worry that whereas human babies and many other animals experience 
	 31	
unpleasant pains, they might not be equipped to perceive something as being bad. Unless 
we explain in more detail what it means to have such evaluative perceptions, BAP looks 
less promising that we might have initially thought.  
The second issue is related to this and is mainly an ontological worry. It is not clear what 
it means for some object of the world to be bad and, more specifically, what would count 
as badness when it comes to our body parts. Let us recall that this is a representational 
theory and that this means that the represented content can be accurate or inaccurate. The 
content of an unpleasant pain experience is informing on a bodily state as being bad. What 
does this imply when the content is indeed accurate? To put it simply, in the same way 
that we can represent objects as having certain features like colour, shape, or size, and this 
content can be accurate when the object has in fact the represented colour, shape, or size, 
there must be a situation where the bodily disturbance represented as being bad is actually 
bad. But what would this badness be? The representational view is often used to give a 
naturalistic explanation of the mind. So BAP could propose a naturalistic explanation of 
bodily badness such as an impediment of proper functioning of the body, lack of 
homeostasis, etc. However, I think that the problem runs deeper. That is, it is not obvious 
that we can provide a naturalistic account of normative properties such as being bad.  
A good way of trying to make sense of this problem is to refer to Moore’s (1903) open 
question argument. Moore argued that we couldn’t give a definition of normative concepts 
by referring to purely naturalistic phenomena that are not normative themselves. BAP 
supporters are susceptible to this critique if they offer a purely naturalistic account for the 
badness of pain. Bodily badness, in so far as it is evaluative, is a normative concept. The 
critique is that each time that we try to define something as normative, such as right or 
wrong, or good or bad, in terms of something non-normative, such as purely natural 
phenomena, this always leads to an open question. This open question shows that we have 
not ultimately explained what makes something normative. Every time that we give a non-
normative description of the normative feature that we are trying to explain, we can ask an 
open question about the non-normative phenomena, which is meant to show that we have 
not really given an account of the normative concept. Smith (1995) explains a similar 
worry that Ayer (1936) pointed out: 
Ayer’s objection to definitional naturalism, following Moore, is that since for 
any natural property F it is possible to think that x has F while at the same time 
thinking that x is not right, it follows that, for no natural property F is it self-
contradictory to claim that x has F but x is not right. But it would have to be 
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self-contradictory, if it were possible to give a naturalistic definition of 
rightness. Therefore, it is not possible to give a naturalistic definition of 
rightness.  (Smith, 1995, p. 36)  
Something similar can be applied to BAP. If we try to account for the badness of an 
unpleasant pain in purely naturalistic terms, such as some detailed bodily disturbances, we 
can still think that such disturbances are not bad. Given that this is the definition of an 
unpleasant pain, it should be self-contradictory to think that some given bodily 
disturbances are not bad. But it is not self-contradictory and, therefore, a naturalistic 
account of the badness of an unpleasant pain cannot ultimately be a proper account. That 
is to say, if we ask what kind of phenomenon in the world - something that can be 
objectively measured - accounts for the badness of an unpleasant pain, we will find out 
that we cannot provide a satisfactory naturalistic explanation of such badness. If the 
purpose of BAP is to provide a representational account that explains the unpleasantness 
of pain in a similar way to how we could account for vision (and other perceptual 
experiences) by merely referring to the representation of information about natural 
phenomena, then BAP leaves an open question: are such and such bodily disturbances 
really bad? This, the idea goes, should appear as a self contradictory question and given 
that it does not look so, this shows that we haven’t really provided an explanation of what 
the badness of an unpleasant pain is.  
If we accept Moore’s open question argument, then DAP and BAP have a quite similar 
problem. Namely, I take it that an important aim of representational accounts is to provide 
a similar explanation across sensory modalities. The phenomenology of vision is a good 
example of how a representationalist account helps us to understand this phenomenon in 
terms of the representation of natural properties. We can explain various features about 
what it means to have visual experiences in terms of the representation of light bouncing 
off the surface of objects, for example. The phenomenology of visual experiences can be 
explained to a large extent in terms of the representation of natural properties. This is one 
of the main virtues of the representational account for understanding phenomenology: that 
it serves to develop a naturalistic approach of phenomenology. If we want to provide an 
ultimately naturalistic explanation of the unpleasantness of pain, it is unclear how the 
representation of such purely naturalistic properties is going to shed light on the 
unpleasantness of pain. In other words, it is hard to see how normative properties, such as 
being bad, are motivational in themselves, if they are ultimately the representation of 
naturalistic properties.  
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In the case of DAP, once we understand bodily damage in terms of some precise bodily 
disturbances, then such disturbances do not seem to elucidate why unpleasant pains are 
motivational. BAP can try to explain such a motivational aspect by appealing to the 
represented badness that constitutes an unpleasant pain, but then once we try to make 
sense of such badness in naturalistic terms, it seems that we fail to properly explain what 
that badness is. As we have seen, the representational account does not seem to be very 
helpful in shedding light on how an unpleasant pain is motivational in and of itself.  
In the next section I will analyse different types of content theories that set out to give a 
straightforward explanation for the motivational aspect of an unpleasant pain. These are 
the imperativist content theories. However, once I have explained this approach, I will 
tackle what I take to be a unifying problem for representational and imperative content 
theories. In section 1.3, I will discuss the messenger-shooting problem, which shows that 
none of the content theories can explain how an unpleasant pain is a normative reason for 
action.  
 
1.2 Imperative theories 
According to this approach the content of the unpleasantness of pain is imperative. In the 
same way that we accept the difference between indicative and imperative sentences, 
imperativists claim that this distinction can be applied to mental content. There are mental 
states that have an indicative content, such as visual experiences. These mental states are 
similar to descriptive sentences insofar as their function is to report and describe how the 
world is, and this information might be accurate or not. In contrast, mental states such as 
unpleasant pains are similar to imperative sentences, since they command us, they tell us 
to do something. Whereas the representationalist views of content tried to explain the 
unpleasantness of pain merely in indicative terms, by telling what unpleasant pain 
experiences represent, imperativist views account for the unpleasantness of pain in terms 
of what the experiences command us to do. 
A good way of grasping the difference between these two types of mental content is to 
appeal to the notion of direction of fit (Anscombe, 1957; Searle, 1979). Mental states such 
as beliefs and visual experiences have a mind-to-world direction of fit. They represent the 
world accurately or inaccurately. They are accurate when “the mind fits the world”, that is, 
when the content of these mental states matches with the way the world actually is. The 
mind ought to match the world. For example, if you believed that there isn’t a red apple in 
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front of you, but there is in fact one, then it is your belief that ought to change in order to 
fit the world and to be accurate. In contrast, mental states such as desires have the opposite 
direction of fit. These mental states have a world-to-mind direction of fit. These mental 
states are not susceptible to being accurate or not. Instead, these other types of mental 
states can be satisfied or unsatisfied. They are satisfied when “the world fits the mind”. 
When the content of a desire does not match with how the world is, then it is the world 
that ought to change for the desire to be satisfied. The world ought to match the mind. 
Roughly, your desire to eat a red apple would be satisfied once you actually eat a red 
apple. According to the imperative views, unpleasant pains have a desire-like direction of 
fit.  
But what is the benefit of explaining pain in terms of an imperative content? A primary 
aspect of the imperative approach is to account for the motivational force of certain mental 
experiences. In contrast to the representational account above, the imperative content is 
meant to capture the motivational force of an unpleasant pain. According to imperativism, 
many of our bodily experiences such as hunger, thirst, itches, and pains are motivational 
because they are constituted by an imperative content (Hall, 2008). These experiences are 
motivational. If feeling hunger in itself gives us a motivating reason for action, then we 
should be able to explain this action by appealing to the imperative content that constitutes 
such experience. Desire, for example, is a typically motivational mental state. This is 
because, we can argue, the proper function of a desire is that the world ought to change so 
that it fits with the content of the desire. This is why we can render actions intelligible by 
appealing to a desire. If you desire a red apple, then you may act in order to get the apple. 
If we take hunger to be a motivational reason, it is because we can explain behaviour by 
referring to such experience, and we can explain that it is motivational because it has the 
same direction of fit that desires have. Hunger is a motivating reason in virtue of being 
constituted by an imperative content. In the same way that one could think that desires are 
inherently motivational, given that they have a world-to-mind direction of fit, if 
unpleasant pains are conceived as having a similar direction of fit, then pains are also 
inherently motivational. This, I think, gives us a general idea of what the imperativist 
accounts have in mind, so we can now take a look into what they propose more 
specifically.10 
																																																								10 See Bain (2011) for an explanation and critique of imperativism. 
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1.2.1 Martínez’ account of pain (MAP) 
What is, exactly, the content of an unpleasant pain, when it comes to imperative content? 
What is such unpleasantness telling us to do? If imperativism is supposed to offer an 
explanation of many bodily experiences such as hunger, thirst, itches and pains, what are 
the commonalities and differences among these experiences’ content? Broadly speaking, 
the commonality is that they all have imperative content; they all tell us to do something 
and this is how imperativists account for these experiences being motivational. The 
difference is that a different type of command constitutes the content of these diverse 
motivational experiences. Roughly, imperativists think that hunger is constituted by the 
command ‘Eat!’, hunger by ‘Drink!’, itch by ‘Scratch!’ and so on. With all this in place, 
we should try to explain what precisely the content of an unpleasant pain is.   
I think that a good way to start with imperative content is Martínez’ proposals (2011, 
2015). Martínez (2015) tells us that a pain is constituted by the content: “See to it that 
bodily damage d does not exist.” (2015, p. 2261) I think, nonetheless, that we need to 
make a modification to this proposal in order to make it stronger and to analyse it in its 
best shape. There are two main problems with this definition. The first one is that it 
includes the notion of damage, which is problematic if damage implies some form of 
normativity, something that is bad. This would collapse into a form of evaluativism, and 
we should avoid including evaluative terms in an imperative account of pain, since these 
are meant to be contrasting theories. This is not problematic if we understand damage as a 
representation of bodily disturbances. However, as we saw in the first version of 
representationalism, this representation seems to be inert, and it does not shed light on 
how pain is a motivating reason in itself, so we need to add a motivational component. 
The second and more important problem with Martínez’ definition is that it does not 
explicitly differentiate the sensory aspect of an unpleasant pain from the hedonic one. That 
is to say, the sensory aspect refers to the phenomenology of the experience in virtue of 
which it is comparable and distinguishable from other sensory experiences such as vision, 
touch, etc. This aspect of the experience is not meant to explain how an unpleasant pain is 
a motivational reason, how such experience might account for actions. In contrast, the 
hedonic aspect of an unpleasant pain, its felt unpleasantness, is responsible for unpleasant 
pains having a motivational dimension. Most of the theories of the nature of pain and 
unpleasantness distinguish these two aspects. One of the main reasons for this is to be able 
to deal with cases where it seems as if people have pain experiences that are not 
unpleasant —I will go into the details of this in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. Here is 
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what I take to be a better formulation of Martínez’ proposal, without changing the essence 
of his view: 
Martínez’ account of pain (MAP) 
An unpleasant pain is constituted of i) an indicative content “There is a bodily 
disturbance d in your own body”, which accounts for the experience being a 
pain, and ii) a hedonic aspect about the indicative content “See to it that bodily 
disturbance d does not exist!”, which account for the unpleasantness. 
This formulation has several advantages. There are two aspects of this proposal that I 
think are particularly relevant. First, by clearly distinguishing the two aspects of an 
unpleasant pain, it provides a straightforward explanation of what constitutes the 
motivational character of an unpleasant pain. An unpleasant pain is a motivating reason in 
virtue of its unpleasantness. This sheds light on the intuition that unpleasant pains are 
motivating in virtue of being unpleasant. If unpleasantness is what makes an unpleasant 
pain a motivating reason, we can explain this in terms of such unpleasantness being 
constituted by an imperative content. Given that the unpleasantness of pain is imperative, 
and that imperatives are desire-like states, we can render actions intelligible by appealing 
to the imperative mental content that constitutes an unpleasant pain. The fact that an 
unpleasant pain is partially constituted by a command explains why having an unpleasant 
pain is a motivating reason. 
Second, this formulation of MAP maintains one of Martínez’ main purposes, i.e., to 
capture that the unpleasantness of pain does not prescribe a particular action. The 
unpleasantness of pain gives us a motivating reason for action, but there are many 
different actions that could be adequate in order to deal with a pain experience. When we 
get burnt, we withdraw from the source of heat —since we often get burned in this way— 
but we might also stop moving when we twist an ankle. These are two different types of 
action in response to different unpleasant pains. Moreover, we might behave in different 
ways in response to the same pain experience; sometimes when we feel a burn, we 
withdraw, but we might also put the burnt area of our bodies under cold water. The key 
point is that these different actions can all be explained by appealing to the same content 
that constitutes the unpleasantness of pain, “See to it that bodily disturbance d does not 
exist!”. An imperative content implies that the unpleasantness of pain has a world-to-mind 
direction of fit and, just as with desires, this is meant to constitute a motivating reason for 
action. This sheds light on how unpleasant pains are motivational because they are 
unpleasant.  
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However, MAP also has to face some difficulties. Let me tackle a few of these. The first 
one is that it is not clear how MAP could account for the variations between how different 
pain experiences are felt. That is, the content of an unpleasant pain is meant to capture the 
phenomenology of the experience, yet MAP is proposing a single content to account for 
unpleasant pains. This would imply, then, that there is only one way in which unpleasant 
pains feel, which is, I would say, obviously false since the pain produced by a cut and a 
burn feel quite different. This is even more salient when we consider a headache, a 
stomach-ache, etc. There is a solution for this. A MAP defender could argue that this 
proposal is an outline; that we would have to be more specific about the precise type of 
content that would constitute each specific unpleasant pain. The variability in terms how 
experiences are felt can be accounted for by the more precise indicative content, for 
example. I think this would be the most natural way for MAP to deal with the phenomenal 
variation. We could explain the felt variation among different unpleasant pains in terms of 
the differences in the indicative content that constitutes the experiences. This, however, is 
still problematic. This assumes that there is no variation regarding the unpleasantness of 
pain. It seems that there is also variation in relation to the unpleasantness of pain: 
variations in the way the unpleasantness of pain is felt. The different ways of being 
unpleasant is something that MAP cannot clearly capture. I will go back to this issue 
towards the end of this chapter, and in much more detail once I talk about the 
heterogeneity problem in the next chapters.  
Second, there are some unpleasant pains with a much less intuitive explanation, if we 
follow MAP. Headaches are a good example of this. That is, if we accept that at least 
some headaches are the result of dehydration, it seems odd that the content of a headache 
orders the elimination of a disturbance in your head, when the cause of a headache has 
nothing to do with something in your head. One of the advantages of MAP is that it is 
meant to explain the kind of behaviour that we normally perform when we experience 
pain. For example, if you cut your finger and experience pain, you do something with you 
finger. If you twist your ankle, you do something with your ankle. However, this kind of 
story does not seem to apply to headaches, which are a very common type of pain. A 
MAP supporter could say even if dehydration headaches are caused by lack of water in 
our bodies, their unpleasantness is actually constituted by a command of the type “See to 
it that such and such bodily disturbance in your head does not exist!” In the face of it, I 
think that a MAP supporter has two alternatives. Either: i) accept that headaches are a type 
of pain experience that is systematically telling us to do something completely useless or, 
if this first option sounds too strange, ii) to conclude that headaches are a type of pain but 
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their unpleasantness must be explained in a different fashion. I don’t think either of these 
options implies a catastrophe for MAP, but they do show make the view less attractive. 
A third possible problem for MAP, which I believe to be much more substantive, comes in 
relation to the imperative content being sufficient to account for unpleasant pains being a 
motivating reason for action. MAP is supposed to explain what constitutes the 
motivational dimension of an unpleasant pain, but such imperative content might not be 
sufficient to count as a motivating reason for action. The idea is that we are not motivated 
to act merely in virtue of receiving a command: being told to do something in itself does 
not count as a motivating reason to act. For example, imagine that you are at a dinner 
party and the young child of one of your friends comes and tells you all “It is late, go to 
bed!” (Bain, 2011) This, I take it, is not obviously a motivating reason to act. You might 
be completely unmotivated to follow this order. If it is possible to remain completely 
unmoved by this order, this shows that a command, in itself, does not entail a motivating 
reason for action. This might not even give you a motivating reason that is not strong 
enough to override other competing reason. It is not as if you would do what this child 
tells you if you didn’t have other stronger motivations. You are really completely 
unmotivated after receiving this order, even if it is a command. If the police came and told 
you to stop the party, on the contrary, you might probably have a motivating reason to 
stop it and go to bed. How could we account for this difference? One way to account for 
this and other aspects of an unpleasant pain is to turn to the next imperativist account. 
 
1.2.2 Klein’s account of pain (KAP) 
Klein (2015b) proposes a different account of pain and unpleasantness. There are two 
aspects of his account that can be helpful to explain what else we need in order for a 
command to be a motivating reason. That is, the command has to i) come from a source of 
authority, in this case it is our own body, and ii) we must care about the command, since 
the command comes from a source of authority. These two elements are quite intertwined 
in Klein’s account. He proposes that the commands that constitute a pain are issued by our 
own bodies, that these commands are in the best interest for ourselves, that we treat the 
body as a practical authority, and given that we care about the issued commands, this 
explains why such commands constitute a motivating reason for action: 
Commands that motivate are those that are issued by a source that we accept 
as having the authority to direct our actions, and so whose commands give us 
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certain reasons to act…  By analogy, the body is a bit like the state. The state 
issues imperatives in the form of laws and other directives. We are like 
citizens who accept the authority of the state, and so we are moved by what it 
commands... [However], the body is more like a dim-witted, paranoid king: 
well-intentioned but error-prone and obsessed with self-preservation, and 
whose commands coincide only roughly with the flourishing of his subjects. 
(Klein, 2015, p. 72-74)  
Going back to the previous counterexample for MAP, we could explain that the difference 
between receiving an order from a child and from a police officer is that the latter has an 
authority that the former lacks, and so we care about the officer’s command in a way that 
we don’t about the child’s. When it comes to pain, our bodily commands are rather like 
the command of the police. Let us have a look into Klein’s proposal so as to unpack it, and 
show some of its strengths and weaknesses:  
Klein’s account of pain (KAP) 
An unpleasant pain is constituted by two imperatives: i) a command “Keep B 
from E (with priority P)!”, which accounts for the experience being a pain 
sensation, and ii) another command, “Don’t have pain sensation!”, which 
constitutes the unpleasantness of the experience.  
This content is meant to account for all aspects of the phenomenology of an unpleasant 
pain. According to KAP, we can account for how different unpleasant pain experiences 
feel by referring to variations in the content of the first imperative. There are three main 
elements that constitute such pain feeling: “B stands for a particular body part, E a 
nominalised passive gerund phrase, and P a ranking function” (Klein, 2015, p. 57). In 
summary, B is meant to capture the felt location of a pain experience, a pain experience is 
about a body part and this determines where the pain is felt. E is a commanded action that 
tells us how to treat the bodily location; this command also constitutes how the experience 
feels, i.e., different ordered actions account for different felt experiences. P is meant to 
capture the intensity with which the pain is felt. According to KAP, we have a list of 
ranked mental states that serve us a guide for action, a sort of mental to-do-list; the higher 
the command is in the ranking, the more intense the experience is. For example, when you 
feel pain because you twisted an ankle, this experience consists in a command “Keep your 
ankle from bearing weight!”, where this command has some priority in relation to other 
motivational mental states. 
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All these three elements, it is worth insisting, are only to account for the sensory aspect of 
a pain. This sensory aspect, according to KAP, is motivational even if it is not unpleasant 
in itself. The unpleasantness of the experience is explained in virtue of a second-order 
command, a command about another command. Particularly, the unpleasantness of pain 
consists in a command to stop a specific pain sensation. That is to say, the unpleasantness 
of pain in this view consists in a command telling us to stop having the first order 
command that accounts for the experience being a pain sensation. This is an important 
difference between MAP and KAP. Whereas MAP took the pain aspect of the experience 
to have indicative content, KAP takes that same aspect of the experience to have 
imperative content. If one wants to be imperative purists, KAP offers an option where all 
the content of an unpleasant pain is constituted by imperative content. 
Beyond this and other possible advantages that KAP might have, there is a major problem 
for imperativists view. I take this to be the main problem for all versions of content 
theories. This should show that beyond the nuances of the type of content that constitutes 
an unpleasant pain, there is a feature of felt unpleasantness that none of the content 
theories can capture: the fact that unpleasantness is non-instrumentally bad.  
 
1.3 The shooting-messenger problem  
The messenger-shooting problem is that having an unpleasant pain is something bad in 
itself, but content theories cannot explain this feature by appealing to the content that is 
meant to constitute the unpleasantness of the experience. But first, what does it mean for 
an experience to be bad in itself? We could try to understand this in two ways. In a 
negative formulation it means that you are better off by not having an unpleasant 
experience, all else being equal. In a positive formulation it means that if you were having 
an unpleasant experience, you would be better off if you didn’t have it, all else being 
equal. The badness of an unpleasant pain seems to be intrinsic. Moreover, if 
unpleasantness is something phenomenal, something that we feel, then this badness is also 
phenomenal. Unpleasant pains feel intrinsically bad. When you have an unpleasant 
headache, an unpleasant hurtful burn experience, an unpleasant cut, etc., there is 
something about those experiences that feels bad. Everything else being equal, you would 
have been better off without experiencing such unpleasant experiences. This is a crucial 
feature of unpleasant pains and other unpleasant experiences, but we cannot capture this 
feature by appealing to the content that different content theories propose. 
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The badness of unpleasantness is very important in relation to motivation and normativity. 
Let us now focus on the latter. It is in virtue of this felt badness, i.e., in virtue of 
unpleasantness, that we have good reasons for getting rid of our unpleasant pains. It is 
desirable to get rid of our unpleasant pains because they feel bad. If we have good reason 
for an action, this means that we are justified to perform such action. The fact that it is 
desirable for us to get rid of an unpleasant pain that feels bad, shows that the 
unpleasantness of pains provides us with normative reason. When you have a headache, it 
feels bad, and since it is feels bad, this provides you with a good reason to take a 
painkiller. Taking painkillers is, therefore, rational. However, content theories are 
committed to saying that taking painkillers is actually non-rational. To make this clear, let 
us go back to the distinction between motivating and normative reason. Whereas the 
former can be understood as an internal mental state in virtue of which an action is 
intelligible, the latter is something in virtue of which it is desirable or required that you 
perform such action. An unpleasant pain is a motivating reason because we can render 
actions intelligible in virtue of such mental states, and an unpleasant pain is also a 
normative reason because it is desirable that we act in order to avoid having such an 
experience. 
Let us picture the next scenario to make this clearer: Othello believes that Desdemona has 
betrayed him very badly. Othello believes that Desdemona has wronged him so badly that 
he has to kill her, but in fact it was really Iago who betrayed Othello. In this case, Othello 
has a motivating reason to kill Desdemona. Othello’s belief, together with his desire, 
constitutes a motivating reason. We could explain Othello’s behaviour by appealing to 
these mental states. However, these mental states do not imply that Othello has a 
normative reason, a good reason, to kill Desdemona. In other words, it is not desirable or 
required, given the circumstances, for Othello to kill Desdemona. Another way of putting 
this, following Smith (1995), is that if Othello were fully rational and knew all of the 
relevant facts, he would not advise his actual self to kill Desdemona. It is not desirable for 
Othello to act in accordance to his own belief. Othello has no good reason to kill 
Desdemona, because Desdemona did not betray him. Now, when it comes to an 
unpleasant pain, the unpleasantness of the experience is a motivating reason and also a 
normative reason. Since an unpleasant pain feels unpleasant, and unpleasantness is 
intrinsically bad, we have a good reason to get rid of the unpleasant pain. An unpleasant 
pain, in virtue of being bad in itself, is a normative reason. 
Let us begin to explain how representationalists cannot account for an unpleasant pain 
being a normative reason. I will only focus on BAP, since it is a development of DAP, the 
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initial proposal based on the representation of damage. First, given that the 
representational content can be inaccurate, representing something as being bad does not 
imply that we have good reason for action. It is not necessarily desirable to act in 
accordance of a representation of a bodily part represented as being bad when the content 
is inaccurate, i.e., when the bodily disturbance is not really bad. We would have a good 
reason to act, you might think, only if our representations were accurate: if you 
represented with absolute certainty that something bad is going on in your body, then this 
would give you a good reason to act. You would have a good reason, it would be 
desirable, to do something about the body part where there is something bad occurring. 
However, this is not the nature of representations: representations might be inaccurate, 
they may misrepresent. For example, you might represent an inoffensive caress as being 
bad. Even if you represented this caress as bad, that does not mean that you have a good 
reason to stop the caress. The caress is, in fact, inoffensive. In the same way that Othello 
might be wrong about Desdemona betraying him, the content that constitutes our 
unpleasant pain experiences as being bad might be inaccurate. In the same way that it is 
not desirable for Othello to kill Desdemona, it is not really desirable to stop an inoffensive 
caress.  
But the problem with BAP runs even deeper. BAP cannot account for an unpleasant pain 
being a normative reason for experience-directed actions, not even when their content is 
accurate. BAP can account for an unpleasant pain being a normative reason, a good 
reason, for bodily-directed actions, such as moving away from a source of damage, when 
the content is accurate. That is to say, when you represent that something bad is happening 
to your body because it is burning, then it is indeed desirable that you act in order to stop 
being burned if you are really being burned. You are justified to perform these actions in 
virtue of your unpleasant pain’s representational content being accurate, because what you 
represent as being bad really is bad. It is rational, then, to perform body-directed actions 
when your pain is accurately representing something bad taking place in your own body.  
However, BAP cannot account for experience-directed behaviour, such as taking 
painkillers, not even when the content is accurate. For BAP, an unpleasant pain can be 
undesirable because of the badness that it is representing, but it cannot be undesirable also 
in virtue of representing badness. This might seem like a subtle difference, but it is very 
important. As I said, felt unpleasantness is taken to be bad in itself. When you have an 
unpleasant pain, the bare fact of having this experience is bad, and gives you a normative 
reason to act. You would be better off if you didn’t have it, all else being equal. This 
feature cannot be explained by referring to the representation of badness in a bodily part, 
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not even when the content is accurate. According to BAP, we cannot explain that it is bad 
to represent badness. But if this were right, then we cannot explain why it is rational to 
take a painkiller. For BAP there is no reason why you should take a painkiller, because 
simply representing something as being bad is not in itself bad. BAP is not capturing a 
crucial feature of an unpleasant pain. That is, we cannot explain in BAP terms why we 
have good reasons to stop experiencing an unpleasant pain. 
Jacobson (2013) explains the messenger-shooting problem with an analogy from where 
the objection gets it name. When a messenger brings bad news to the king, it is non-
rational for the king to kill the messenger as a way of dealing with the bad news. 
Receiving the message is not in itself bad, what is bad is what the message informs the 
king about, assuming that the bad news is accurate. If the messenger informs that people 
are dying in the kingdom, the message isn’t bad: it is bad that people are dying. Whereas it 
would be rational to do something to stop people from dying, it would be non-rational to 
shoot a messenger who brings bad news as a way of dealing with the content of the news. 
It is not desirable to shoot the messenger. The king would have a good reason to send a 
doctor to the kingdom to stop people from dying; this action directed at the content of the 
news would be desirable. In contrast, the king has no good reason to shoot the messenger, 
since the fact that someone gives bad news is not in itself bad. 
BAP is analogous to the messenger situation. Simply representing badness in your body is 
not bad in itself, as it is not bad in itself to receive a message about something bad. What 
is susceptible to being bad is what is happening in your body, in the one case, and what is 
bad is that people are dying in the kingdom, in the other. In the same way that it would be 
non-rational to shoot the messenger, i.e., it is not desirable or required to kill the 
messenger, BAP is committed to say that it would be non-rational to stop representing 
bodily badness. However, the theory should explain why it is actually rational to do 
something in order to stop experiencing an unpleasant pain. When we take a painkiller that 
is precisely what we do: we stop the experience. If it is rational to take a painkiller, but 
BAP is committed to say that it is non-rational, we must conclude that BAP is wrong.  
Imperativism faces very similar difficulties to representational accounts regarding 
justification for action. First, imperativism has difficulties in justifying body-directed 
behaviour. Receiving a command does not entail that we have a good reason to obey and 
act in accordance with such an order: there are commands that we should not follow. The 
fact that we receive a command to do something about a bodily disturbance does not entail 
that we have a good reason to follow such an order. Suppose now that you receive a 
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harmless caress and, for some reason, you receive a body command to stop such a 
disturbance. Would you have a good reason to stop the caress merely in virtue of receiving 
this bodily command? No, you wouldn’t, a harmless caress is not doing anything bad to 
you. The imperativist could argue that even if the commands are not always useful, they 
often are. In either case, there is a more relevant problem. The messenger-shooting 
problem is also problematic for imperative views.  
Imperativists cannot account for the intrinsic badness of an unpleasant pain either. They 
are also committed to saying that taking painkillers is non-rational. Just receiving an order 
is not good or bad in itself. It might be annoying to receive an order, but this not so merely 
by virtue of it being received. It might bother us to receive an order because receiving an 
order might cause something else that bothers us; it is instrumentally annoying. A 
command might interrupt us from doing something else, but it is the interruption that is 
bad, not the order in itself. If the messenger came to the king and commanded him to do 
something to stop people from dying in the kingdom, it would still be undesirable for the 
king to shoot the messenger as a way of dealing with the command. The mere fact that the 
command had been given wouldn’t be a normative reason, a good reason, for terminating 
it or the messenger. The king might have a good reason to send a doctor to deal with the 
content of the command, especially if the messenger has some form of credibility or 
authority. However, simply receiving a command is not bad in itself. If everything 
remains the same, i.e., all else being equal, we are not worse off just by receiving a 
command or better off by not having a command. Taking a painkiller would be equivalent 
to shooting the messenger. Taking painkillers is rational; we have good reason to take 
them to stop feeling an unpleasant pain. However, for imperativists it would also be non-
rational to perform such experience-directed actions.  
 
1. 4 Solutions to the messenger-shooting problem 
Both imperativists and representationalists have offered possible solutions to the 
messenger-shooting problem, as I will show in this section. These solutions have taken 
two main forms: i) to argue that it is rational to take a painkiller due to instrumental 
reasons or ii) that it is rational to take painkillers in virtue of another mental state that is 
not the pain. I think that that both strategies are unsatisfying. The former option will be 
unable, in principle, to capture the non-instrumental badness of pain; the latter option 
misses the main point of a content account of pain, since it does not explain unpleasant 
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pain’s badness in terms of mental content. I will discuss each of these answers to the 
messenger-shooting problem.  
 
1.4.1 Pain as instrumentally bad 
Let me start with the former strategy. As I said, there is a very strong intuition confirmed 
by our lived experience and by our behaviour in relation to unpleasant pains, that is, 
having an unpleasant pain is bad in itself. More specifically, an unpleasant pain is bad 
because it is unpleasant. The first strategy to deal with the messenger-shooting problem 
mainly consists in denying that pain is bad in itself. According to this solution, having an 
unpleasant pain is only instrumentally bad. The reason in virtue of which one takes a 
painkiller, for example, is not because it is bad in itself to have an unpleasant pain 
experience. It is something else that justifies this type of bodily-directed and experience-
directed actions. What could this instrumental reason be? Imperativists have proposed that 
what is ultimately bad about an unpleasant pain is that it is interfering with other activities, 
and it is because of this interference that it is rational to perform experience directed 
behaviour such as taking a painkiller (Klein, 2015b; Klein & Martínez, forthcoming; 
Martínez, 2015). 
According to imperativists, we can account for taking painkillers even without unpleasant 
pain being bad in itself. Instead, it is an instrumental reason that explains why we take 
painkillers. We take a painkiller in virtue of the fact that an unpleasant pain is interfering 
with our mental to-do-list of other activities. In other words, the pain command is 
interfering with other commands and this interference is what justifies our experience-
directed actions. It is desirable to take a painkiller because the mental interference is bad. 
If this is correct, this means that the only good reason to take painkillers is to prevent the 
unpleasant pain command from interfering with your other activities. Once more, if we 
accept this, there is a good reason to take a painkiller to shoot the messenger, but the 
reason is not that the message is bad in itself. If we use again the kingdom analogy, the 
idea would be that the king may shoot the messenger, but it is not undesirable to act in this 
way. The reason behind killing the messenger is that the message is interfering with other 
activities that the king has to do. It is in virtue of such interference that the king has a 
reason and can even be justified to shoot the messenger. I do not think, however, that this 
solution from imperativists is satisfactory.  
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Let us consider and contrast two different scenarios. In the first scenario you have to do 
many things throughout the day: prepare coffee in the morning, take your children to 
school, go to work, prepare dinner at night, etc. In the second scenario you have to do the 
exact same things, but you also have a persistent toothache; you are still able to perform 
all the activities that you were supposed to do and no one could notice the difference in 
your performance. Which of these two situations is worse? The latter one is worse, I take 
it, and you would be better off if you could take a painkiller. If this is correct, it shows that 
you have a good reason to take a painkiller that is not merely in virtue of the pain 
interfering with your activities. These two scenarios seem clearly possible to me; the fact 
that the latter scenario is worse shows it is rational to take a painkiller for non-
instrumental reason. I think that it is true that we might have good instrumental reasons to 
take a painkiller - not having an unpleasant pain could be desirable for many reasons - but 
that is not what is at stake. Even if it is true that an unpleasant pain is bad because it 
interferes with other activities, this does not show that an unpleasant pain is not also bad 
in itself. This example shows that we have a reason to get rid of pain for its own sake and, 
as I argued in section 1.3 of this chapter, content theories are not able to capture this 
feature.  
Let us consider another case. Suppose that you are being tortured with unpleasant pain. 
There’s no way to escape. This, I think, is a very bad situation to be in. Namely, you 
would clearly be better off without suffering this unpleasant pain, all else being equal. If 
you could take a pill that stopped you from having unpleasant pains, I think that you 
would have a good reason to take it. According to imperativists, the reason behind you 
taking that pill is that in this way such unpleasant pain produced by being tortured would 
not be interfering with you mental to-do-list. I am not denying that this might be true, 
there are many other things that you would rather do instead of being tortured. However, 
what I am trying to point out is that it seems silly to say that the only reason why it is bad 
to be tortured is because the unpleasant pain that you are experiencing is interfering with 
other things that you would like to do. Having an unpleasant pain is instrumentally bad, 
but that does not undermine that it is also bad in itself.11  
I think that the problem for imperativists in accounting for unpleasant pains’ badness is 
structural. The imperativist has to show that an unpleasant pain is not bad in itself, i.e., 
that the apparent non-instrumental badness consists really in some instrumental reason. 
The previous two scenarios are meant to show that pain is indeed bad in itself and not only 																																																								11 Bain (2017) presents a similar intuition.  
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instrumentally bad. That is, having a toothache is bad even when it is not interfering with 
our activities. I do not think that we can deny that an unpleasant pain is bad in itself. Any 
attempt to explain non-instrumental badness by appealing to instrumental reasons is 
doomed to failure. If we accept that something is non-instrumentally bad, we will not be 
able to account for such badness in virtue of something instrumental. That is, if something 
is non-instrumentally bad, it will remain bad regardless of any instrumental badness that it 
might entail. I think that the examples discussed above encourage us to think that 
unpleasantness is non-instrumentally bad. 
The imperativist could then say that we are simply begging the question. Given that we 
assumed that an unpleasant pain is non-instrumentally bad, then the instrumental 
explanations won’t convince us. The imperativist could argue that, precisely, we take a 
painkiller only in virtue of instrumental reasons; thinking otherwise is petitio principii. 
But we are not begging the question, I think. Even if an unpleasant pain is not interfering 
with your mental to-do-list, it would still be bad to be in that state. Unpleasant pain’s felt 
badness does not rely on you being able or not to perform or plan other activities, although 
it is worse if you are having an unpleasant pain and the pain also interferes with your to-
do-list. Even if we followed the imperativists and accepted that we only take painkillers in 
order to avoid mental interference, we will have to face a point in the justification where 
something is bad in itself. The imperativists then would have to explain, for example, why 
it is bad to have a mental state such as pain interfering with a mental to-do-list. Is mental 
interference bad in itself or is it bad because of something else? 
In either case, I think that the felt unpleasantness of pain seems like a very promising 
candidate for something that is bad in itself, and as long as this is the case content theories 
won’t be able to explain this feature of an unpleasant pain by appealing to the content that 
is meant to account for the experience. The examples discussed are meant to show that we 
must accept that an unpleasant pain is non-instrumentally bad. All in all, if we are justified 
to take a painkiller in virtue of the felt badness of unpleasant pain experiences, this shows 
that the experience of an unpleasant pain is non-instrumentally bad. Any attempt that tries 
to explain this felt non-instrumental badness via instrumental reasons will fail.  
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1.4.2 Pain as bad in virtue of other mental states 
Representationalists have offered two main strategies in order to provide an answer to the 
messenger-shooting problem by appealing to other mental states. It is rational to take a 
painkiller in virtue of i) a negative emotion directed at the unpleasant pain (Boswell, 
2016) or ii) because we have a general aversion to the unpleasant pain (Cutter & Tye, 
2014). In both cases we justify taking a painkiller by referring to another mental state that 
is not the unpleasant pain itself. Boswell’s solution is problematic in a similar way to the 
imperativists arguments. That is, it fails because he is trying to account for experience 
directed behaviour by referring to instrumental reason. The second option is better, I think, 
since it does not appeal to instrumental reason. However, I also think that it is problematic 
since it can only explain the motivation to take a painkiller but it cannot account for the 
justification to do so.  
Let us start with the first proposal. Bowell’s solution is based on empirical models of pain 
according to which a normal pain experience is constituted of three elements: i) a raw pain 
sensation (that is not good or bad), ii) an affective component (where pain gets its usual 
felt badness), and iii) a negative emotional component (Fields, 1999; Gracely, 1992; Price, 
2000). Following this model, it is in virtue of the emotional component that it is rational to 
take a painkiller. The reason why we take a painkiller is to stop having the negative 
emotion directed at the unpleasant pain. If you experience anguish or anxiety due to the 
felt badness of your pain, then you have a reason to take a painkiller; it is desirable for you 
to stop the pain because this prevents you from experiencing anguish or anxiety. We are 
supposed to explain that one takes a painkiller because it is a way of preventing having a 
negative emotion.  
This solution is not going to work, however. It has the same problem that I previously 
discussed in reference to explaining unpleasant pain’s felt non-instrumental badness by 
appealing to instrumental reasons. As I discussed earlier, these types of non-instrumental 
explanations are doomed to failure if we think that pain’s felt badness is also non-
instrumental. That is, if we think that pain’s felt badness is bad in itself, then it cannot be 
that we are only justified to take a painkiller because of the bad emotional response that 
pain causes. In order for this solution to work, we would have to show that an unpleasant 
pain is actually not bad in itself. Could it be that taking into account this empirical model 
shows that we only have instrumental reasons to take painkillers? I don’t think so. In 
short, you could have an unpleasant pain with no negative emotional response and that 
would still be bad. 
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Again, it seems that there is quite a strong intuition that experiencing an unpleasant pain is 
not bad merely because of the emotional response that it typically provokes. Having a 
negative emotion directed at your unpleasant pain is worse than only having an unpleasant 
pain, but this does not show that experiencing an unpleasant pain is bad only in virtue of 
the negative emotional response that pain elicits. That is to say, Boswell can account for 
some other reasons why we might take a painkiller. It can be because an unpleasant pain 
interferes with other activities, as imperativists propose, or it could also be because this 
prevents us from having other negative emotions. That said, this does not show that these 
are the only reasons why we take a painkiller, nor does it show that these are the main 
reasons. Showing that there are instrumental reasons to take a painkiller does not entail 
that there aren’t also non-instrumental reasons. Moreover, Boswell’s proposal does not 
show that a representational account can explain the non-instrumental badness of pain by 
appealing to the content that constitutes the unpleasant experience.  
Let us now have a look at Cutter and Tye’s strategy. First, this solution avoids the shared 
problem of the previous possible solutions. Cutter and Tye explain that we have a reason 
to take painkillers because we have an aversion to unpleasant pains. It is in virtue of this 
aversion that we can explain why we take a painkiller when we have an unpleasant pain. 
This aversion should not be merely explained as an instrumental reason, of course, if we 
want to avoid the type of problem that we have encountered previously. This aversion 
strategy escapes such a problem. This is because it is not the badness of the aversion itself 
that instrumentally explains the badness of the unpleasant pain. Instead, having such an 
aversion to an unpleasant pain experience explains that the unpleasant pain is bad. What 
do they mean by ‘aversion’ then?  
A good way of making sense of ‘aversion’ is to put it in terms of a general con-attitude. 
The aversion is a desire for the unpleasant pain not to occur. In other words, unpleasant 
pain’s non-instrumental badness can be explained by appealing to the desire to not have an 
unpleasant pain. This is not a form of instrumentalism because we are not explaining the 
badness of an unpleasant pain in terms of the badness of the desire. It is neither a desire to 
not have an unpleasant pain because in this way we will avoid something else that the 
unpleasant pain may cause. It is a desire directed at the unpleasant pain for its own sake. 
This aversion can be understood as a non-instrumental desire to not have an unpleasant 
pain. When we take a painkiller, the idea goes, this is not as a way of preventing having 
this desire; instead, this desire is constitutive of the badness of experiencing an unpleasant 
pain and it is in virtue of this desire that we can explain, for instance, our motivation to get 
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rid of an unpleasant pain experience. The desire is what accounts for an unpleasant pain 
being bad and we can render actions intelligible by appealing to this desire.  
Cutter and Tye’s view about what constitutes the unpleasantness of pain is a form of 
evaluativism, such as BAP. They maintain that the content of an unpleasant pain and 
particularly of its unpleasantness is evaluative. This is not crucial to their solution to the 
messenger-shooting problem, however. The important thing is that we account for the 
reasons to take a painkiller by appealing to a non-instrumental mental state distinct from 
the unpleasant pain. When it comes to experience-directed behaviour such as taking 
painkillers, one may argue that these actions are not explained in virtue of the unpleasant 
pain’s content, but in virtue of other mental states directed at the unpleasant pain 
experience. Notice that this is not an instrumental explanation: according to this solution 
to the messenger-shooting problem we do not take painkillers in order to avoid such 
desires, the fact that we have these desires is what is meant to account for our motivating 
and justifying reasons to take painkillers. These non-instrumental desires are meant to 
render our actions intelligible and, I take it, to also justify such actions. This, I think, is the 
best available solution that content theories have proposed by appealing to other mental 
states in order to deal with the messenger-shooting problem.  
There are, nonetheless, at least two problems with this solution. The first one is that this 
explanation can account for our motivation to take a painkiller, but it is not as clear how it 
should account for our justification to do so. That is, when we appeal to another mental 
state to account for why we take a painkiller, we are only making such action intelligible, 
we are offering a motivating reason, but this does not imply that we are justified to take 
painkillers, that we have a good reason to do so. If we accept that we have a good reason 
to take painkillers, content theories have not explained why this is. They have not 
explained this in terms of mental content and they have not explained this in terms of 
having a desire to not have an unpleasant pain. Having an aversion to an unpleasant pain 
does not entail that we have a good reason to take painkillers, that it is desirable. Aversion 
in itself does not imply justification. For example, we can have an aversion towards many 
things and the mere aversion does not imply that we have a good reason to act in relation 
to our aversion. In fact, we can have an aversion towards things that are good for us. For 
example, we might be averse to going to a chemotherapy session, but, all things 
considered, it might be good since it is the only way to save our lives once we have 
cancer. There are a few solutions that a content approach could implement in order to 
account for normative reason in terms of desire. I think that a straightforward answer is to 
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appeal to desire frustration. However, I will leave this to the next chapter, where I explain 
the theories that account for the unpleasantness of pain in terms of desire.  
The second issue with appealing to aversion as a way of dealing with the messenger-
shooting problem is that the theory is no longer capable of explaining that the badness of 
an unpleasant pain resides in its phenomenology. Moreover, we are not able to explain the 
badness of an unpleasant pain purely based on the notion of mental content. This is not 
particularly problematic in itself; one does not have to explain everything there is about 
the unpleasantness of pain in terms of content, unless one was trying to actually do so. 
One of the initial virtues of content theories was that we could explain the phenomenology 
of mental experience such as an unpleasant pain, and everything that rests on that, by 
appealing to the notion of content. However, it seems that we cannot do this when it 
comes to the badness of the unpleasantness of pain. Content theories seem to have to use 
the notion of desire in order to explain this feature. They have to give up the idea that the 
phenomenology of an unpleasant pain is bad in itself. In fact, there is a different way to 
account for the unpleasantness of pain that relies solely on the notion of desire.  
Finally, content theories have not addressed an important issue regarding unpleasant 
experiences, including unpleasant pains: the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. One 
key difficulty for content theories is dealing with the heterogeneity of unpleasant 
experience. Namely, there seems to be no unitary feeling that all and only unpleasant 
experiences share and in virtue of which they all qualify as unpleasant. In a nutshell, all 
unpleasant experiences feel unpleasant, but they all feel quite different. Content theories 
consider that one single type of content accounts for one single way of being unpleasant 
among all unpleasant experiences. However, there is a strong intuition that there are many 
ways of being unpleasant, which is something that content theories cannot capture as they 
have been so far proposed. This problem will become clearer in the upcoming chapters, 
and I will consider other accounts that have directly addressed this issue. In contrast, 
content theories treat unpleasantness as if there were a unitary unpleasant phenomenal 
character that all pains, and all unpleasant experiences, share.  
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1.5 Conclusion 
Even if content theories offer an initially plausible account for the nature of pain and 
unpleasantness, they also face several problems. Both representationalist and imperativist 
accounts face a major difficulty. Namely, neither can explain why we are justified to 
perform experience-directed actions such as taking painkillers in virtue of mental content 
that constitutes an unpleasant pain. The best available explanation for content theories to 
account for experience-directed actions is to appeal to a non-instrumental aversion. A 
good way of making sense of this aversion is to phrase it in terms of desires. However, 
other philosophers have precisely tried to account for pain’s unpleasantness by appealing 
to external mental states such as desires, and have built a theory of the unpleasantness of 
pain that has the notion of desire as the core feature of the account.  
In the next chapter I will explain what precisely these alternative theories say in order to 
account for pain’s unpleasantness in terms of desire. I will refer to these as the desire 
theories of the unpleasantness of pain. Desire theories have an important advantage over 
content theories: they account for the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. I will go 
into the details of this problem in the next chapter. In the upcoming chapter I will expose 
and analyse the desire account of the unpleasantness of pain. 
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CHAPTER 2: DESIRE THEORIES 
 
2.0 Introduction 
In this second chapter I will explain and discuss a different way of accounting for the 
unpleasantness of pain. This account relies crucially on desires in order to explain what 
constitutes the unpleasantness of pain and of other unpleasant experiences. The general 
idea is to explain that a sensory experience, such as a pain, is unpleasant in virtue of that 
sensation being desired not to occur (Armstrong, 1962; Brady, 2017; Pitcher, 1970). It is 
because we desire a pain sensation not to occur that it qualifies as unpleasant. In order to 
explain how the desire theories account for pain’s unpleasantness, and critique such 
approaches, I will proceed as follows. 
First, it is important to clarify what desire theories take desires to be, and so I will clarify 
this. Second, I will explain how these theories use the notion of desire to account for the 
unpleasantness of pain and of other unpleasant experiences. For this, I will focus on 
Heathwood’s (2006, 2007, 2011) proposal, which I take to be a well-developed and 
detailed version of desire theories. I will argue that desire theories have important benefits 
in contrast to the content theories from the previous chapter; desire theories are in a better 
position to explain the nature of pain’s unpleasantness in the face of the heterogeneity 
problem. That is, according to the heterogeneity problem, there is no single unitary 
unpleasant feeling common to all and only unpleasant experiences, yet content theories 
seem to take unpleasantness as a unitary feeling. Desire theories can accept the problem 
heterogeneity poses, and can explain that even if this is the case, all unpleasant 
experiences qualify as unpleasant not in virtue of a unitary feeling, but in virtue of the 
desires that constitute these unpleasant experiences.  
Third, once the desire theories’ proposal is clarified, I will focus on two problems for the 
theory. The first one is raised by Bramble (2013); he claims that we can have unpleasant 
unconscious experiences and that desire theories cannot accommodate this. Broadly, he 
argues that we can have unconscious unpleasant experiences but that we cannot have 
desires about these experiences. If this is correct, then we cannot account for the 
unpleasantness of these experiences based on the desire theories’ proposal. I will argue 
against Bramble and show that there are various ways in which desire theories can 
accommodate these cases.  
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The second problem, which I take to be a fundamental objection to desire theories, is often 
put as a Euthyphro dilemma: do we desire not to be in pain because pain is unpleasant, or 
is pain unpleasant because we desire not to be in pain? Desire theories have to take the 
second horn of the dilemma. I will argue that desire theories have an answer to the 
dilemma, but such an answer is still problematic. The second horn of the dilemma is, 
intuitively, implausible. Roughly, desire theories defenders fail to account for why we 
desire not to have pain sensations, if, according to their own theory, there is nothing bad 
about pain sensations in themselves. Desire theories can still provide an answer for this 
critique, by explaining that we have these desires as the result of a process of natural 
selection. However, the natural selection argument that desire theories can offer is also 
problematic. There are two main issues with this response. First, even if it offers an 
explanation for us having these desires, and a good instrumental reason to have these 
desires in order to survive, this explanation still cannot provide a non-instrumental reason 
for having such desire. Second, there is a much simpler and more intuitive answer: to take 
the other horn of the Euthyphro dilemma and so defend a theory that takes the 
unpleasantness of pain as a phenomenal property that is bad in itself. I will explain and 
analyse this alternative approach in Chapter Three. 
 
2.1 Pain’s unpleasantness in terms of desire  
2.1.1 Sid-desires 
Desires are a fundamental type of mental state.12 That is to say, a desire cannot be reduced 
to something more basic in terms of mental states. Desires are, in this way, one of the 
building blocks of the mental building, as it were. A good way of understanding what 
desires are is to contrast them with beliefs since these are another type of fundamental 
mental states. One important similarity between desires and beliefs is that they are both 
typically intentional. To put it simply: they are about something. You might believe that 
you have a red apple or a desire to have a red apple. Both mental states are similar insofar 
as they are about having a red apple, but there is a very important difference. The 
difference between these two types of mental states is often explained in terms of 
direction-of-fit.  
																																																								12 For more on the nature of desire see Schroeder (2017, 2004). 
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Let us take a look at this distinction in order to understand what desires are. The direction-
of-fit distinction is attributed to Anscombe (1957, §32). She asks us to imagine a man who 
goes to the supermarket with a shopping list that he follows to pick up the items he has on 
this list. In this scenario, there is also a detective who carefully writes down on another list 
everything the man picks up from the shelves. As Searle puts Anscombe’s point: 
[T]he function of the two lists will be quite different. In the case of the 
shopper’s list, the purpose of the list is, so to speak, to get the world to match 
the words; the man is supposed to make his action fit the list. In the case of the 
detective, the purpose of the list is to make the words match the world; the 
man is supposed to make the list fit the actions of the shopper… I propose to 
call this difference a difference in direction of fit. The detective’s list has the 
word-to-world direction of fit (as do statements, descriptions, assertions, and 
explanations); the shopper’s list has a world-to-word direction of fit (as do 
requests, commands, vows, promises). (Searle, 1979, pp. 3–4) 
The two lists are about the same items, but there is a very important difference regarding 
what these lists are meant to capture. Similarly, beliefs and desires have a very different 
nature: whereas beliefs are more like the detective’s list with a word-to-world direction of 
fit, desires on the other hand are more like the shopper’s list and have a world-to-word 
direction of fit. In other words, a desire is doing what it is supposed to do when it is 
satisfied, when the world is in such a way that it matches with the content of the desire. 
This is similar to the direction of fit that imperative content has, as we saw in the previous 
chapter. In contrast, beliefs and other representational states can be accurate, when their 
content matches with the world. Another way of making sense of this is in terms of what 
ought to change when there is a mismatch between the content of the mental state and the 
world. When there is a mismatch between the content of the desire and the world, it is the 
world that ought to change for the desire to be satisfied. In contrast, when there is a 
mismatch between the content of the belief and the world, it is the belief that ought to 
change in order to be accurate.  
A desire is a fundamental mental state that has the function of being satisfied. Now that it 
is clearer what a desire is, I can move on to explaining how a desire can be used to 
account for the unpleasantness of pain. Desire theories offer a reductive account of 
unpleasantness. Unpleasant experiences are so in virtue of being constituted by two more 
basic mental states: i) a hedonically neutral sensory experience, i.e., a sensation that is 
neither pleasant nor unpleasant, and ii) a particular kind of desire not to have this sensory 
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experience (Heathwood, 2007). An unpleasant pain, for instance, is composed of: i) an 
inherently hedonically neutral pain sensation (i.e. it might be unpleasant but it isn’t in 
itself) and ii) a desire to not have this pain sensation. Even if Heathwood’s theory and 
examples are mainly focused on the reduction of sensory pleasure to desire, Heathwood’s 
view is also meant to capture unpleasant experiences including the nature of unpleasant 
pains. Let us now explain in more detail the two components that constitute an unpleasant 
pain according to this view. 
Heathwood takes pain to be a sensory experience. However, he unfortunately does not 
explain what exactly a sensory experience is. That said, he does suggest that smell and 
taste experiences may count as sensory pleasures. But, for the moment, we only need to 
focus on pain. If pain counts as a sensory experience, I understand that this means that 
pain sensations have a certain phenomenology, that there is something it is like for 
someone to have a pain sensation; pain is a qualitative state in the sense that there is a pain 
quale, and when you have a pain sensation you are aware of it, at least typically and under 
normal circumstances. Further, it is crucial to underline that, according to Heathwood, 
sensory experiences are hedonically neutral, they are not pleasant or unpleasant in 
themselves — this is an important feature of the theory and I will show that it is also 
highly problematic. 
The second element of an unpleasant pain is the particular kind of desire that is directed at 
the pain sensation. The desire, according to Heathwood, must be i) simultaneous, ii) 
intrinsic, and iii) de re about the hedonically neutral pain sensation. I will refer to this as a 
sid-desire. It is because of such sid-desire for a pain sensation not to occur, that the 
unpleasant pain is unpleasant. The desire is about the pain sensation not to occur qua a 
qualitative phenomenal experience, that is, the desire is for a pain sensation quale not to 
occur. More precisely, it is a sid-desire about a state of affairs, that is, a state in which one 
is experiencing a pain sensation that is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. For example, think 
about a smell like the one produced by coffee. The idea is that this smell is in itself 
neutral, it is not pleasant or unpleasant. Similarly, when one experiences pain, there is a 
sensory component that is in itself neutral, but this neutral feeling is desired not to occur 
and it is in virtue of such desire that the whole experience is unpleasant. I will now explain 
each of the features of a sid-desire in order to make this clearer. 
The desire that constitutes an unpleasant pain has to be simultaneous with the pain 
sensation that the desire is about; both elements have to occur at the same time. Why is 
this time constraint important? This constraint helps to deal with various possible 
	 57	
counterexamples for desire theories. For example, suppose you have a desire in the 
morning to have the taste experience of a strong black coffee, but it is not until the 
afternoon when you finally get your strong black coffee experience, yet the taste 
experience is disgusting, it is very unpleasant. Should it not be pleasant since you wanted 
it? Not according to desire theories, because the relevant desire in virtue of which the 
coffee experience is pleasant or unpleasant has to be co-occurring. Instead, the desire that 
we are considering occurred many hours before. What is really happening in this scenario 
is that in the morning you wanted the taste, but then, when you actually had it, you didn’t 
want it. The constituting desire that explains that the taste is unpleasant is the one that is 
directed at the taste sensation at the same time that the sensation is taking place.  
Something very similar can be said for pain. In the morning you had the desire to go the 
gym, at that moment when you stepped out of bed you wanted to feel the burning pain of 
exercising through weightlifting. Then when you actually go to the gym in the afternoon 
and do weightlifting, the experience of burning pain felt in your biceps is unpleasant. 
Shouldn’t the pain be pleasant according to desire theories since you wanted it? Not really, 
because the relevant desire that constitutes unpleasantness must be simultaneous with the 
sensory experience. The desire that is going to account for experiences being pleasant or 
unpleasant must be simultaneous to the sensory experiences. To put it another way, only 
simultaneous desires are relevant in order to explain what makes the experience hedonic, 
i.e., the types of desire that account for sensory experience being pleasant or unpleasant 
are necessarily simultaneous to the neutral sensory experiences to which they are directed. 
This does not mean that all simultaneous desires are relevant in accounting for an 
experience being hedonic, but it does mean that the desires that are constitutive of a 
hedonic experience must be simultaneous to the sensory experience. In this example, 
desire theories explain that even if you wanted to experience that burning pain sensation in 
the morning, the concurrent desire in the afternoon is actually for that pain sensation not 
to occur. 
The desire must also be intrinsic. A typical way of understanding intrinsic desire is to put 
it in terms of desiring something ‘for its own sake’, as opposed to desiring that something 
for something else, that is, to have an extrinsic desire. For example, suppose that your 
mother is very sick and you desire that she gets better. You have a desire about your 
mother’s health improving. If you desire this for its own sake, its means that you desire 
her health to improve tout court, you do not desire this for the sake of something else that 
you desire. In contrast, if you desire her health to improve in virtue of something else, 
whatever that might be, then your desire about your mother’s health would not be 
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intrinsic. If you desire it because in this way she will be able to come to your wedding, 
because in this way she will be able to go on vacation, or anything else, then your desire 
about her health is extrinsic. However, I think we need to be more detailed about what it 
means to desire something ‘for its own sake’. I propose that when X is desired intrinsically 
this means the following: 
S desires X intrinsically if and only if S desires X without having this desire in 
virtue of a relation that S represents X having with some Y that S also desires. 
In contrast, desiring X extrinsically means that: 
S desires X extrinsically if and only if S desires X in virtue of a relation that S 
represents X as having with some Y that S also desires.  
This, I think, gives a finer grained explanation of what we mean by desiring something for 
its own sake. That is, when you desire your mother’s health to improve intrinsically, this 
means that you do have this desire without representing the content of your desire as 
having any type of relation with something else. In this case, you desire your mother to get 
better without representing her getting better as being connected with something else. In 
contrast, when you desire that same thing extrinsically, this means that you desire your 
mother’s health to improve in terms of a relation that you take to exist between her health 
improving and something else that you desire. This improvement, for instance, can be 
seen and linked to her ability to go to your wedding: you think that if she gets better she 
can come to your wedding. According to desire theories, the type of desire that constitutes 
the pleasantness or unpleasantness of experiences must be intrinsic. For example, when 
we account for the unpleasantness of pain and one desires a pain sensation not to occur, 
this is in virtue of the pain sensation in itself and not in virtue of any relation that the pain 
sensation is taken to have with something else. 
Given that the desire has to be intrinsic, this implies that the relevant desire is also non-
instrumental. Instrumentality is a type of relation, and desiring something instrumentally 
means that we desire that something in virtue of the represented causal relation between 
what we desire and something else. Broadly, X is instrumental if there is some Y such that 
X causally brings about Y.  An instrumental desire for X is a desire for X in virtue of X 
being represented as having a causal relation with some desired Y. For example, if you 
want to stop being thirsty and you represent water as a means to stop being thirsty, your 
desire for water is an instrumental one. You desire water on the basis that you believe, i.e., 
that you represent, that water has the causal power to make you stop being thirsty, which 
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is something that you also want. Intrinsic desires cannot be instrumental because they are 
not held on the basis of a represented relation and instrumental desires are held in virtue of 
a represented relation, a causal relation to be more precise. This means that the desire that 
constitutes unpleasantness has to be intrinsic, and hence, it cannot be an instrumental 
desire.  
Let us illustrate this last idea. Suppose that you desire to experience a pain sensation as a 
means for forgiveness. You want me, for example, to punch you in the face, and thus 
cause you pain, as you think that this will renew our friendship since you did something 
bad to me (you lied to me about something important, you stole something valuable from 
me, etc.). I agree and I punch you in the face and cause you pain. As you experience the 
pain, you also desire to have that pain since by feeling this pain you hope to be forgiven. 
Shouldn’t the experience be pleasant since you wanted it simultaneously? Desire theories 
can explain that even if you did want the pain simultaneously, the desire was not intrinsic; 
it was an instrumental desire. What really happened is that you had a simultaneous 
extrinsic desire for the pain to occur, you had an instrumental desire for the pain to occur; 
however, you also had a simultaneous intrinsic desire for that pain not to occur, your 
desire for such pain not to occur was not held in virtue of any relation that you thought the 
pain had with something else, including possible causal relations. This is meant to show 
that the kind of desire that constitutes the unpleasantness of the experiences is not only 
simultaneous, but also intrinsic. Being simultaneous and intrinsic are necessary features of 
the desire in virtue of which we account for the experiences being hedonic.  
The third and last feature that desires must have in order to constitute unpleasantness is 
that they have to be de re. A good way of understanding what this means is to refer to the 
distinction between types and tokens. Whereas to desire X de dicto means to desire it 
understood as a type, desiring X de re is to desire it as a token. Let me illustrate this. Take 
the sentence “I desire a red apple”. This can be understood de dicto, which means that the 
desire would be satisfied by any object that follows under the type being a red apple; the 
desire is about a type of object, not about an object in particular. Now, if we understood 
the sentence de re, this means that the desire can only be satisfied by a specific red apple, 
the desire would only be satisfied by one specific token of the type being a red apple.13 
The relevant desire that is supposed to constitute unpleasantness has to be de re, because 																																																								13 This is not the only way of understanding what de re means. Another way of understanding de re is in 
terms of an indexical and de dicto as not being indexical. I will not go into details about the various ways of 
understanding the distinction de dicto vs. de re since I do not think it makes an important difference for 
understanding desire theories’ proposal.  
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one may desire some sensory experience de dicto to occur, and yet the whole experience 
be unpleasant, or, vice versa, desire the sensory experience not to occur de dicto, yet the 
whole experience be pleasant.  
For example, suppose that you desire to have the experience of flagellation. In this 
scenario you desire this experience intrinsically, which implies this is not in virtue of any 
represented relation between the experience of flagellation and something else —
including instrumental relations such as the flagellation causing something else. I insist 
that this desire to experience flagellation is not seen as a means for something else, such 
as redemption of your sins; you just want the experience for its own sake. Then, as you 
have the experience of flagellation, you continue to desire it to occur. This might be 
psychologically odd, but I do not see why it would be impossible to have such a desire. 
Once you finally have the experience, it is unpleasant. Shouldn’t it be pleasant since you 
intrinsically and simultaneously desire it to occur? According to desire theories, what is 
really happening is that even if you do desire the experience de dicto to occur, you also 
desire it de re not to occur. In other words, even if you do desire this flagellation pain to 
occur as a type, you also desire it not to occur as a token. With all this in mind, we can 
give a precise formulation of what desire theories propose. 
Desire theories proposal 
An unpleasant pain experience is unpleasant if and only if it is 
constituted of two components: i) a pain sensation that is inherently 
hedonically neutral, and ii) a simultaneous, intrinsic, de re desire of 
that pain sensation that it not to be occurring.  
All in all, according to desire theories, an unpleasant pain experience qualifies as such in 
virtue of it being constituted by these two elements. These are necessary and sufficient for 
having an unpleasant pain. What it means to have an unpleasant pain experience is to have 
a sensory pain that is, in itself, neither pleasant nor unpleasant, and to have a sid-desire 
that is about that specific pain sensation. It is important to point out that it is the 
compound experience that has the property of being unpleasant and not its individual 
constituents. The pain sensation is not unpleasant in itself and neither is the sid-desire. 
Instead, an unpleasant pain is constituted by such a sensation and a sid-desire. Now that 
we have a clear grasp of the proposal, we can turn to analysing its virtues and vices. I will 
start with the former. 
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2.1.2 The heterogeneity problem  
Let us explain one of the main advantages of desire theories over content theories. If we 
are trying to find the best possible account for the unpleasantness of pain and other 
experiences, a strong reason to opt for desire theories is that they can provide an answer to 
the heterogeneity problem. The general idea is that, on the one hand, all unpleasant 
experiences feel unpleasant; however, on the other hand, there seems to be no unitary 
feeling that all and only unpleasant experiences share. This idea also applies to pleasant 
experiences and, in fact, most of the literature on the heterogeneity of experience is about 
pleasant experiences. The idea is similar, that is, there is no qualitative aspect that all and 
only pleasant experiences share and by dint of which they are pleasant. Feldman (2004) 
provides a good example of this intuition: 
Reflection on sensory pleasures quickly reveals an enormous 
phenomenological heterogeneity. Perhaps this can be expressed more simply: 
sensory pleasures are all “feelings”, but they do not “feel alike”. Consider the 
warm, dry, slightly drowsy feeling of pleasure that you get while sunbathing 
on a quiet beach. By way of contrast, consider the cool, wet, invigorating 
feeling of pleasure that you get when drinking some cold, refreshing beer on a 
hot day…[T]hey do not feel at all alike. After many years of careful research 
on this question, I have come to the conclusion that they have just about 
nothing in common phenomenologically. (Feldman, 2004, p. 79) 
Feldman’s intuition is, I take it, that even if we agree that the warm and cool feelings in 
each of the situations are pleasant, there seems to be no unitary feeling in virtue of which 
both qualify as pleasant. This intuition is also held for unpleasant experiences. If you think 
of many of the unpleasant experiences that you might have, such as feeling pain, feeling 
dizzy, experiencing itching, hunger, thirst, etc., there is nothing phenomenal, no conscious 
unitary feeling, in virtue of which all and only these experiences can be grouped as all 
belonging to the same type of experience. Korsgaard (1996) writes along these lines: 
If the painfulness of pain rested in the character of the sensations…our belief 
that physical pain has something in common with grief, rage and 
disappointment would be inexplicable. For that matter, what physical pains 
have in common with each other would be inexplicable, for the sensations are 
of many different kinds. What do nausea, migraine, menstrual cramps, 
pinpricks and pinches have in common that makes us call them all pains? 
(Korsgaard, 1996, p. 148) 
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It is worth noting that Korsgaard is using the word ‘pain’ here in a very loose sense. That 
is, nausea is not a pain as a headache is, most would agree. Many would agree too, I take 
it, that feeling nausea is unpleasant, but it is not a pain as the feelings of being cut or burn 
are. Furthermore, pinpricks and pinches are stimuli that cause pain, but they are not pains 
themselves. The word that she should be using here is, I think, “unpleasant”. That is, all 
these unpleasant experiences are extremely diverse and they do not seem to have one 
single phenomenal aspect that unifies them all and by dint of which they all qualify as 
unpleasant. What this suggests is that being unpleasant is not a shared qualitative feature 
among all and only unpleasant experiences; being unpleasant, this suggests, cannot be 
explained in virtue of a shared unitary feeling that all and only unpleasant experiences 
share. There is nothing that feels alike among all and only unpleasant experiences. 
The heterogeneity problem 
We have a very strong intuition that i) all and only unpleasant experiences feel 
unpleasant; it is in virtue of feeling unpleasant that they qualify as such. 
However, after careful introspection, there is also the strong intuition that ii) 
there is nothing qualitative, nothing phenomenal, no unitary feeling, that all 
and only unpleasant experiences share and in virtue of which they all count as 
unpleasant.  
So how do desire theories confront the heterogeneity problem? I think that the simplest 
and most elegant way for desire theories to confront it is to say that unpleasantness is not 
qualitative, it is not something phenomenal: unpleasantness is not a feeling. That is, there 
is no single unitary feeling that all and only unpleasant experiences have, because 
unpleasantness is not a feeling. Instead, desire theories can explain that what unifies all 
unpleasant experiences, or at least all unpleasant sensory experiences, is that they are 
partially constituted by a sid-desire. What really unifies all and only unpleasant sensory 
experiences is that they are constituted by the same type of desire, and it is in virtue of this 
that they all have the property of being unpleasant. More precisely, what unifies all and 
only unpleasant sensory experiences is that they are partially constituted by a sid-desire 
for a hedonically neutral sensory experience not to occur. This is not a denial that there is 
something phenomenal about unpleasant sensory experiences, including unpleasant pains, 
since these unpleasant experiences are partially constituted by sensory experiences. 
However, it is a denial that being unpleasant is phenomenal in any way. 
So, how can we explain that many unpleasant experiences are felt in different ways, if 
unpleasantness is not a feeling? Let us focus on the case of unpleasant pains to make this 
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simpler to clarify: how can different unpleasant pains feel different and still count as 
unpleasant if unpleasantness is not a feeling? Desire theories’ answer for this must be to 
account for the phenomenological difference by appealing to the differences in how 
different sensory pains feel. Take for example the difference between the feeling of being 
cut or burnt. An unpleasant cut feeling and an unpleasant burn feeling are different 
experiences insofar as they are constituted by distinct sensory components. These diverse 
sensory aspects, desire theories should explain, are what account for their different 
phenomenology. The fact that these two experiences are also partially constituted by a sid-
desire not to have a pain sensation is what accounts for them being unpleasant. However, 
the proposal goes, unpleasantness strictly speaking is not something felt. Feelings might 
be unpleasant, but unpleasantness is not a feeling. The downside of this view is that we 
have to sacrifice the strong intuition that unpleasantness is indeed something felt, that 
unpleasantness is a feeling. The upside of the account is that we can explain in a 
straightforward way what unifies all and only unpleasant pains and unpleasant sensory 
experiences.  
There are several other aspects of unpleasantness that can be illuminated with this 
understanding of desire theories. Let us start with motivation. If we consider that a mental 
state is motivational if we can render behaviour intelligible in virtue of such a mental 
state, then we could explain how unpleasant pains are motivational. For this, we will rely 
importantly on the fact that unpleasant pains are constituted by a desire, that is, when we 
are in unpleasant pain this implies that we have a sid-desire because we desire a pain 
sensation not to occur while the sensation is occurring. For example, some body directed 
behaviour could be explained in virtue of our sid-desires. That is to say, given that we 
desire not to have a pain sensation, we might act in order to satisfy this sid-desire by 
withdrawing from a source of bodily damage, such as moving away from a burning object. 
By acting in this way, we do something in order to stop having the pain sensation caused 
by being burned. Our action is aimed at satisfying the content of our sid-desire for that 
pain sensation not to be occurring. This action is made intelligible in virtue of that sid-
desire. We can thus explain what makes unpleasant pains motivational.  
Let us now consider unpleasant pain’s normative force, that is, the fact that having an 
unpleasant pain also justifies certain actions; that unpleasant pains provide justification for 
action, a good reason to act. In order to explain this, it is important to accept that having 
frustrated desires is bad in itself and satisfying our desires is good in itself all else being 
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equal.14 That is, you may desire to jump off a high cliff, and it may be a terrible idea to act 
in order to satisfy this desire all things considered, given the bad consequences of this 
action. However, everything else being equal, it would be good to satisfy even this desire, 
since desires are mental states that are ultimately meant to be satisfied. Desire satisfaction 
is good in itself because, all else being equal, it is better to have satisfied desires than 
frustrated ones. Desire frustration is bad in itself, because all else being equal it is worse to 
have a frustrated desire. If we accept this, we can then show how desire theories can 
explain why unpleasant pains also provide us with good reasons to act. That is, given that 
it is bad in itself to have frustrated desires, and that unpleasant pains are constituted by 
frustrated sid-desires, then it is bad in itself to have unpleasant pains. We are, therefore, 
justified to act in order to not have frustrated sid-desires. The bare fact of having an 
unpleasant pain implies having a frustrated desire, and this in itself provides us with a 
good reason to act in order to stop having a frustrated desire.  
This understanding of desire theories is, I think, quite straightforward, and, even if it goes 
against the strong intuition that unpleasantness is something felt, this approach offers a 
simple answer to the heterogeneity problem. That is, we do accept that various unpleasant 
experiences feel very differently, yet they are all unpleasant. How can we explain this? 
Desire theories’ answer is simple. Unpleasantness is not a feeling. It is important for 
desire theories to claim that unpleasantness is not a feeling, because otherwise they would 
not have given an answer the heterogeneity problem. If desire theories took 
unpleasantness to be a unitary feeling that is explained in terms of sid-desires, then this 
feeling does not seem to present in all and only unpleasant experiences. Desire theories 
have to give up a very strong intuition that unpleasantness is something felt, but they can 
nicely deal with the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. Moreover, even if desire 
theories do not appeal to any unpleasant feeling, they can still accommodate the 
motivational force and normativity of unpleasant pains. However, even if this is a 
promising theory of the unpleasantness of pain, I will now show that it is also problematic. 
																																																								14 This is the strategy that Cutter and Tye (2014) may use when they introduce the notion of aversion in 
order to explain the badness of an unpleasant pain. They could claim that the frustration of such desire 
provides a normative reason. However, in contrast to their approach, desire theories account for both the 
unpleasantness of pain and also for the badness of pain in terms of desire. In this sense, desire theories are a 
more elegant theory than Cutter and Tye’s, since they do not rely on mental content in order to explain 
unpleasantness. 
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2.2 Problems for desire theories 
2.2.1 Unconscious unpleasant experiences 
Bramble (2013) raises a problem with desire theories. The argument is that i) we can have 
unconscious unpleasant experiences, yet ii) we cannot have desires about unconscious 
experiences and, therefore, iii) what accounts for the unpleasantness of these unpleasant 
unconscious experiences cannot be a desire. If this is correct, then desire theories are 
mistaken. Desire theories are supposed to give an explanation of unpleasant experiences, 
yet they cannot explain why unconscious experiences are unpleasant. I first describe a 
case that Bramble uses to illustrate an unpleasant unconscious experience, and explain 
why, according to him, desire theories cannot account for the unpleasantness of this 
experience. I think that there is a clear strategy to deal with Bramble’s critique: to show 
that we can have desires about unconscious unpleasant experiences. That is, even if it is 
true that unconscious experiences can be unpleasant, we can have desires about these 
experiences and, therefore, desire theories can offer an explanation for these cases too.  
Haybron (2008) offers an example of an unpleasant unconscious auditory sensory 
experience. Given that desire theories are mostly focused on sensory experiences, this 
seems like a good possible counterexample. Bramble uses Haybron’s case as an example 
of an unconscious unpleasant experience, i.e., an unpleasant experience that we might be 
unaware of. The example is the following: 
Perhaps you have lived with a refrigerator that often whined due to a bad 
bearing. If so, you might have found that, with time, you entirely ceased to 
notice the racket. But occasionally, when the compressor stopped, you did 
notice the sudden, glorious silence… In short, you’d been having an 
unpleasant experience without knowing it. (Haybron, 2008, p. 222) 
According to Bramble, this example shows that desire theories are wrong. “This is 
because one can hardly have the relevant kind of attitude (be it disliking, not wanting, 
disvaluing, or whatever) toward an experience that one is entirely unaware of.” (Bramble, 
2013, p. 204) If we are entirely unaware of an experience, I take this to be an unconscious 
experience. If we are unaware of the auditory experience produced by the refrigerator, yet 
that experience is unpleasant, and according to Bramble we cannot have an attitude such 
as a desire about that auditory experience because we are unaware of the experience, as in, 
it is an unconscious experience, then what accounts for this experience being unpleasant 
cannot be a desire. Desire theories are supposed to capture the unpleasantness of 
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experiences, especially of sensory experiences like an auditory one, yet desire theories are 
unable to explain what makes this unconscious auditory experience unpleasant. Since we 
cannot have the relevant kind of attitude towards this auditory experience, i.e., a desire, 
then it cannot be that a desire constitutes its unpleasantness. 
Even if we accept that we can have unpleasant unconscious experiences, I think that 
Bramble’s argument is not convincing. I do not see why we couldn’t have desires about 
such unpleasant experiences.15 These desires, in fact, could be had both at the conscious 
and unconscious level, i.e., we might be aware of having these desires or not. What does 
Bramble mean by having an experience that we are not aware of? He could say that one is 
unaware of an experience, i.e., that an experience is unconscious, when one has such 
experience without noticing it, without directing any particular attention towards the 
experience. However, one could make the experience conscious, if one directed one’s 
attention to it. What does it mean to bring one’s attention to an experience? I think that 
Bramble could argue that one way to account for this is in terms of having a meta-mental 
state, i.e., a mental state about another mental state. That is to say, the moment that we 
have another mental state about the sensory experience, this means that the sensory 
experience becomes conscious. If this is correct, then Bramble could argue that we cannot 
have desires about unconscious sensory experiences, since the very moment that we have 
the meta-mental state then the experiences stops being unconscious.  
For example, when you are driving a car, you might see and hear many things while 
thinking about something else —you are driving back home after receiving really bad 
news, say, and most of your attention is directed at the recent news. After reflection, you 
cannot remember what you saw or heard while driving, you were not aware of these visual 
and auditory experiences even if you had them. Similarly, you might try to stop smoking, 
eating junk food, or drinking alcohol, but if there is something to smoke, eat, or drink in 
front of you, you might find yourself smoking, eating, or drinking without noticing it. You 
started smoking, eating, or drinking without being aware of it. I think this sense of being 
unaware of an experience is plausible for Haybron’s fridge scenario, in fact. Bramble 
could argue that, in this sense, one might have an unpleasant auditory experience without 
being aware of it, because one has the experience without directing one’s attention to it. 
But then, at the very the moment that you direct your attention to the experience, you 
become aware of the experience. 																																																								15 Heathwood (forthcoming) has recently offered a similar answer. He argues that the type of example that 
Bramble has in mind involves a weak sense of being unaware of a sensation, and, in this weak sense, we can 
have desires about experiences we are unaware of. 
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This does seem plausible and it is line with a common understanding of consciousness.16 
Bramble could say something similar about sensory experiences and desire. The moment 
you have a desire directed at another mental state, such as a sensory experience, the 
sensory experience becomes conscious and, therefore, we cannot have desires about 
unconscious unpleasant sensory experiences. Once you have another mental state about 
your smoking, eating, or drinking experience, then you become aware of such previously 
unconscious smoking, eating, or drinking experiences. Similarly, the moment you desire 
not to be having these smoking, eating, or drinking experiences, you become aware of the 
fact that you are having such sensory experiences, and these smoking, eating, or drinking 
experiences become conscious. This would show that Bramble is right, that is, we cannot 
account for the unpleasantness of unconscious sensory experiences by appealing to the 
desire theories’ approach.  
However, I don’t think that Bramble can use this strategy. The reason is that having 
desires about sensory mental states does not guarantee that the latter are conscious. In 
other words, we can indeed have desires about unconscious sensory experiences. There 
are various ways in which this might be possible. First, it could be that both the desire and 
the sensory experience are unconscious. If Bramble accepts the existence of unconscious 
sensory experiences, it should not be strange to accept that there are unconscious desires. 
If this is correct, then the whole process of having a sensory experience and desiring for 
the sensory experience not to be occurring could be unconscious. When you are driving 
while having unconscious sensory experiences, you could also have unconscious desires 
about them. When you are having unconscious smoking, eating, or drinking experiences 
you could also be unconsciously desiring not to be having these experiences. When you 
have an unpleasant and unconscious auditory experience produced by the refrigerator, 
desire theories could explain that this counts as unpleasant in virtue of your unconscious 
sid-desire for this experience not to be occurring. I do not see why this solution isn’t 
available for desire theories. We can have unconscious desires about unconscious sensory 
experiences, without being aware of any of these mental states.  
What I believe that Bramble is trying to point out is that a desire cannot come into 
existence, into being, that we cannot form or produce a desire, if it is about something we 
are completely unaware of. He might think something similar about beliefs: how could a 
belief come into being if it is about something that we are not aware of as existing at all? 																																																								16 See for example the higher-order-theories of the mind. In this approach, broadly speaking, a mental state 
is conscious only when one is aware of such a mental state; one might only be aware if one has a mental 
state M1 if there is another mental state M2 directed at M1 (Rosenthal, 1986). 
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This might seem paradoxical because forming a belief about X seems to imply that we are 
somehow aware of X. I think it might be rare to form beliefs about something that we are 
not aware of, but it is neither impossible nor paradoxical. Why couldn’t beliefs or desires 
come into being if they are about things that we are not aware of? We could, I think, 
produce beliefs or desires about things we are not aware of if the whole process takes 
place unconsciously, as the previous examples are meant to show. That is, the whole 
process of belief or desire production can occur unconsciously. If this is right, then 
Bramble has to accept that we can have desires about unconscious sensory experiences.  
Let me motivate the idea of forming and holding desires unconsciously. If we bear in 
mind that desires can be dispositional, i.e., that we still have certain desires, such as 
standing-desires, even if we are asleep or in a coma, this means that our desires can be 
satisfied while we are unconscious. For example, if you have the desire to win the lottery 
and you actually win it while you are sleeping, your desire is being satisfied as you sleep. 
That is, if we can hold a desire unconsciously, without being aware that we have such 
desire, this suggests that various processes concerning desire can take place 
unconsciously. If this is the case, then desires could also be unconsciously produced. 
Going back to Haybron’s case, there might be two possible scenarios. First, you have a 
conscious auditory experience together with a conscious desire and, at some point, you 
become unaware of having both of them: you now hold an unconscious desire about an 
unconscious experience. Second, you are aware of the auditory experience, then you 
become unaware of this experience and, unconsciously, you produce a desire for that 
auditory experience not to occur: you unconsciously form a desire about an unconscious 
experience. I see no reason why these could not be available explanations for desire 
theories. There is nothing about the notion of desire production that requires that the 
process occurs consciously and even if there was, we could still have unconscious desires 
about unconscious sensory experiences. Desire theories can account for Haybron’s case.  
If this is not enough to convince you of desire theories’ capacity to deal with unconscious 
unpleasant experiences, there is one last possibility: one could have conscious desires 
about unconscious sensory experiences. You are aware of having a desire but you cannot 
access what it is about. I believe something similar can happen with other mental states. 
For instance, the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon could be explained similarly. When you 
know the name of someone, or some place, but you find yourself incapable of accessing 
that name, you know that you know, but you can’t access what you know, i.e., you cannot 
manage to become aware of the content of your own belief even if you try to direct your 
attention at it. If we accept this understanding of tip-of-the-tongue beliefs, I think we 
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could also say something similar for tip-of-the-tongue desires. That is, we are aware of 
having a desire, but without knowing what it is that we desire, what our desire is about. 
You have a certain feeling of frustration, you know there is something missing, but you 
don’t know what it is, that is, you have a tip-of-the-tongue desire. You might know that 
there is something that you want, but without knowing what it is. This again is meant to 
show that we can have desires about unconscious mental states.  
How would a tip-of-the-tongue desire apply to Haybron’s example? You hear a sound, 
you have an auditory experience, and you also have a sid-desire for that sound experience 
not to occur. You then focus your attention on other things: cooking, eating, talking with 
your family, thinking about things you have to do, etc. As a consequence of these other 
activities, you stop being aware of the auditory experience. All this time you still have the 
desire for the auditory experience not to be occurring. At some point, you know there’s 
something annoying happening, you know that you want something but don’t know what 
it is that you want. Then, suddenly, when the refrigerator’s compressor stops, you realise 
what was annoying you. Once the auditory experience stops you realise that that is what 
you wanted, you wanted that glorious silence: your frustrated desire was the desire for the 
auditory experience not to be occurring.  
In conclusion, Bramble’s argument against desire theories is not sound. Even if we accept 
that we can have unconscious unpleasant experiences, i.e., that we can have an unpleasant 
experience without being aware of it, I think that desire theories can account for this. This 
is because, contrary to what Bramble argues, we can have desires about unconscious 
sensory experience in many different ways. We can have desires about unconscious 
sensory experience, consciously or unconsciously. 
 
2.2.2 The Euthyphro Dilemma  
The second problem for desire theories takes the form of a version of the Euthyphro 
dilemma: is pain unpleasant because we desire not to have it, or do we desire not to have 
pain because it is unpleasant? Broadly, whereas desire theories endorse the former horn of 
the dilemma, the latter seems to be much more intuitive yet unavailable for desire theories. 
This is why this is a dilemma for desire theories; that is, there are two options, but one is 
problematic and the other unavailable. It is more intuitive that we desire not to have a pain 
in virtue of pain being unpleasant, than thinking that pain qualifies as unpleasant merely in 
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virtue of our desire for the pain not to occur. Desire theories can offer an initial solution to 
the dilemma. I will show, however, that this first solution will turn out to be problematic. 
Do we desire pleasant sensations because they are pleasant, or are pleasant 
sensations pleasant because we desire them? The reductor of sensory pleasure 
to desire responds, “Yes and Yes.” Yes, we desire pleasant sensations because 
they are pleasant (in other words, we desire them in advance because we know 
we will be desiring them when we get them). And Yes, pleasant sensation [sic] 
qualify as pleasant in virtue of the fact that they are intrinsically desired. 
(Heathwood, 2007, p. 39) 
Heathwood acknowledges the problem for his account and offers a solution to the 
dilemma. His solution to the Euthyphro dilemma is meant to apply to pleasant sensory 
experiences, but his ‘Yes and Yes’ solution can easily be adapted for unpleasant pain. 
That is to say, yes, we desire not to have pain in advance because we know that we will 
desire not to have it when we get it, and yes, pain qualifies as unpleasant in virtue of the 
sid-desires that we get when we have the pain sensation. In order to understand 
Heathwood’s answer, we first need to point out that he takes sensory experiences to be the 
bearers of the property of being pleasant and, similarly, in his view it is the pain sensation 
that is unpleasant. This is different from what I take to be the desire theories’ proposal. 
The way I understand desire theories’ view will in fact be more helpful to deal with the 
Euthyphro dilemma. There is an important similarity and difference between the desire 
theories’ view and Heathwood’s. The similarity is that in both views we explain the 
unpleasantness of pain in virtue of sid-desires, i.e., simultaneous, intrinsic, and de re 
desires for the hedonically neutral pain sensation for it not to be occurring. 
However, the difference is that whereas Heathwood takes the pain sensation to be the 
bearer of the property of being unpleasant, I think that it is better to take the compound, 
constituted by the sid-desire and the pain sensation, as the bearer of the property of being 
unpleasant. This is what I take to be desire theories’ proposal. This nuance is borrowed 
from Brady (2017). He proposes that it is better to understand the whole compound as the 
bearer of unpleasantness, instead of the pain being the bearer of the property. I will 
explain the benefits of this view after discussing how it is problematic to understand that 
the pain sensation is the bearer of the property of being unpleasant à la Heathwood.  
Let us make sense of Heathwood’s response to the Euthyphro dilemma. Heathwood 
argues that, yes, we desire not to have an unpleasant pain sensation in virtue of its 
unpleasantness. Heathwood is providing a reason for having a desire not to have 
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unpleasant pain experiences. More precisely, the reason why we desire not to have an 
unpleasant pain is because they are unpleasant. This is a justification for the desire to not 
have an unpleasant pain. The pain being unpleasant is a normative reason to desire not to 
have such pain. It is desirable to have such desire about an unpleasant pain because of the 
unpleasantness of the pain. That is, Heathwood is showing that we have a good reason to 
desire not to have unpleasant pains, in the same way as the first horn of the dilemma 
points out, i.e., we desire not to have unpleasant pains because they are unpleasant. 
However, it is not this desire - the desire regarding the unpleasant pain - that the 
Euthyphro dilemma is aimed at. 
I think that we can better understand Heathwood’s answer to the Euthyphro dilemma in 
terms of two different desires: a desire D1 in virtue of which the unpleasant pain sensation 
is unpleasant, and a desire D2 that is directed at that same pain sensation because the 
sensation is unpleasant. Heathwood can provide a justification of our D2 desires; we can 
explain why it is desirable to have these D2 desires. We have a good reason to have a D2 
desire because this desire will stop us from having an unpleasant pain. It is bad to have an 
unpleasant pain, we can explain, because it implies having a frustrated D1 desire. Since 
desire frustration is bad in itself, this provides a good reason to have a D2 desire. Desire 
frustration is intrinsically bad, since the nature and function of desire is to be satisfied. Put 
in another way, all else being equal, we are always better off with a desire being satisfied 
rather than unsatisfied, and always worse off with a desire being unsatisfied rather than 
satisfied. If we accept this, then we are justified in D2 desiring not to have an unpleasant 
pain sensation, because in this way we won’t have a frustrated D1 desire.  
However, Heathwood still has a problem. He has not provided any account for the D1 
desire regarding the hedonically neutral pain sensation. That is, when we ask through the 
dilemma if the pain sensation is unpleasant in virtue of our desire not to have it, we are 
still missing an account for this D1 desire that is meant to account for the unpleasantness 
of the experience. In short, Heathwood has not explained why one would take the second 
horn of the dilemma. He says that, yes, unpleasant sensations qualify as unpleasant in 
virtue of the fact that they are intrinsically desired not to occur, but we have not given yet 
any normative or motivating reason not to desire a pain sensation that is not unpleasant in 
itself. Heathwood has not provided a reason for the D1 desire. That is to say, so far there 
seems to be no reason why someone would desire not to have a hedonically neutral pain 
sensation.  
	 72	
The Euthyphro dilemma remains problematic. We can rephrase it more precisely: do we 
have a D2 desire not to have a pain sensation because the sensation is unpleasant in itself, 
or is the pain sensation unpleasant in virtue of us having a D1 desire for the sensation not 
to be occurring? The first horn of the dilemma seems quite sensible; there is a good 
reason, a justification, for having this D2 desire. Heathwood could explain that this D2 
desire is justified by appealing to the avoidance of D1 desire frustration. Heathwood wants 
to answer “yes” to both horns of the dilemma, but he has not really been able to say “yes” 
to both of them. He would say that, indeed, a pain sensation is unpleasant in virtue of a D1 
desire for the sensation not to be occurring, but there is no reason that accounts for one 
having a D1 desire. Why would you have D1 desires about completely hedonically neutral 
pain sensations? As an analogy, if an experience such as seeing something red is not 
unpleasant in itself, there seems to be no particular reason for wanting an experience of 
seeing something red not to be occurring. Heathwood’s “Yes and Yes” answer is 
unsatisfactory because, yes, he can account for prospective D2 anti-unpleasant pain 
desires, but, no, he cannot account for the simultaneous D1 anti-hedonically neutral pain 
desires. He has not explained the grounds upon which one would have a D1 desire about 
something that has nothing experientially bad for oneself. 
There is another strategy available to try to deal with the Euthyphro dilemma. I think this 
one is successful, as it does not consist in giving an answer to the dilemma but in showing 
that the dilemma does not apply to desire theories. That is, the strategy is to argue that it is 
not the pain sensation that bears the property of being unpleasant, but rather the whole 
compound of the hedonically neutral pain sensation plus the sid-desire about that pain 
sensation (Brady, 2017). This solution offers an explanation of what constitutes an 
unpleasant pain, without claiming that something that was not unpleasant in itself 
becomes unpleasant in virtue of standing in relation to our desires. What I explained as the 
desire theories’ proposal is precisely this. It is a version that accounts for the 
unpleasantness of pain in terms of sid-desires, as Heathwood proposes, but from a 
perspective by which we understand the property of being unpleasant as Brady does. That 
is, we have a D1 sid-desire directed at a hedonically neutral pain sensation, and this desire 
together with the pain sensation bear the property of being an unpleasant pain. 
Additionally, we also have a D2 desire directed at the compound. In this version there is 
no dilemma. If we accept this constitutive explanation, there is simply no dilemma to be 
raised. 
Nevertheless, there is still an unsolved problem. Desire theories’ proposal has still not 
been able to account for the D1 desire that constitutes an unpleasant pain. That is, even if 
	 73	
there is no dilemma for desire theories, the dilemma allows us to notice that there is a 
weakness in the theory. We can offer a sensible justification for D2 desires directed at the 
unpleasant pain experience, but the D1 desire remains unexplained in the theory. 
Unpleasantness seems to have a very tight connection with normativity and justification, 
yet don’t we have any reason at all for having the sid-desire that constitutes an unpleasant 
pain? If we accept this version of desire theories, à la Brady, we can justify the 
proscriptive D2 desire to not have an unpleasant pain in terms of avoiding D1 desire 
frustration, since an unpleasant pain is still constituted by a frustrated D1 sid-desire. 
However Brady’s solution has the same problem as Heathwood’s when it comes to 
accounting for the simultaneous D1 sid-desire that constitutes an unpleasant pain. That is, 
there is no clear reason for having desires about the hedonically neutral pain sensation. 
 
2.2.3 The evolutionary explanation  
Desire theories can try to offer a solution for this. This solution is independent if we take 
desire theories as Brady or as Heathwood understand the unpleasantness of pain, that is, 
regardless of whether we think that what is unpleasant is the pain sensation or the 
compound of the sensation plus a desire. However, given that Brady’s explanation avoids 
the Euthyphro dilemma, I take his as preferable, as I previously explained. The solution is, 
in any case, to offer an instrumental normative reason why we have sid-desires for a pain 
sensation not to be occurring, even if such pain sensations are not unpleasant in 
themselves. However, it is crucial to notice that this solution does not provide a motivating 
reason or a non-instrumental normative reason why an individual would have such sid-
desire. This is a teleological and evolutionary explanation, to be more precise. That is, 
according to this solution, our sid-desires have a purpose and such purpose is to help us to 
stay healthy and alive, i.e., these sid-desires are evolutionarily advantageous for us to 
have. I will refer to this as the evolutionary explanation.  
The evolutionary explanation  
It is useful for creatures like us to sid-desire not to have hedonically neutral 
pain sensations, because in this way we avoid bodily damage and thus are 
more likely to survive and stay healthy.  
In an evolutionary story of our development, we can argue that what explains why we 
have sid-desires for pain sensations not to be occurring is that our ancestors were more 
likely to survive by having such desires and they passed this on to us. We are hardwired in 
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such a way that we have sid-desires not to have hedonically neutral pain sensations. Given 
that these pain sensations are often the result of or linked to bodily damage, by sid-
desiring not to have these hedonically neutral sensations we are better off, because having 
these sid-desires helps us to avoid and stop bodily damage. Hall (1989) has a similar idea. 
He thinks that there is nothing intrinsically bad or awful about pain experiences, but 
creatures like us have developed to inherently dislike them; “evolution has done its work 
very well and almost every living creature in the animal kingdom finds the sensations 
accompanying almost every kind of nociception unpleasant. So goes the evolutionary 
story.” (Hall, 1989, p. 648) However, even if the evolutionary explanation provides a 
sensible explanation of why we have this kind of desire, it is not proving what I think we 
really need: an explanation of why an individual would form a sid-desire about a 
hedonically neutral pain sensation. We still lack a complete understanding of why we have 
such sid-desires, an understanding of the motivating reasons and the non-instrumental 
reasons that a sentient being has behind such sid-desires.  
For example, when we ask someone “why do you want to marry me?” there could be 
many explanations for this desire. We could provide motivating reasons for desiring to 
marry someone, reasons that render having such desire intelligible. Our desire to marry 
someone could be explained by our belief that this person is intelligent, sexy, reliable, etc., 
i.e., by our belief that this person is somehow good. The belief about that person being 
good is a motivating reason to have the desire to marry him or her; having this belief 
explains why we have the desire to marry that person. Moreover, we could provide 
normative reasons to desire to marry someone, a good reason to have the desire to want to 
marry such a person. There might be good instrumental reasons for having the desire to 
marry someone. If by marrying this person we will be happier, believing that this person is 
good is a good instrumental reason for us to have the desire to marry that person. By 
having this desire we will be motivated to marry the person, and thus we will be happier. 
This last type of explanation is the one that the evolutionary explanation provides. 
However, the evolutionary explanation does not provide other kinds of reasons that we 
would also expect pain to provide for our desires about pain: motivating reasons and non-
instrumental normative reasons.  
According to the evolutionary explanation, having sid-desires not to have hedonically 
neutral pain sensations is part of a process of natural selection. There might be a good 
reason to have these desires, i.e., having these desires helped us evolve to survive. It is 
desirable to have these sid-desires in order to guarantee our survival. However, even if the 
evolutionary explanation provides an instrumental justification of why we might have sid-
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desires not to have hedonically neutral pain sensations, I think that this accounting for sid-
desires is lacking something: i) we have not yet explained the motivating reason for which 
we have these sid-desires, and ii) we have not given a non-instrumental reason for having 
these sid-desires. We, as individuals, do not have these sid-desires because we think in 
this way our species will survive, nor because of the way pain sensations feel. At the end, 
pain sensations in this view are not unpleasant or experientially bad for the individuals. 
Moreover, there is a strong intuition that desires concerning pain are non-instrumentally 
justified and motivated, pain is a motivating reason and a good non-instrumental reason 
for desiring not to have pain. However, the evolutionary explanation behind sid-desires 
only offers an instrumental justification of such desires. It is good to have these sid-desires 
in order to survive.  
Let us try to make this clearer. Something similar could be said about other sensory 
experiences, e.g., we could explain why it is evolutionarily advantageous for us to be good 
at perceiving red objects. However, even if we can give an evolutionary explanation of 
why creatures that were good at perceiving red objects were more likely to survive, this 
does not mean that we have provided a motivating reason for these creatures to look at red 
objects, or a non-instrumental justification of it. Even if it is good for us to have 
perceptual systems to detect red objects with less difficulty than objects of other colours, 
this is not a motivating reason for us to look at red objects nor does it mean that we have a 
good non-instrumental reason to do so. When we offer an evolutionary explanation in 
these cases, we offer an explanation of the phenomenon, and we can even provide an 
explanation of why it is desirable for us to have evolved in such a way. However, we have 
not yet given an explanation of why individuals act in the way they do, i.e., we have not 
provided a motivating reason or a non-instrumental reason for individuals’ behaviour. 
Similarly, when we explain that it is good for an individual to sid-desire her own pain 
sensation not to be occurring, we have not explained the motivating reason or the non-
instrumental reason for this sid-desire. We can explain why a volcano explodes, why 
glucose is needed for certain biological processes, why our visual system evolved for 
being particularly good at perceiving red objects, and why, according to the evolutionary 
explanation, having certain sid-desires is advantageous for our survival. However, this 
does not mean that there is a motivating reason or a non-instrumental justification for the 
volcano to explode, for glucose being needed for certain biological processes, for being 
good at perceiving red objects, or for having sid-desires not to have hedonically neutral 
pain sensations. Desire theories are unable to rationalise the constitutive sid-desires of an 
unpleasant pain in terms of motivating reasons and in terms of non-instrumental reasons. 
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This is problematic when we consider that there is a strong intuition that this is precisely 
the type of reason that pain offers in relation to desire.  
Furthermore, the teleological evolutionary explanation for our sid-desires can be 
problematic in multiple other ways. First, it is not clear that we really need sid-desires 
about pain sensation for survival, or that it is the best possible explanation of how we 
prevent bodily damage. For instance, anti-damage desires might also play an important 
role in our survival and might even be more efficacious for protecting our bodies under 
certain circumstances. If we accept the evolutionary explanation as correct it is because, I 
take it, it is a good explanation of how we survived. Being a good explanation of our 
survival would make such an explanation at least more appealing, despite its inability to 
offer a rationalisation for the motivating reason or for the non-instrumental justification of 
our sid-desires for a pain sensation not to occur. 
However, there are other competing explanations of what we needed to survive. For 
example, anti-damage desires might have also played an important role. That is, we could 
explain that we are equipped with desires to avoid damage and that these desires might be 
even more effective than sid-desires directed at pain sensations, since anti-damage desires 
address the main issue directly. That is, it is probably more efficacious for avoiding bodily 
injury to desire not to have bodily injury than desiring not to have a hedonically neutral 
pain sensation that is highly associated with bodily injury. I won’t go into the detail of 
this, but I do want to point out that even if desire theories can provide an explanation for 
why we have sid-desires for pain sensations not to be occurring by appealing to an 
evolutionary tale, the evolutionary explanation is not the only possible account of how 
desires might have played a role in our survival, which diminishes, I think, the appeal of 
the evolutionary tale. 
Second, desire theories’ view of unpleasantness might be too demanding in terms of what 
is actually needed in order to account for how we protect our bodies. This is because one 
might argue that the actions to protect our bodies via our pain sensations require beliefs 
about the connection between the damage and the pain sensations, together with more 
beliefs about how to deal with such bodily damage in order to stop the pain sensation. 
This kind of cognitive requirement may appear as too demanding for the kind of creatures 
that we might want to ascribe unpleasant pains to, together with self-preserving bodily 
behaviour. These might include, for example, very young infants and other mammals to 
which this kind of belief is not often attributed. That is to say, desire theories’ explanation 
requires a sophisticated apparatus of knowledge of the connection between pain sensation 
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and bodily damage, yet it seems unlikely that many animals that do have unpleasant pains 
and act in order to protect their bodies guided by such experiences, have such type of 
knowledge. If this is correct, desire theories are not actually offering a good explanation of 
how sid-desire played an evolutionary role. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
Regardless of the difficulties just mentioned, there is a more straightforward reason to 
reject desire theories. The other horn of the Euthyphro dilemma is still available. Even if 
the dilemma cannot be applied to desire theories if we take the unpleasantness to be a 
property of the whole compound experience, the dilemma gives us the possibility to 
account in a simple way for the relation between unpleasant pains and desires. We can 
forget about the sid-desire that constitutes the unpleasantness of pain since we can explain 
such unpleasantness in different terms. We can simply take the first horn that the 
Euthyphro dilemma offered. Why do we desire unpleasant pains not to be occurring? 
Because unpleasant pains feel unpleasant and feeling unpleasant is bad in itself. Pain feels 
unpleasant and this is why we desire not to have it. The fact that unpleasant pains feel bad 
gives us a motivating reason and a non-instrumental justification to desire these pain 
experiences not to occur. Moreover, this is also consistent with the evolutionary 
explanation. It is good for us to desire not to have unpleasant pains, because this is also a 
good way to avoid bodily damage. In the upcoming chapter I will consider theories that 
take unpleasantness to be a phenomenal property, without thinking that such 
phenomenology consists in some form of mental content, as content theories proposed in 
Chapter One. In the next chapter I will start by analysing the distinctive feeling view of 
unpleasantness. According to this view, the unpleasantness of pain is a phenomenal 
property that all unpleasant pains have. In the next chapter I will explain and examine this 
proposal. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DISTICTIVE FEELING THEORY 
 
3.0 Introduction  
In this third chapter I will explain, analyse, and critique the distinctive feeling theory. In 
this account there is something it is like to undergo an unpleasant experience, 
unpleasantness is a single qualitative property that all and only unpleasant experiences 
have and by dint of which these experiences qualify as unpleasant. This view is meant to 
explain how such a phenomenal property, the property of being unpleasant, qualifies 
certain mental states. According to this view, unpleasant experiences are unpleasant in 
virtue of having such a phenomenal property. This chapter is devoted to trying to 
understand what this phenomenal property is, and if we can really account for the 
unpleasantness of pain and other unpleasant experiences based on this view. I will show 
that we cannot.  
There is an important difference between the distinctive feeling theory and the content 
theories from Chapter One that should be pointed out. In order to explain this difference, 
we should acknowledge first a similarity: both types of theories take unpleasantness to be 
a feeling. However, the difference is that only content theories try to account for this 
feeling. Content theories account for felt unpleasantness by appealing to the mental 
content that is meant to constitute such unpleasantness. In contrast, the distinctive feeling 
theory focuses on describing how to understand this phenomenal property, and how it 
qualifies certain sensory experiences, rather than trying to offer a reductive account of 
what constitutes such phenomenal property. 
I will start by describing the distinctive feeling theory. Once the theory is established, I 
will explain the first problem within this account. The problem is primarily concerned 
with how the distinctive unpleasant feeling can be a motivating and normative reason for 
action. One offered solution is to appeal to normative beliefs about such distinctive 
unpleasant feeling. However, I will show that this solution is problematic. I argue that in 
order to account for unpleasantness being motivational and normative, we should 
understand this property as bad in itself.   
Even if the distinctive feeling theory can account for motivation and normativity of 
unpleasantness, I will show that, ultimately, it is unable to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the unpleasantness of pain and of unpleasantness in general. The main issue 
for this theory is the heterogeneity problem. The distinctive feeling theory establishes that 
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all unpleasant experiences count as unpleasant in virtue of a shared phenomenal property 
that all and only unpleasant experiences have. All unpleasant experiences share the same 
ingredient, as it were, which is a unitary feeling of unpleasantness. However, according to 
the heterogeneity problem, there is no single qualitative aspect, no single unitary 
phenomenal property, no single ‘ingredient’, by dint of which all and only unpleasant 
experiences qualify as unpleasant. If the heterogeneity problem is correct, as I will show, 
the distinctive feeling theory is wrong. 
Finally, I will consider a possible argument in order to save the distinctive feeling theory 
from the heterogeneity problem. This solution is based on the idea that if we can make 
comparisons among unpleasant experiences, this must entail that all unpleasant 
experiences that are compared share the same unpleasant phenomenal property. I will 
show that this last attempt is unsuccessful in saving the distinctive feeling theory.  
 
3.1 The distinctive feeling theory 
Bramble (2013) defends the idea that pleasant and unpleasant sensory experiences are 
respectively pleasant and unpleasant in virtue of a distinctive feeling. A distinctive feeling 
is a distinctive quality, a phenomenal aspect in virtue of which a sensory experience 
qualifies as pleasant or unpleasant. More precisely, I think that a clear way to understand 
what Bramble has in mind is to say that an unpleasant distinctive feeling is a phenomenal 
property of mental states such as sensory experiences. I think we can understand this 
feeling being distinctive in two main ways: i) in terms of a unitary feeling, i.e., it is the 
same feeling in virtue of which all and only sensory experiences that are unpleasant 
qualify as such, and ii) in the sense that it is available to introspection, that is, the 
distinctive feeling is something that is part of our conscious experience and we can direct 
our attention to it, at least under normal circumstances. If unpleasantness is a distinctive 
feeling, it means that it is a unitary, single, and introspectable aspect of sensory 
experiences. For instance, unpleasant auditory, taste, touch, or pain experiences are all 
unpleasant because they instantiate the phenomenal property of being unpleasant, i.e., 
because they share a common unpleasant feeling. 
Bramble thinks that sensory experiences can exist without being hedonic, i.e., without 
being pleasant or unpleasant. He accepts the possibility of pain existing as a hedonically 
neutral sensory experience, in the same way that one might accept that an auditory 
experience of hearing a musical note, or a gustatory experience of tasting a flavour, does 
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not have to be pleasant or unpleasant. I think that a good way of making sense of these 
cases is that one can have mental states that instantiate the property being a sensory pain, 
i.e., these experiences feel like a pain, but this pain-like experience does not have to have 
the phenomenal property of being unpleasant. Note that the property of being unpleasant 
is a property of being a pain, but not vice versa. In other words, the two properties are not 
qualifying the mental state at the same level. The property of being unpleasant is 
dependent on the property of being a sensory pain, but not the other way around. I think 
that it is better for Bramble to understand the property dependence in this way because 
this can accommodate how we can have solely sensory experiences without them being 
unpleasant; however, it is much less obvious that we can have mental experiences that are 
merely unpleasant, but not sensory or phenomenal in another way. I think that a clearer 
way of putting this idea is that being unpleasant is a meta-phenomenal property, i.e., it 
qualifies other phenomenal properties such as the property of being a sensory pain 
experience, a touch experience, an auditory experience, etc. I consider this to be a sensible 
way to understand the distinctive feeling theory. 
However, one of the problems for the theory is to explain how exactly the distinctive 
unpleasant feeling can explain the motivational and normative force of hedonic 
experiences. That is, when we have an unpleasant pain, it seems that it is because of its 
unpleasantness that we can render an action intelligible, i.e., that unpleasant pains are 
motivational. It is by appealing to this distinctive feeling, one would think, that we could 
explain actions in relation to an unpleasant pain. Moreover, unpleasant pains also give us 
good or bad reasons to act because they are unpleasant, that is, unpleasant pains are also 
normative: it is desirable to act in virtue of the unpleasantness of pain. However, it is not 
clear how the unpleasant feeling that Bramble proposes is supposed to capture this aspect 
of unpleasantness. Let me try to be clearer on why it is not obvious that the unpleasant 
distinctive feeling explains the motivational and normative force of an unpleasant pain.  
There are other distinctive phenomenal aspects of experience that are neither motivational 
nor normative. If we consider other distinctive experiences that might also count as 
phenomenal, it is hard to explain why these other distinctive phenomenal experiences are 
not motivational or normative in themselves, yet the distinctive unpleasant feeling is. 
Think, for example, about the distinctive visual experience of seeing something red. This 
experience qualifies as a visual experience of seeing red because it instantiates a 
phenomenal property, the experience has a distinctive red-feeling-ness, i.e., the 
phenomenal quality common to visual experiences of red objects undergone by normal 
subjects in normal view conditions. Red-feeling-ness is the phenomenal quality associated 
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with certain visual experiences, in a similar way that we could talk of unpleasantness 
when we refer to pain experiences. Red-feeling-ness is not a property instantiated by an 
object such as an apple. Being red, or redness, is a property of an apple. Red-feeling-ness 
is the property of a mental state, i.e., the property of a visual experience. Having an 
experience of something being red is, I think, quite distinctive in the sense that we can 
introspect that we are having a visual experience of something being red. That is to say, 
there is something it is like for us when we undergo a visual experience of seeing 
something red, there seems to be a unifying commonality among all and only the 
experiences of seeing something red, and this common phenomenology is available to 
introspection, at least under normal circumstances.  
The red-feeling experiences and the unpleasant-feeling experiences seem to be distinctive. 
There is something it is like to undergo experiences with these properties, and we can 
identify if we are having a red-feeling or an unpleasant-feeling experience under normal 
circumstances. However, and this is what is problematic for the distinctive feeling theory, 
an experience of seeing something red does not seem be a motivating reason or a 
normative reason in itself — not even a reason that might be overridden by other stronger 
reasons. The distinctive feeling theory should explain the motivation and justification 
resulting from experiences being unpleasant, i.e., of experiences instantiating a 
phenomenal property of unpleasantness. However, it is not clear how instantiating a 
phenomenal property in itself is motivational or normative. For example, visual 
experiences instantiating phenomenal properties are not in themselves motivational or 
normative.  
How is it that the distinctive experience of seeing something red is not a motivating or 
normative reason for action, but that a distinctive unpleasant experience is both 
motivational and normative? Let me rephrase this, how is it that having a distinctive red-
feeling experience in itself does not render actions intelligible, but a distinctive 
unpleasant-feeling experience does? If this is not obvious, it is even less evident when it 
comes to normativity: how can we explain that a distinctive red-feeling experience does 
not give us in itself a good reason to act, but that a distinctive unpleasant-feeling 
experience does? If they are both mental states instantiating phenomenal properties, why 
does only one of them have these further characteristics? Sobel (2005), for example, raises 
this doubt for pleasant experiences.	 ‘‘Given the historical significance of versions of 
hedonism that claim a phenomenological commonality between pleasures, it is 
surprisingly obscure what can be said by way of vindicating the reason-giving status of 
such states.’’ (Sobel, 2005, p. 445)That is, if pleasant experiences provide reasons for 
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action in virtue of being phenomenal, it is not obvious how being phenomenal accounts 
for these experiences providing reason for action. Alston (1967) has a similar worry: 
What we are suggesting to be necessarily true is (P) the fact that one gets 
pleasure out of x is a reason for doing or seeking x…The conscious-quality 
theory can throw no light on this necessity... Why should it be necessarily true 
that a certain unanalyzable quality of experience is something to be sought? 
(Alston, 1967, p. 346, my emphasis) 
Bramble offers a response to this: “in the normal case of attraction to pleasure and 
aversion to pain, our attraction and aversion is the product of normative beliefs… our 
attraction to pleasure, and aversion to pain, is the result of our regarding our pleasures as 
good and our pains as bad.” (Bramble, 2013, p. 215, my emphasis) There is, I think, a 
clarification needed of Bramble’s answer. When Bramble talks about aversion ‘to pain’, I 
think that he is referring to aversion to our unpleasant pain, since he accepts that pain can 
be, at least in principle, hedonically neutral. Even more precisely, the aversion is towards 
the unpleasantness of the pain. But leaving these clarifications aside, I think that 
Bramble’s central idea is the following: we can explain the motivational aspect, and even 
the normative force associated with unpleasant experiences, by appealing to normative 
beliefs about these unpleasant experiences.  
Bramble thinks that the difference between a distinctive unpleasant-feeling experience and 
a distinctive red-feeling experience is that we normally have normative beliefs about the 
former and not about the latter. It is in virtue of this normative belief that we should be 
able to account for the motivation and normativity of unpleasant pains then. Note, 
however, that it is not the unpleasant experience in itself that is motivational or normative, 
it is rather the fact that we have a belief about it that accounts for motivation. It is because 
the unpleasant-feeling experience is believed to be bad that we can account for motivation 
in relation to this experience, Bramble argues. This proposal is problematic in various 
ways. Let us start with the motivational aspect. According to Bramble, having an 
unpleasant pain is motivational insofar as we have a normative belief about the 
unpleasantness of the experience being bad. That is, Bramble could argue that we can 
render actions intelligible by appealing to such belief. It is not strictly speaking the 
unpleasantness of pain that is motivational; rather the normative belief about the 
unpleasantness of pain is the motivating reason to take action. 
This solution is problematic, however. First, we could argue that evaluative beliefs like 
this one - beliefs of something as being bad - are in themselves motivationally inert. That 
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is to say, these kinds of beliefs by themselves are not enough to render actions intelligible, 
they need other mental states such as desires in order to account for actions. For example, 
your belief alone about smoking being bad for your health is not enough to count as a 
motivating reason, i.e., this belief alone cannot render an action intelligible, one might 
think. When you are trying to stop smoking, someone offers you a cigarette and you say 
‘no’, we cannot explain this action merely in virtue of your belief about smoking being 
bad, we would also need to attribute to you a desire to stop smoking in order to really be 
able to account for your behaviour. This would show, against Bramble, that the mere 
normative belief that he uses to account for action is not sufficient to be a motivating 
reason. 
Bramble could argue that the normative belief is in itself a motivating reason, but that 
there are other stronger competing motivations, which explains why we might not act in 
accordance to our normative beliefs, even if we have them. However, the mere normative 
belief might not even be a motivating reason that could be overridden by other stronger 
motivating reasons. In contrast, a desire to stop smoking may constitute a motivating 
reason that could be overridden, i.e., all else being equal and in the lack of other 
competing and stronger motivations, such a desire would motivate you to stop smoking. 
This is because desires are typically motivating states, i.e., they have world-to-mind 
direction of fit, as we saw in Chapter Two. This desire counts as motivational, because we 
could explain certain behaviour by appealing to such desire as a motivating reason for 
action in the lack of competing motivations. In contrast, evaluative beliefs do not seem to 
constitute in themselves motivating reasons for actions, not even as motivations that might 
be overridden. One could argue that, even if you did not have other competing 
motivations, the belief that smoking is bad does not constitute in itself a motivating reason 
to act.  
Beyond this, there is one more problem for Bramble if we try to account for motivating 
reasons in terms of normative beliefs: his proposal looks overly intellectual. If we need to 
have evaluative beliefs in order to explain the motivation associated with unpleasant 
pains, this may become too demanding in order to apply it to many cases. For instance, if 
we think that other animals and young children have unpleasant pains and are somehow 
motivated by these, we must explain that this is so because of their evaluative beliefs 
about unpleasant pains being bad. This looks too demanding, that is, dogs and babies 
don’t obviously have evaluative beliefs about their unpleasant experiences - especially if 
we think that evaluative beliefs require the ability of having concepts - yet they are 
motivated by these experiences. If this is correct, it cannot be that unpleasant pains are 
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motivational only via evaluative beliefs, as Brambles proposes. Bramble tries to solve this 
worry by suggesting that other animals, and probably very young infants, are capable of 
having some sort of very basic ‘insight’. This insight should explain how they could 
represent their unpleasant pains as being bad; a dog and a baby might not have evaluative 
beliefs, probably because they lack conceptual abilities, but they have evaluative insights 
about the unpleasant experience being bad. However, I think that this is still problematic. I 
think that once Bramble introduces the notion of evaluative belief in order to account for 
actions related to unpleasant pains, he inherits similar problems to the ones that content 
theories and desire theories have.  
Let me start with the problems in relation to content theories. I think the clearest way to 
explain this difficulty is in relation to normative reasons. That is, not only do we think that 
unpleasant pains motivate action, but also that they justify action: the unpleasantness of 
unpleasant pains is a good reason to take painkillers. Even if Bramble only explicitly 
appeals to normative beliefs in order to account for the motivation associated with the 
unpleasantness of pain, one would expect that same evaluative belief should serve to 
account for the normativity associated with unpleasantness. The evaluative belief that 
Bramble appeals to in order to account for the motivation associated with unpleasant pain 
should also illuminate, I think, the normativity associated with unpleasant pains. This is 
because a theory of the unpleasantness of pain should explain how the unpleasantness of 
pain is both motivational and normative, yet Bramble has not given an explanation for 
unpleasantness being normative. 
Having an evaluative belief of an unpleasant pain being bad should not only give us a 
motivating reason for action, but also a good reason. However, an evaluative belief that 
something is bad does not entail a good reason to act, not even as a reason that might be 
overridden by other stronger ones. In the case of the evaluative version of content theories 
- the account of representational content defended by Bain (BAP) - a bodily disturbance 
was represented as being bad for oneself. However, this evaluative content does not seem 
to constitute a normative reason in itself, as I argued in Chapter One. According to 
Bramble, it is an unpleasant pain that is believed to be bad. Even if what is believed to be 
bad is different in each of these theories, in both cases the representation of something as 
being bad does not account for the normativity associated with unpleasant pains.  
Let me illustrate this. The fact that you represent eating vegetables as being bad for you 
does not entail in itself that you have a good reason not to eat your vegetables. It is not 
desirable not to eat vegetables solely on the basis of believing that eating vegetables is 
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bad. An evaluative representation about something being good or bad does not entail 
justification in itself, i.e., just believing that something is good or bad does not entail in 
itself a good or bad reason to act in accordance to the belief. One simple way of 
understanding why evaluative representations are not normative reasons in themselves is 
that these representations might be false. Bramble’s appeal to evaluative belief has 
precisely this problem. This is because the nature of representations is that the content of 
the representational states can be inaccurate. In other words, representing something as 
being bad does not entail that there is something that is really bad, thus representing 
something as bad does not entail having a good reason to act in relation to that evaluative 
representation. The distinctive feeling theory cannot explain why unpleasant pains are 
normative by merely appealing to the normative belief of unpleasant pains being bad. The 
distinctive feeling theory claims that our aversion to an unpleasant pain is explained in 
terms of an evaluative belief, but a mere evaluative belief is not necessarily a normative 
reason that can explain action in relation to an unpleasant pain. 
Moreover, the distinctive feeling theory may also lead to a Euthyphro dilemma, similar to 
the one that desire theories had to face. That is: do we represent the distinctive unpleasant-
feeling experience as bad because it is bad in itself, or is the distinctive unpleasant-feeling 
experience bad because we represent it to be bad? The distinctive feeling theory view 
seems to be taking the second horn of this dilemma. However, this is a dilemma. The first 
horn is much more intuitive, yet unavailable for distinctive feeling theory, if we want to 
account for the badness of the distinctive unpleasant feeling by appealing to the evaluative 
judgement about such feeling. The second horn is problematic since it leads an issue of 
justification. There seems to be no justifying reason, no good reason, to judge that the 
unpleasant distinctive feeling is bad, if there is nothing bad about it. I think that the best 
solution for the distinctive feeling theory is to take the first horn of the dilemma, and not 
to explain the badness of an unpleasant pain by appealing to evaluative beliefs.  
This was precisely the appeal of this kind of theory in contrast to the desire theories 
discussed in the previous chapter. If unpleasantness is a feeling that explains and 
rationalises other mental states and actions, it is because the feeling is bad in itself. Being 
bad is an intrinsic property of the unpleasantness of pain. It is in virtue of this felt 
unpleasantness, that is bad in itself, that pain motivates and justifies actions. In fact, the 
idea that unpleasantness is bad in itself is widely accepted. Most content theories take 
unpleasantness to entail non-instrumental badness, even if they fail to explain why this is 
so, purely in terms of mental content. Desire theories also take unpleasantness to be 
intrinsically bad, and they explain this by appealing to desire frustration; although they 
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have to drop the strong intuition that unpleasantness is something felt in order to deal with 
the heterogeneity problem. I think that the solution for the distinctive feeling theory to be 
able to account for the normativity associated with the unpleasantness of pain is to 
establish that there are some phenomenal properties that are also normative. 
Unpleasantness is an example of this.  
I think that the best strategy for a theory that claims that unpleasantness is a phenomenal 
property is to establish that such phenomenal property is bad in itself. In other words, to 
claim that the difference between unpleasantness and other phenomenal properties is that 
unpleasant experiences feel bad. Following Smuts, “to ‘feel good’ is about as close to an 
experiential primitive as we can get… Phenomenology is likely our best tool… one cannot 
help but make recourse to metaphors. Here are a few: we might say that the pleasurable 
experience glows, we feel a warm feeling; the good feeling hums.” (Smuts, 2011, p. 11, 
my emphasis). Bramble does not need to account for unpleasant pains being linked to 
motivation and normativity by appealing to normative beliefs, I think. Unpleasantness is 
an intrinsically motivational and normative phenomenal property because it entails 
badness. This is the starting point. We might not have given an explanation of why this is 
so, but there might not be an explanation for this. However, even if we grant that a 
distinctive unpleasant-feeling experience is bad in itself, and therefore it is a motivating 
and normative reason, there is still one crucial remaining issue. A theory such as 
Bramble’s cannot account for the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences.  
 
3.2 Heterogeneity problem for the distinctive feeling theory 
The heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences is a fundamental problem for the distinctive 
feeling theory. According to the heterogeneity problem, even if all unpleasant experiences 
feel unpleasant, there is no single unitary phenomenal property, no unitary feeling, in 
virtue of which all and only unpleasant experiences qualify as unpleasant. The distinctive 
feeling theory consists in claiming the opposite, that all and only unpleasant experiences 
qualify as unpleasant because they all share the same and only unitary distinctive feeling. 
According to the heterogeneity problem, if we make a list of all of the experiences that are 
unpleasant and we introspect them, we will not be able to find one single distinctive 
feeling that all and only these experiences have that could explain what makes all these 
experiences unpleasant. In other words: of course all and only unpleasant experiences 
share one property, they all are unpleasant! But the key intuition of the heterogeneity 
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problem is that all these unpleasant experiences are not unpleasant because they all share 
the same and only unitary phenomenal property of unpleasantness. 
Bramble denies one of the intuitions behind the heterogeneity problem: even if it seems as 
if there is no unitary feeling in all and only unpleasant experiences, there is in fact such 
feeling. However, this feeling is not easy to notice because it is ‘permeating’ the sensory 
experiences. This permeation is meant to explain why, after simple introspection, it seems 
as if there was no distinctive phenomenal property that unifies all pleasant or unpleasant 
sensory experiences, respectively. In other words, the distinctive feeling is there, it is just 
that we cannot easily introspect it and become aware of it. In Bramble’s words: 
Consider what ‘the pleasant feeling’ would have to be like if the distinctive 
feeling theory is to be at all plausible. It would have to be the sort of feeling 
that can occupy an experience, and so make it count as pleasant, by 
permeating it. Consider, for example, pleasant experiences of listening to 
Bach, eating a juicy peach, solving a puzzle, sunbathing, etc. Clearly, if ‘the 
pleasant feeling’ exists, it does not make these sort [sic] of experiences 
pleasant by being ‘tacked on to them’, so to speak, in any crude fashion. 
Instead, it must be the sort of feeling that can come in extremely low 
intensities, and very finely discriminable locations within one’s experiential 
field, so that it can come scattered throughout one’s experiential field. If the 
distinctive feeling theory is correct, and I enjoy listening to Bach, while you 
do not, then the difference between our experiences of Bach has got to be that 
mine is permeated by ‘the pleasant feeling’, while yours is not. (Bramble, 
2013, p. 209–210) 
Bramble only focuses on the heterogeneity of pleasant sensory experiences, but the same 
can be said for unpleasant sensory experiences and, more specifically, for unpleasant 
pains. That is to say, according to Bramble all unpleasant pains share the same 
phenomenal property of feeling unpleasant, but we cannot identify this shared feeling 
because it permeates the pain experiences, as opposed to being roughly ‘tacked on’. If this 
were right, what does it mean for a distinctive feeling to permeate our experiences, instead 
of it merely being tacked on to them? I think the analogy with colour experience will be 
helpful to make sense of Bramble’s proposal. 
Let us suppose, as I have said before, that the distinctive unpleasant-feeling is analogous 
to the distinctive red-feeling that typical experiences of seeing something red have. 
According to the distinctive feeling theory, there is a shared distinctive unpleasantness 
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when we experience a cut, a burn, a headache, etc. Although, as Bramble says, the 
distinctive feeling of unpleasantness is hard to find after introspection, given the subtle 
permeation with which the unpleasantness modifies the pain experiences. Similarly, one 
recognises some similarity in the experiences of seeing a ladybird, of seeing a stop sign on 
a traffic light, and of seeing an apple. All of these experiences are phenomenologically 
similar because they have some shared red-feeling-ness. If this is a fair analogy, which I 
think it is, we can try to understand what it would mean for distinctive red-feeling-ness to 
be permeating our visual experiences, so we can make sense of the permeation of the 
distinctive unpleasantness that Bramble brings to the table. 
Suppose that you have the visual experience of a Magritte painting. How could red-
feeling-ness permeate this visual experience? I can think of two ways of making sense of 
the notion of permeation. First, in the way that water permeates a sponge by filling its 
cavities with water, if the Magritte painting were filled with tiny red dots, these tiny red 
dots would be dispersed and filling the cavities of the painting, as it were. These subtle red 
dots in the painting translate into red-feeling-ness permeating your experience of a 
Magritte painting. In the same way that the dots are ‘scattered throughout one’s 
experiential field’, red-feeling-ness is spread throughout your visual experience. The dots 
still allow you to identify what you see as a Magritte. Similarly, the permeating red-
feeling-ness still allows you to identify your visual experience as one of a Magritte 
painting. To get an idea of this, see figure 1 below. This is one possible way to try to make 
sense of how a distinctive feeling can permeate an experience.  
An alternative is to understand the permeation as a filter. It could be that one’s visual 
experience is permeated in the sense that it is being modified as if it had a filter. Imagine 
you go to the museum wearing red shaded glasses, your experience of a Magritte painting 
is then filtered with a red tonality, you still identify the painting as a Magritte but now it 
has a red permeation. Similarly, your visual experience of the painting has now some red-
feeling-ness permeating it. See figure 2 to get an idea of how this would be. Even if figure 
2 might not be exactly what happens when one wears coloured shades, the modification of 
the pixels of the image turned closer to the red spectrum is meant to exemplify how your 
visual experience of this image now has some red-feeling-ness, that it would not have had 
without modifying the colour of the image. This image modification results, the idea goes, 
in your visual experience having permeating red-feeling-ness. Sometimes the modification 
of the painting might be so subtle, so fine grained, that it would result in an almost 
unnoticeable red-feeling-ness at an experiential level.  
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Now, contrast these two possibilities as opposed to what being ‘tacked on’ would mean in 
terms of a phenomenal property of experience. If someone attached a big red stripe to the 
Magritte painting, the red stripe would be literally tacked on to the painting. This would 
not translate into your experience being permeated by red-feeling-ness, but rather into 
having red-feeling-ness being tacked onto it. To illustrate this, see figure 3 below. The 
unpleasant feeling is not ‘tacked on’ to the pain experience, Bramble says. The feeling can 
come “in extremely low intensities and very finely discriminable locations within one’s 
experiential field”. In other words, the fact that our unpleasant pain experiences are 
permeated with such distinctive unpleasantness does not imply that this unpleasant feeling 
will always be easily localisable or discernible. So, what Bramble proposes should be 
rather similar to figures 1 or 2 and not at all like figure 3. I think this gives us a better idea 
of what Bramble could mean when he says that a distinctive feeling permeates our pain 
experiences. 
 
However, I think Bramble’s appeal to permeation is unsatisfying when it comes to dealing 
with the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. In short: there is something quite odd 
about something being distinctive yet going unnoticed. As I said earlier, if something is 
distinctive, this can be understood as meaning that it is noticeable. That is precisely one of 
the initial appeals of the distinctive feeling theory. Namely, unpleasantness is a feeling 
and such feeling is available to introspection. The distinctive unpleasant-feeling should be 
at least noticeable after careful introspection, but it isn’t. Furthermore, careful 
introspection shows us that there is no shared unitary unpleasant feeling among all and 
only unpleasant experiences. Consider a headache, a stomach ache, the feeling of a burn, 
the pain produced by a cut. Do all of these have one single shared distinctive unitary 
unpleasant-feeling? Now consider the feeling of being nauseous, having a cramp, an itch, 
or numbness. Do all of these have one single shared distinctive unpleasant-feeling that is 
also shared with all unpleasant pains? It does not seem to be so. Bramble’s proposal about 
the distinctive feeling is problematic in various ways.  
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First, if by distinctive Bramble means easily noticeable, the distinctive feeling is not easily 
noticeable. Once Bramble introduces the notion of permeation, he admits that it is not very 
easy to introspect an unpleasant distinctive feeling. Bramble seems to argue that the 
distinctive feeling is almost unnoticeable, since it is permeating the experience, but how 
can something almost unnoticeable be distinctive? If this is not contradictory, it is at least 
very odd. Second, if by distinctive he merely means noticeable, it is not very obvious that 
we can notice a distinctive unpleasant feeling in a pain experience, in the way that we can 
notice red-feeling-ness in visual experiences. Whereas we seem to be able to introspect a 
phenomenal quality of red-feeling-ness in various visual experiences, this does not seem 
to apply so clearly to the unpleasant-feeling. Third, even if we accept that we can 
introspect an unpleasant-feeling in at least some unpleasant experiences, e.g., in various 
pains, there is no unitary distinctive feeling that is present in all and only the experiences 
that we introspect as being unpleasant. This last intuition is key for heterogeneity being a 
problem for the distinctive feeling theory.  
If the unpleasant distinctive feeling is a phenomenal property, it should be available to 
introspection, even if it is permeating the sensory experiences. This introspection should 
allow us to identify all unpleasant experiences as sharing the same unitary unpleasant 
feeling, a common phenomenology. The distinctive feeling theory proposes that there is 
one unitary phenomenal aspect in virtue of which all and only unpleasant experiences 
qualify as unpleasant. When we cannot find such feeling, Bramble argues that such feeling 
is hard to find because it is permeating the experience. However, even if it is hard to 
notice, it should at least be noticeable after careful introspection. Careful introspection 
does not show any unitary unpleasant phenomenal commonality among all and only 
unpleasant experiences. Bramble’s solution to the heterogeneity problem relies heavily on 
the rather metaphorical notion of permeation. However, even when we try to make sense 
of such a notion, as we do by comparing unpleasantness with red-feeling-ness, we cannot 
identify one unitary feeling that all and only unpleasant experiences have. The 
heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences shows that the distinctive feeling theory is wrong.  
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3.2.1 A possible solution for the distinctive feeling theory? 
I think that there might be another way to try to show that there must be some unitary 
phenomenal feature that is shared among all and only unpleasant experiences. The mere 
fact that we can compare different unpleasant experiences among them entails that they all 
share a qualitative aspect of unpleasantness.17 So, the idea goes, if you compare items A 
and B, where both are unpleasant and you distinguish which is more unpleasant to you, 
this should mean that A and B share a qualitative property in virtue of which you evaluate 
which one is more unpleasant. You can then do the same process between B and C, C and 
D, and so on. At the end, you will have a list of unpleasant experiences that all share a 
phenomenal property of unpleasantness, which should show that the heterogeneity of 
unpleasant experiences is not actually a problem for an approach such as the distinctive 
feeling theory. The fact that we can compare different unpleasant experiences, in virtue of 
being unpleasant, must show that they all have the same type of unpleasantness in 
common, the same and only unpleasant feeling. If this is correct, the supporter of the 
distinctive feeling view could endorse such an argument. However, I will show that this 
argument based on the comparison of various unpleasant experiences cannot really 
dissolve the heterogeneity problem.  
There are various reasons why this comparison argument is problematic. The first problem 
is that even if we claim to be judging between two different experiences on the basis of 
their unpleasantness, this does not imply that we are actually judging the experiences 
based on their unpleasantness as understood as a phenomenal property, some feeling that 
is introspectively available. Instead, it could be that what we are really doing is judging 
them based on other mental states. If you were asked ‘which is more unpleasant to you A 
or B?’, and you answered ‘A’, this answer does not entail that you are making a judgment 
based on a phenomenal shared feature between A and B. It could be that you are reporting 
which one you like more, which one you desire more, which one causes less suffering to 
you, etc. In either case, the basis of the judgment is not necessarily a shared qualitative 
unpleasant feeling that A and B have in themselves. 
Let me try to clarify this with an analogy. For example, you could be asked ‘what is more 
pleasant for you: a) hiking in the mountains, or b) lying on the beach?’ The fact that you 
have a preference for any of these options does not imply that your judgement is based on 
any shared phenomenal property common to these two possible scenarios. You might 
prefer the beach because it reminds you of your childhood vacations, for instance, which 																																																								17 I owe this idea to Jennifer Corns.  
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is not something that the experience of being on the beach entails, and neither something 
that lying on the beach or hiking in the mountains necessarily share. The preference that 
you might have for one option over another does not entail a comparison in virtue of a 
mutual property that both items have. In the same way, when we compare different 
experiences, regarding which one is more pleasant or unpleasant, our judgment is not 
necessarily based upon a phenomenal property of these experiences.  
There is a second, more fundamental problem for this comparison argument. Even if we 
compare different experiences because they share a phenomenal property, this does not 
entail that the heterogeneity of these experience is not still a problem for the distinctive 
feeling theory. The defenders of this theory could claim that making a list of unpleasant 
experiences does entail that all the items in the list are unified by one single shared 
phenomenal property. They might think this because, otherwise, it would have been 
impossible to make the list. In a sense this is correct. The fact that we come up with a list 
of items that are being compared because they are unpleasant implies that all the items 
have a shared property: being unpleasant. However, this list does not entail that all the 
items share the same way of being unpleasant, that is, that there is a unitary feeling that all 
and only unpleasant experiences share and by dint of which they are unpleasant. Even if it 
were true that items A and B are unpleasant and that B and C are also unpleasant, this does 
not necessarily imply that A, B, and C share the exact same type of phenomenal 
unpleasantness, that is, that they are all unpleasant in the same way. B may share some 
phenomenal property with A and with C, but it is not necessary that A and C also share the 
exact same phenomenal property between them.  
Let us use an analogy to clarify this point. First, you are asked to judge what is more 
delicious: a) a sandwich with tomatoes, or b) a soup with tomatoes. Then, you are asked to 
judge what is more delicious: b) that soup with tomatoes, or c) a carrot soup. The 
sandwich, the tomato soup, and the carrot soup are all delicious. However, this does not 
mean that they are delicious on the exact same grounds. On the one hand, the tomato 
sandwich and the tomato soup may be judged in virtue of the quality of their tomatoes. On 
the other hand, the tomato soup and the carrot soup might be judged in virtue of their 
consistency. This three-item-comparison does imply that all compared items are delicious, 
but they do not have to be delicious in the same way. Some might be delicious qua their 
tomato-ness and others qua their consistency. In this case, being delicious is not one single 
qualitative property that is shared among the three items; deliciousness is not a single 
shared ingredient that is present among all instances. When we are comparing different 
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items in terms of their deliciousness, we might not be comparing them qua the same type 
of deliciousness. 
We can say something similar for the comparison of unpleasant experiences. You might 
compare if it is more unpleasant for you: a) to feel nauseous, b) to have a headache, or c) 
to feel an itch. The comparison is possible, and at the end you would have a list of three 
unpleasant experiences. These comparisons could be made with many more experiences 
and you could create a quite large list of unpleasant experiences. However, this does not 
entail that all the items in the list share the same property of unpleasantness, if it is 
understood as a unitary qualitative feeling that can only have variations in terms of 
intensity. The comparison argument can show that all items are unpleasant, but it does not 
imply that all of its items are being compared on the grounds of being unpleasant in the 
same phenomenal way. In other words, this comparison does not entail that the feeling of 
nausea, of a headache, and of an itch all have the exact same phenomenal property, 
understood as an introspectively available unitary feeling that comes in varying intensities.  
The question that a defender of the distinctive feeling theory should ask in relation to the 
heterogeneity of experiences is: which is more unpleasant regarding the exact same shared 
felt qualitative feeling of unpleasantness A or B, B or C, C or D? If we were able to answer 
this question with no difficulties, then we could show with no doubt that heterogeneity of 
unpleasant experiences is not a problem for the distinctive feeling theory. However, we 
cannot answer this question effectively. This is precisely what the heterogeneity problems 
shows, that is, even if we accept that many diverse experiences are all unpleasant, this 
unity does not seem to be explained in virtue of a unitary shared phenomenal property of 
unpleasantness, of one and only distinctive feeling.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
I think that the distinctive feeling theory is useful to get a grasp of an approach for which 
unpleasantness is a phenomenal property that is not taken to be reducible. Even if Bramble 
does not argue that this phenomenal property is bad in itself, I think that this is the best 
strategy for a theory such as this to account for the unpleasantness of pain being a 
motivating and a normative reason. We can explain that we take a painkiller because the 
unpleasantness of pain is bad in itself. The unpleasantness of pain being bad renders our 
actions intelligible, it explains why an unpleasant pain is a motivating reason. The badness 
of unpleasantness also explains why taking a painkiller is desirable, why it is good to stop 
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feeling something unpleasant. The intrinsic badness of unpleasantness accounts for an 
unpleasant pain also being a normative reason. 
However, even if we accept that this phenomenal property is bad in itself, the distinctive 
feeling theory fails to deal with the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. In the 
upcoming chapter I will consider two more theories that account for the unpleasantness of 
pain in terms of a phenomenal property. In contrast to the distinctive feeling view, these 
other theories can appeal to phenomenal variations in order to deal with the heterogeneity 
of unpleasant experiences. I will show how these theories rely on the notion of dimension 
in order to deal with the heterogeneity problem. Moreover, I will explain how one of these 
views successfully provides a solution to the heterogeneity problem. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE DIMENSIONAL THEORIES OF 
UNPLEASANTNESS 
4.0 Introduction  
In this chapter I will explain other theories that take unpleasantness as a phenomenal 
property. These accounts, in contrast to the distinctive feeling theory, add the notion of 
dimension to unpleasantness. I will focus on two theories that opt for this strategy. I will 
evaluate how adding the notion of dimension to unpleasantness can be used to deal with 
the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. I will show that the notion of dimension, 
understood in line with the determinable-determinate distinction, is useful to argue for 
unpleasantness as a phenomenal property, while also solving the heterogeneity problem. 
According to the first theory, the hedonic dimension theory, unpleasantness is a dimension 
along which sensory experiences may vary. The idea comes from Kagan (1992), even if 
he is generally concerned with pleasant experiences. In the case of pain, for instance, 
unpleasantness can be explained as the felt dimension along which sensory pains can vary. 
Broadly, according to this proposal, unpleasantness is to pain what volume is to sound. 
This dimension is meant to account for the variations among different unpleasant 
experiences, e.g., this dimension can be used to explain the different intensities with 
which unpleasant pains might be felt. I will divide the discussion of this theory into two 
parts. 
First, I will briefly consider a critique from Bramble (2013). Bramble thinks that Kagan’s 
analogy with volume is inapt: whereas volume is an essential property of sound, being 
hedonic is not an essential property of sensory experiences. I will show that there is a way 
to deal with Bramble’s critique. Second, I will show that even if the analogy between 
unpleasantness and volume can be apt, Kagan’s suggestion to take unpleasantness as a 
dimension is not enough to give an answer to the heterogeneity problem. Even if the 
qualitative dimension approach is useful to account for a type of variation among 
unpleasant experiences, i.e., to account for different intensities of unpleasantness, it does 
not account for other important forms of phenomenal variation among unpleasant 
experiences.  
Given that the hedonic dimension theory is not able to solve the heterogeneity problem, I 
will consider a different theory that gives an answer to this problem by appealing to the 
determinable-determinate distinction (Crisp, 2006). First, I will explain Crisp’s proposal 
to solve the heterogeneity problem based on the determinable-determinate distinction. I 
will explain how we should understand Crisp’s account in order to give a straightforward 
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answer to the heterogeneity problem. Broadly, based on this proposal, we can understand 
that in the same way that scarlet is a way of being red, and red is a way of being coloured, 
a headache is a way of being a pain, and pain is a way of being an unpleasant experience: 
being a pain is a determinate of the determinable being unpleasant.  
However, this theory has a fundamental difficulty: accounting for cases of pain not being 
unpleasant. The account derived from Crisp’s proposal about pain and unpleasantness 
entails that pain is unpleasant. In this view it is necessary that pain is unpleasant, as it is 
necessary that scarlet is red. It is impossible for a pain not to be unpleasant. However, 
there are various cases that suggest that pain might not be unpleasant. In the upcoming 
chapters, I will revise these cases.  
 
4.1 Hedonic dimension theory  
The hedonic dimension theory proposes that unpleasantness should be understood as a 
dimension along which experiences such as pain may vary. This proposal relies on an 
analogy: volume is to sound what pleasantness or unpleasantness are to sensory mental 
states. If this analogy is correct, one of the virtues of this proposal is that it can capture an 
important feature of unpleasant experiences, i.e., that unpleasantness can have different 
intensities. There are some experiences that are more, or less, unpleasant than others. In 
the same way that volume is a property of sound, and that this property may come with 
different intensities, being unpleasant is also a property of certain sensory mental states 
and this property can also have different intensities. In Kagan’s words: 
An alternative move is to identify pleasantness not as a component of 
experiences, but rather as a dimension along which experiences can vary. As 
an analogy, consider the loudness of auditory experiences — that is, sounds. It 
is obvious that loudness or volume is not a kind of sound. And it seems 
plausible to insist that loudness is not a single kind of component of auditory 
experiences. Rather, volume is a dimension along which sounds can vary. It is 
an aspect of sounds, with regard to which they can be ranked… Similarly, 
then, pleasure might well be a distinct dimension of mental states, with regard 
to which they can be ranked as well… For it seems to me that there is a sense 
in which a specific volume is indeed an ingredient of a given sound, along 
with a particular pitch, and so forth. (Similarly, intensity or saturation is an 
ingredient of colors, along with hue.) (Kagan, 1992, p. 172–173) 
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Let us try to make sense of Kagan’s idea. His proposal is about pleasantness, but 
something very similar can be said for unpleasantness, that is, unpleasantness is an aspect 
along which different experiences can vary, including pain. Since volume is a dimensional 
property with intensities, we can explain that some sounds are louder than others. 
Similarly, if unpleasantness is a dimensional property with intensities, we can explain that 
some unpleasant experiences are more intense. Moreover, if we take unpleasantness to be 
bad in itself, we can also explain that some unpleasant experiences are worse, they feel 
worse. I think that the key feature of Kagan’s idea is that if volume is a dimension of 
sound, this means that volume can have different intensities, and, therefore, that sound can 
also have different intensities in terms of its volume. Similarly, if unpleasantness is like 
volume, this means that a sensory experience can have different intensities in terms of 
how bad it feels.  
 
4.1.1 The essentiality of unpleasantness 
With this in mind, let us now analyse some of the difficulties that the hedonic dimension 
theory may encounter. First, Bramble (2013) argues that Kagan’s analogy is inapt. 
“Consider that, for most pleasant experiences, one can reduce their pleasantness to 
nothing, while leaving the experience intact, whereas one cannot ever reduce the volume 
of an auditory experience to nothing and still be left with the auditory experience in 
question.” (Bramble, 2013, p. 209) I think that a simple way of explaining Bramble’s 
critique is to focus on volume as a property of sound. Whereas volume is an essential 
property of sound, being pleasant or unpleasant is not essential to mental states such as 
sensory experiences. Sound is often understood as a physical phenomenon, as a 
perturbation in a medium such as air; these perturbations can be measured in waves and 
the standard way of understanding sound’s volume is in terms of the amplitude of the 
waves. The bigger the volume the bigger the wave. If the wave has no size, this means that 
there is no perturbation in the medium, that is, that there is no sound. This is why volume 
is essential to sound. In contrast, being pleasant or unpleasant is not essential for sensory 
experiences. For example, we could have a taste experience of drinking coffee without it 
being pleasant or unpleasant. Whereas sound cannot exist without volume, certain sensory 
experiences can exist without having a hedonic dimension. This, it is claimed, shows that 
the analogy is inapt. 
I think that there are two key things to mention about Bramble’s critique. First, it is 
important to have in mind that the heterogeneity problem is not concerned with 
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unpleasantness being essential or not to sensory experiences. That is to say, the intuition 
behind the heterogeneity problem is that there is no unitary phenomenal feeling in virtue 
of which all and only unpleasant experiences count as being unpleasant. This intuition can 
be addressed regardless of unpleasantness being essential or not to sensory experience, 
and I will explain in detail how Kagan’s suggestion about unpleasantness being a 
dimension can be used to try to deal with the heterogeneity problem in the upcoming 
subsection. The second important thing to mention about Bramble’s critique is that there is 
a simple way of dealing with it.  
I think that there is a simple and elegant way to take Kagan’s analogy between the 
unpleasantness of experiences and the volume of sounds. We could take his analogy as 
comparing the unpleasantness of unpleasant experiences with sound’s volume. That is, if 
volume is essential to sound, we can argue that being unpleasant is essential to unpleasant 
mental experiences. I think that Bramble’s mistake consists in understanding Kagan’s 
analogy as referring to hedonically neutral experiences. Rather, we should understand that 
in the same way that volume is an essential property of sound, unpleasantness is an 
essential property of unpleasant experiences. In this way, even if it is true that a sound 
must have volume in order to exist, the analogy is apt because an unpleasant experience 
has to be unpleasant in order to exist as an unpleasant experience. An unpleasant pain has 
to be unpleasant in order to count as an unpleasant experience. The analogy is finally apt 
regarding essentiality. 
 
4.1.2 The heterogeneity problem for the hedonic dimension theory 
There is, however, another much more important problem for the hedonic dimension 
theory: it cannot account for the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. Let me show 
this. Volume is a property that all and only sounds have and unpleasantness is a property 
that all and only unpleasant experience have. The variations that volume provides in terms 
of sound can explain some form of intensity of sound. Sound can have various intensities 
regarding volume. I think that if we understand Kagan’s analogy of volume, this is helpful 
to make sense of how unpleasant experiences can also have various intensities. The 
intuition behind the heterogeneity problem is that there is a phenomenal variation among 
unpleasant experiences that a unitary unpleasant feeling cannot account for. We could then 
try to account for such phenomenal diversity of unpleasant experience in terms of the 
hedonic dimension theory.  
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Recognition of the qualitative differences between the sounds of a symphony, 
rain falling, and a bird chirping, does nothing at all to call into question our 
ability to identify a single dimension —volume —with regard to which these 
and other sounds can be ranked… Recognition of the qualitative differences 
between the experiences of hiking, listening to music, and reading philosophy, 
need not call into question our ability to identify a single dimension —pleasure 
— along which they vary in magnitude. (Kagan, 1992, p. 172–173) 
This is not problematic so far. We can agree with Kagan about the diversity of pleasant 
experiences and the same can be said for unpleasant experiences. The problem with the 
hedonic dimension theory is that unpleasantness varies in ways that are not only explained 
in terms of intensity. Whereas volume only varies in terms of intensity, unpleasantness not 
only varies in terms of intensity. The hedonic dimension theory has to show that all and 
only the experiences that are unpleasant are unified in virtue of being unpleasant, in virtue 
of having the same phenomenal unity, the same phenomenal dimension, and that the only 
variation among all these unpleasant experiences, qua their unpleasantness, is regarding 
the intensity of the same unitary felt unpleasantness. The hedonic dimension theory is not 
able to meet this intuition, and this is why the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences is a 
problem for this theory. This is a fundamental problem for this account.  
If we think that it is the same qualitative dimension that unifies all unpleasant experiences, 
we must show that the same and only phenomenal dimension can account for all the 
phenomenal variations among unpleasant experiences. If we understand unpleasantness as 
analogous to volume, this means that all the variations of unpleasantness can be reduced 
to variations in intensity. However, unpleasant experiences vary in ways that are not only 
accountable in terms of intensity. I agree that hiking, listening to music, and reading 
philosophy can all be pleasant, but I do not think that their pleasantness can only vary in 
terms of intensity. The same can be said for unpleasant experiences, i.e., it is not 
particularly hard to accept that experiencing grief, nausea, suffering from severe burns, 
having a headache, etc. are all unpleasant. What is controversial is that all these 
experiences are all unpleasant in virtue of the same shared phenomenal aspect that all and 
only these experiences have, and that the only difference regarding their unpleasantness is 
that some of these experiences are more unpleasant than others. Kagan admits that it is 
odd to say that there is something phenomenal shared among all these experiences, but he 
insists that: 
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Once we have a picture like this in mind, we might in fact be prepared to insist 
that there is a sense in which pleasure is an ingredient common to all pleasant 
experiences… Thus, pleasantness might well be considered an ingredient of 
(conscious) mental states in general, albeit an ingredient that we will only 
notice if we "chop up" experiences in some nonstandard ways. But whether or 
not pleasure can be helpfully viewed in this way as an ingredient of 
experiences, the possibility remains that it is a single, specific dimension along 
which experiences vary. (Kagan, 1992, p. 172–173) 
Kagan seems to suggest that we will find the shared qualitative property, the shared 
phenomenal dimension, once we have “chopped up the experiences in some nonstandard 
ways”. I am not sure what this could mean, but I do think that the crucial point about 
Kagan’s view is that there is a “dimension along which experiences vary”. This idea of 
dimension allows us to shed light on the phenomenal heterogeneity of hedonic 
experiences. However, if we understand unpleasantness as being similar to volume, I think 
that the analogy is limited because unpleasantness varies in ways that volume does not. 
Whereas volume varies in intensity, which can be understood in terms of a wave’s size, 
unpleasantness not only varies in intensity. If we take seriously the analogy between 
sound’s volume and the unpleasantness of unpleasant experiences, we will find that the 
analogy is inapt. It is not inapt regarding the essentiality of these properties. The analogy 
is inapt because the variations of unpleasantness cannot be captured in terms of the 
variations of volume.  
Let me clarify this last idea. For argument’s sake, let us understand sound as being 
constituted of three distinct essential dimensions: duration, i.e., for how long a disturbance 
occurs in a medium; volume, which can be understood in terms of the size of the waves 
that represent the strength of sound, to put it simply; and pitch, which is the frequency of 
the waves within the duration of sound. If sound’s volume is an essential dimension of 
sound, this implies a few things, for example: i) two different sounds may vary only qua 
their volume, i.e., both sounds have the same duration and the same pitch, but the intensity 
of their volume is different, and ii) two sounds may have the exact same intensity of 
volume but vary regarding to their other essential properties, that is, vary in their duration 
or their pitch. 
In contrast, when we try to do something similar for unpleasant experiences, we notice 
that the heterogeneity of unpleasantness cannot be explained in terms of the hedonic 
dimension theory. We cannot give a similar account for unpleasantness, where the 
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intensity of unpleasantness is the only kind of variation among all and only unpleasant 
experiences. To show this, I will first consider unpleasant pains. Suppose that all 
unpleasant pains are mental states that are constituted by these essential properties: felt 
duration, felt location, a pain sensory aspect, and felt unpleasantness to a certain degree. 
Consider two headaches; I take it that we could have two different pains that vary only in 
the way that they are unpleasant. That is, we could have two headaches, a dull one and a 
sharp one, that have the same felt duration, felt location, a headache-like feeling, and the 
same intensity of unpleasantness, i.e., they feel equally bad, and yet they are different 
types of headache experiences. 
If this is correct, this shows that there are phenomenal variations that we cannot explain 
merely in terms of the intensity of how bad the experiences feel. According to the hedonic 
dimension theory, intensity is the only type of variation among unpleasant experiences in 
terms of their unpleasantness. However, what I am trying to show is that different 
unpleasant pains can vary in the way in which they are unpleasant, without being different 
in terms of how bad they feel. When two sounds vary in volume, their difference qua 
volume can only be a difference in terms of intensity. In contrast, when it comes to 
unpleasantness, the differences between two unpleasant experiences qua their 
unpleasantness are not only differences regarding their intensity, but also differences 
regarding other ways of being unpleasant.  
If this is not persuasive enough, let me offer a few more cases. The heterogeneity of 
unpleasantness becomes clearer the broader the type of unpleasant experiences we want to 
explain. Compare a migraine with a stomach ache or a toothache. They vary in location, 
clearly, but are they all achy because of the exact same phenomenal quality dimension? 
Suppose that they all rank with the same intensity qua their unpleasantness and that they 
all last the same amount of time. There is going to be an obvious difference regarding 
location, there might also be a difference regarding a sensory component of the 
experience, but it does not seem clear to me that they are all unpleasant in the same 
phenomenal way. 
Compare a migraine with feeling nauseous. Their unpleasantness may differ not just in 
intensity, like the volume of two sounds, but in other ways too. Contrast an intense 
migraine with intense grief (i.e., with the feeling that one can gets when someone dear 
dies). Are these two intense unpleasant experiences unpleasant in the exact same 
phenomenal way? I think that the careful comparison between all these unpleasant 
experiences shows that there is no unitary feeling among all and only these experiences 
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and in virtue of which they all qualify as unpleasant. I consider that Kagan’s notion of 
dimension offers some improvement over the distinctive feeling theory, since with it we 
can account for a type of variability within unpleasant experiences. The hedonic 
dimension theory acknowledges that unpleasant experiences may have different 
intensities. However, this is not enough to shed light on all the possible variations 
regarding the unpleasantness of unpleasant experiences.18 
In conclusion, the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences is an issue for the hedonic 
dimension theory. Even if the notion of unpleasantness as dimension serves to give us a 
better grasp of the variations among unpleasant experiences, this theory does not seem to 
capture the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. If we take unpleasantness to be 
phenomenal and bad in itself, we can understand the intensity of unpleasant experiences in 
terms of how bad they feel. However, how bad an unpleasant experience feels does not 
seem to be the only way unpleasant experiences may vary in terms of being unpleasant. In 
the next section I will consider a different theory that accounts for the unpleasantness of 
pain in terms of a phenomenal property and that is able, I will argue, to solve the 
heterogeneity problem.  
 
4.2 The solution to the heterogeneity problem  
The heterogeneity of unpleasant experience is a major issue for theories that take 
unpleasantness to be a phenomenal property: there is a strong intuition that there is no 
unitary phenomenal unpleasant aspect that is present among all and only unpleasant 
experiences, and in virtue of which all these unpleasant experiences qualify as unpleasant. 
In other words, even if we accept some phenomenal unity among all unpleasant 
experiences, it seems that we cannot account for this unity by appealing to a phenomenal 
property, the same unpleasant feeling that all and only these experiences have. Something 
very similar can be argued for the variety of pleasant experiences. So how can we preserve 
the intuition that unpleasantness is phenomenal, while explaining the wide phenomenal 
diversity within unpleasant experiences?  																																																								18 Aydede (2014) proposes a similar approach to Kagan’s that can be used to account for different 
intensities of unpleasantness. “Just the fastness or slowness of dances can be recognized across all different 
types of dances, the pleasantness or unpleasantness common to various otherwise quite different sensations 
is detectable, indeed introspectively available.” (Aydede, 2014, p. 113) However, I think that this proposal 
faces similar worries since the intensity of unpleasantness is not the only type of phenomenal variation 
among unpleasant experiences.  
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In order to deal with this problem, while maintaining the intuition that unpleasantness is 
something that we somehow feel, it has been proposed that we should explain the way in 
which experiences can be pleasant or unpleasant by appealing to the determinable-
determinate distinction. Crisp (2006) proposes this with respect to pleasure: 
If the advocate of heterogeneity is seeking in enjoyable experiences something 
like a special sensation, such as sweetness, or a tingle or feeling located in a 
certain part of the body, such as an itch or pins and needles, or indeed 
something like a perceptual quality such as redness, she will fail. But there is a 
way that enjoyable experiences feel: they feel enjoyable. That is, there is 
something that it is like to be experiencing enjoyment, in the same way that 
there is something that it is like to be having an experience of 
colour…Enjoyment, then, is best understood using the determinable-
determinate distinction, and the mistake in the heterogeneity argument is that it 
considers only determinates. Enjoyable experiences do differ from one 
another… But there is a certain common quality… feeling good... The 
determinable–determinate distinction also helps us to be clear about the role of 
‘feeling’ in this analysis: feeling good as a determinable is not any particular 
kind of determinate feeling. (Crisp, 2006, p. 109) 
There are a few rather terminological things to say about Crisp’s passage. First, Crisp’s 
idea can be equally applied to experiences that feel bad, i.e., several instances of 
experiences can be explained as determinates of the common feeling-bad determinable. 
Instead of referring to these determinables as ‘feeling good’ or ‘feeling bad’, I will refer to 
them as being pleasant or being unpleasant. The change in the way in which I will refer to 
these determinables is primarily terminological, in order to maintain coherence with the 
previous chapters. The common thing between feeling nauseous, feeling itchy, and the 
experience of a headache, is that they are all unpleasant.  
Second, I should also point out that when I talk about determinables and determinates, I 
will be referring to properties. That is, as in previous chapters, being unpleasant is a 
property of mental states, and I will talk about different ways of being unpleasant that are 
also properties of mental states. I will show that these properties of mental states should be 
understood based on the determinable-determinate distinction, if we want to solve the 
heterogeneity problem. Moreover, I will often compare the property of being unpleasant, 
or unpleasantness, to other properties. For instance, I will compare unpleasantness to the 
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property of being red, or redness, when it comes to objects, or to the property of being red-
feeling, or red-feeling-ness, when it comes to visual experiences.  
Now that these terminological issues are established, we can start explaining how the 
determinable-determinate distinction will serve us to deal with the heterogeneity of 
unpleasant experiences. I propose that a good way of making sense of this distinction is to 
say that different determinates vary among themselves non-additively. I propose that this 
understanding of the determinable-determinate distinction is crucial if we are to make 
sense of this proposal. I will first exemplify this notion by considering the property of 
being coloured as a determinable. To say that being coloured is a determinable is to say 
that the colour properties that fall under it differ from one another non-additively. In other 
words, the difference between being red and being blue is not that being red consists in 
being coloured plus being X, whereas being blue consists in being coloured plus being Y, 
but rather that being red consists in being coloured in a particular way, and being blue 
consists in being coloured in a different particular way. Moreover, being coloured is the 
sum of the different ways of being coloured; being coloured is nothing more that being 
either red, or blue, or yellow, or green, etc. Some determinates can also be determinables 
of other determinates. For example, being red can also be a determinable with multiple 
determinates such as being magenta, crimson, scarlet, etc. The same can be said for blue, 
for example being baby-blue or navy-blue can be determinates of the blue determinable.19  
By means of contrast, let us consider other cases where the instances of a common group 
are different additively. Consider the property of being a young animal. All of the items 
that fall under this property share a distinctive ingredient, i.e., being young, plus 
something else. For example, being a kitten means to be young plus be a cat; being a cub 
is to be young plus be a bear; being a lamb means to be young plus be a sheep; and so on. 
That is to say, the properties of being a kitten, a cub, and a lamb are different ways of 
being a young animal, and they differ from one another in an additive way; they are not 
determinates of a common determinable. They are ways of being a young animal, but 
these different ways of being are not captured by the determinable-determinate distinction. 
The key is to understand that different determinates of the same determinable are not 
unified by dint of sharing a distinctive ingredient plus something else. In this way, we can 
also apply the determinable-determinate distinction to properties of mental states. 
Something similar can be said for unpleasant experiences. Following this distinction, 																																																								19 For more on the determinable-determinate distinction see Funkhouser (2006, 2014), Johnson (1921), 
Prior (1949), and Wilson (2017, 2009). 
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being unpleasant is not a common ingredient among the different unpleasant experiences. 
Instead, being unpleasant is a determinable with determinates such as being the feeling of 
nausea, of itch, of pain, etc. These different determinates are different ways of being 
unpleasant and they vary from each other non-additively. We can give an answer to the 
heterogeneity problem once we adopt this approach.  
I think that a clear way of making sense of this is to make an analogy with being coloured. 
All ways of being coloured are different, yet they belong to the same kind. There seems to 
be no unitary coloured-ness that is present in being red, being blue, being yellow, etc. 
How can being red and being blue be different and yet both be ways of being coloured? 
The answer is that they are both determinates of the same determinable. Being red and 
being blue are different non-additively. They do not share a distinctive coloured-ness plus 
something else. The same can be said about the difference between being magenta and 
being scarlet; they do not share some unitary redness plus something else, they are 
different ways of being red non-additively. The details about what accounts for being red 
and being blue to be different, and for being magenta and being scarlet to also be different, 
are still missing. I will come back to this. However, what is important at this point is to 
understand that different determinates of a common determinable are different in a non-
additive way. That is, they do not belong to the same kind by sharing a unitary ingredient 
plus something else. 
Let us now apply this notion to different ways of being an unpleasant experience, in order 
to address the heterogeneity problem. If we try to make sense of Crisp’s idea, this means 
that being unpleasant is a determinable with various determinates such as being an itch, 
being a pain, being a cramp, etc. This means that being an itch and being a pain do not 
share a common ingredient of unpleasantness plus something else that makes them 
different. They are different ways of being unpleasant non-additively. In the same way 
that there is no unitary coloured-ness shared between being red and being blue, there is no 
unitary shared unpleasantness between being an itch and being a pain. If we understand 
Crisp’s proposal in these terms, the heterogeneity problem is solved, I claim. According to 
the heterogeneity problem there is no single unitary phenomenal ingredient common to all 
and only unpleasant experiences and by dint of which these experience are unpleasant. 
This is correct according to the non-additive understanding of unpleasantness as a 
determinable. All it means to have an unpleasant experience is to have a mental state with 
the determinate property of either being an itch, being a pain, being a cramp, etc. These 
different determinate properties entail unpleasantness without unpleasantness being a 
unitary ingredient common to all of them. 
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If we understand unpleasantness as a determinable, together with the non-additive 
understanding that I offer for the determinable-determinate distinction, the heterogeneity 
problem dissolves. Being a pain or being an itch are ways of being unpleasant that differ 
non-additively: being an itch and being a pain do not share some unitary unpleasantness. 
We can maintain that being unpleasant is a phenomenal property that is bad in itself, and 
also accept that being unpleasant is not a common unitary ingredient common to all and 
only unpleasant experiences.  
 
4.2.1 The dimensions of unpleasantness 
I think that even if the determinable-determinate distinction helps us to deal with the 
heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences, there is still an important element missing: we 
need to explain what makes different determinates vary from one another. What makes 
being red different from being blue? What makes being scarlet different from being 
magenta? In order to explain this, I think we need to focus again on the notion of 
dimension. Kagan was right in noticing that unpleasant experiences may vary in a way that 
is similar to the way in which sounds may vary. However, understanding the 
unpleasantness of experience as being similar to the volume of sound was limited to 
accounting for variations amongst unpleasant experiences other than their intensity. In this 
section I will develop Crisp’s proposal in order to account for how different determinates 
of a common determinable vary non-additively. The differences among determinates of a 
common determinable can be explained in terms of variations along the multiple 
dimensions that might constitute a determinable. I think that Johnson’s mention of colour 
as a determinable can be helpful at this point. 
[I]n fact, the several colours are put into the same group and given the same 
name colour, not on the ground of any partial agreement, but on the ground of 
the special kind of difference which distinguishes one colour from another; 
whereas no such difference exists between a colour and a shape. (Johnson, 
1921, p. 176, my emphasis) 
Similarly, Prior (1949, p. 13) says “redness, blueness, etc., all characterise objects, as we 
say, ‘in respect of their colour’… And this is surely fundamental to the notion of being a 
determinate under a determinable”. So what is this special kind of difference that. Johnson 
talks about? How is it that redness and blueness vary in respect to their colour, as Prior 
mentions? I think that for this we need to appeal once more to the notion of dimension. 
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This is key to understand how different determinates of a common determinable can vary 
from one another. The dimensions are the essential properties of determinable and in 
virtue of which each of its determinate varies from the rest. As I said, this is what was 
missing. We needed to know what makes different determinates of a common 
determinable different among them and this is the answer: it is a difference along the 
essential dimensions of the determinable. I think that Kagan was right, when making the 
analogy with volume, to notice that unpleasantness may vary along a dimension. 
However, we should notice that there might be multiple dimensions along which 
unpleasantness may vary.  
Let us focus on the dimensions of being coloured. Three dimensions arguably constitute 
the property of being coloured: hue, saturation, and brightness. These three elements are 
necessary and sufficient for being coloured. Being coloured is equivalent to all the 
possible combinations along these three dimensions. Being coloured is the disjunction of 
the possible combinations of hue, saturation, and brightness. Accordingly, being red is the 
disjunction of the possible combinations of hue, saturation, and brightness, but within a 
more limited range than being coloured. For instance, a very precise shade of red, such as 
Coca-Cola red, is composed by a certain hue, saturation, and brightness, and the same 
applies to all the possible shades of red. The difference between two very specific shades 
of red, such as Coca-Cola red and Ferrari red, is that they have different hue, saturation, or 
brightness. This is what it means to be different non-additively, i.e., for properties to vary 
along the same essential dimensions. 
I think that this accounts for what Johnson had in mind when he talked about a “special 
kind of difference”. That is, the special difference between colour and shape is that they 
are different determinables, i.e., they have different essential dimensions. When we talk 
about different ways of being for various determinates of a common determinable, this 
means that the variation between these determinates is explained in terms of variation 
along the same dimensions. Contrast this to the different ways of being a young animal. 
This kind of difference is not explained in terms of variation along the same dimensions. 
The differences among these properties are explained in terms of variations along different 
essential dimensions: only the property of being a kitten entails being a cat, only the 
property of being a cub entails being a bear, only the property of being a lamb entails 
being a sheep, and so on. 
If being a pain and being an itch are determinates of a common determinable, this means 
that these properties share the same essential dimensions. Being coloured is nothing over 
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and above the disjunction of all the possible ways of being red, blue, yellow, etc., i.e., 
being coloured is nothing over and above the disjunction of all the possible combinations 
of hue, saturation, and brightness. In a similar fashion, the phenomenal property of being 
unpleasant is nothing over and above the disjunction of all the different ways of being 
unpleasant, where these may include being a pain, being an itch, being a cramp, etc. These 
different ways of being unpleasant should be accounted for in terms of variations among 
the same essential dimensions. 
Going back to Kagan’s proposal, unpleasantness is not what volume is to sound. Rather, 
unpleasantness seems to be like sound in the sense that sound, as unpleasantness, may 
vary along multiple dimensions. Volume is one of the dimensions along which sound may 
vary. Similarly, intensity is one of the dimensions along which different ways of being 
unpleasant may vary. Sound may vary along dimensions other than volume, such as pitch, 
timbre, duration, etc. This also applies to different unpleasant experiences that might vary 
along dimensions other than intensity. However, which are the precise dimensions of 
unpleasantness? Before we can answer this, I think we need to consider a fundamental 
problem for the theory that we have developed so far.   
 
4.3 Pains that are not unpleasant 
I think that Crisp’s idea of the determinable-determinate distinction as I have developed 
addresses the heterogeneity problem for unpleasant experiences. However, there is a 
critical problem for this account. This way of understanding pain in relation to 
unpleasantness entails that pain is necessarily unpleasant. However, it does not seem to be 
necessary that pain is unpleasant. Let me explain this. Determinate properties entail their 
determinables. For example, if being scarlet is a determinate of being red, being scarlet 
entails being red. Moreover, if being red is a determinate of being coloured, since scarlet 
entails being red, being scarlet also entails being coloured. If being a pain is a determinate 
of being unpleasant, then being a pain entails being unpleasant. This means that being a 
pain without being unpleasant is impossible, as it is impossible to be red without being 
coloured. However, there are cases that suggest that people might experience pains that 
are not unpleasant: pain asymbolia is often taken to be the more convincing example of 
this.  
We have found a theory capable of dealing with the heterogeneity problem, while 
maintaining that unpleasantness is a phenomenal property; however, there might be actual 
cases that contradict the theory. This problem leads us to a fundamental question about the 
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nature of pain and unpleasantness: are there pains that are not unpleasant? I think we 
should benefit from the problem of understanding pain as a determinate of unpleasantness 
and see if there are actual cases that put into question that pain entails unpleasantness. I 
think that this quest needs to be taken seriously in order to have a detailed understanding 
of the nature of pain and unpleasantness. So, in the next chapters I will consider if there 
are in fact cases where people experience pains that are not unpleasant. If we find actual 
examples of people who have pain experiences that are not unpleasant, this shows that the 
theory about pain and unpleasantness that we have developed so far is wrong. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explained two different theories that rely on the notion of dimension 
in order to account for the unpleasantness of pain. I have argued that the determinable-
determinate distinction is useful to deal with the heterogeneity problem, while maintaining 
that unpleasantness is a phenomenal property. A key feature of this theory is that 
determinates of a common determinable vary non-additively, i.e., we can account for 
differences among different determinates of a common determinable by appealing to 
variations along their constitutive dimensions.  
However, according to this theory, being a pain entails being unpleasant. It is necessary 
that if an experience is a pain, it is also unpleasant. In contrast, many philosophers 
consider that it is not only possible, but that there are actual examples of pain experiences 
that are not unpleasant. In the next chapter I take a detour from the theories of 
unpleasantness and I examine the candidates of pain experiences that are not unpleasant. 
In doing this, I address something that I take to be crucial to understanding the nature of 
pain and unpleasantness, i.e., the possibility of an experience being a pain without also 
being unpleasant.  
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CHAPTER 5: ARE PAINS ALWAYS UNPLEASANT? 
 
5.0 Introduction 
There is an important aspect to the relation between pain and unpleasantness. Given that 
pain is the paradigmatic unpleasant experience, we should ask: are pains always 
unpleasant? The question regarding whether pain is necessarily unpleasant has been 
important within recent philosophical discussion. In this chapter I will analyse various 
cases that suggest that pain might not be unpleasant. That is, these cases are possible 
examples of experiences that feel like a pain but that are not unpleasant. If these cases 
involve pain experiences that are not unpleasant, this shows that pain is not necessarily 
unpleasant. If being a pain does not entail being unpleasant, being a pain cannot be a 
determinate of unpleasantness, as I argued in Chapter Four. Pain asymbolia is the clearest 
example in which people experience pains that are not hedonic, i.e., pleasant or 
unpleasant. However, I will show that the evidence of the existence of pains that are not 
hedonic is not as conclusive as we might have thought. 
I will organise the different pain disorders that might involve non-unpleasant pains into 
two categories. First, I will consider pain insensitivity cases. These are pain disorders that 
have been understood as cases where people are incapable of having pain experiences. 
There are different causal explanations for why these people do not experience pain, and 
different situations in which this may occur. I will describe various types of pain 
insensitivity cases and show that it is false that these people are completely incapable of 
experiencing pain. I will show that pain insensitivity cases could be interpreted as 
involving non-unpleasant pains, although they shouldn’t be interpreted as such. 
Second, I will consider cases of pain indifference. In these situations it seems as if people 
might become indifferent to their pain experience because their pains are not unpleasant. 
The standard analysis of pain indifference cases is to think that people stop reacting in the 
usual way to their pain experiences because such pains are not unpleasant anymore. 
However, I will show that this is not the only possible interpretation for these cases. There 
are two main alternative interpretations: i) to argue that people might be indifferent to 
their pain experiences, but that these experiences are still unpleasant, or ii) to argue that, in 
fact, what these patients feel are not really pain experiences. Pain asymbolia patients, also 
known as asymbolics, constitute the clearest candidate within this category. 
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I will conclude that even if there are cases suggesting the existence of pains that are not 
unpleasant, the evidence is not conclusive. The fact that pain is paradigmatically 
unpleasant suggests that all pains are always unpleasant in fact. In the next chapter, I will 
consider and explain the possibility of pain being pleasant rather than unpleasant.  
 
5.1 Non-hedonic pains 
Some philosophers have thought that unpleasantness is a necessary feature of pain: if it 
isn’t unpleasant, it cannot be a pain. Some may think that "it is probable that if [pains] are 
all in fact unpleasant, then they are necessarily so..." (Pitcher, 1970, p. 491) In his 1970 
paper, Pitcher considered various empirical cases that called into question the idea that 
pain is necessarily unpleasant. He considered cases of patients who had been through a 
lobotomy, who were fakirs, masochists, wounded soldiers, etc. He argued that these cases 
could be ultimately explained based on a pain model from the time - the Melzack and 
Wall’s Gate Theory of pain (1965)20 - and concluded that he could not find any example 
of a pain that wasn’t in fact unpleasant. Even if people seemed to have pains that were not 
unpleasant, what was really happening is that the signal responsible for the pain 
experience was blocked, as the Gate Theory proposed, and this explained why in these 
cases there was no pain experience at all. This was meant to show that there are no actual 
cases of people experiencing pains that are not unpleasant. The fact that all pain 
experiences that we have are unpleasant is probably a consequence of pain being 
necessarily unpleasant, Pitcher thought. 
However, not everyone agreed with him. Hall, for instance, argued that one “could have 
exactly the same kinds of sensation as you have when you are cut, burned, or bruised, and 
they not be unpleasant.” (Hall, 1989, p. 643) Hall thinks it is at least possible that one 
could have all these normally unpleasant pain experiences, but without having the 
unpleasant aspect of them. These experiences would be pain-distinctive, i.e., they would 
be the kind of experiences that we are happy to call ‘pain’, hence not merely thermal 
experiences, or pressure experiences, etc., but without being unpleasant. The possibility of 
something like this implies that pain is not necessarily unpleasant: that it is possible that 
an experience could instantiate the phenomenal property of being a pain, without also 
instantiating the phenomenal property of being unpleasant. In the next sections I will 
consider various candidates for this kind of experience. If we find an actual example of an 																																																								20 See reprinted version (Melzack & Wall, 1996). 
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experience that feels like a pain without also being unpleasant, this would confirm without 
a doubt that being a pain does not entail being unpleasant.  
 
5.1.1 Congenital pain insensitivity  
There are different conditions in which it seems as if people never experience pain. Let us 
start by focusing on congenital pain insensitivity, where people seem to be born without 
the capacity to experience pain. It is often thought that people with this condition never 
experience pain in their lives. They are insensitive in the sense that, whereas other people 
when stimulated with noxious stimuli would have a pain experience, people who are 
insensitive to pain would not have a pain experience at all. In this case, the insensitivity is 
congenital; people are born incapable of experiencing pain. They do not react in the usual 
way to stimuli that would normally cause pain and they claim that they do not experience 
pain in these situations.  
Thus, the defect must be present from birth, rather than acquired as a possible 
secondary manifestation of a disease process or traumatic injury; there must be 
a general insensitivity to pain, i.e., an insensitivity to a variety of potentially 
noxious stimuli over the entire body, with no or slight involvement of the other 
sensory modalities; and there must be no general mental or physical 
retardation. In short, persons with congenital insensitivity to pain must, strictly 
speaking, be "normal" in every respect other than this defect. (Sternbach, 
1963, p. 253, my emphasis) 
People with congenital pain insensitivity are rare and are more likely to suffer injuries, 
infections, and often die younger than the average population — which has made it 
difficult to fully understand the condition. It also shows the relevance of being able to 
experience pain as a means of protection and survival. However, it is worth noting that it 
is not obvious whether the protection role of pain is mainly or even fully dependent on its 
typical unpleasantness. Given that unpleasantness is taken to be motivational and 
normative, this suggests that the protective role of an unpleasant pain is importantly due to 
it being unpleasant. There are some cases of congenital pain insensitivity that indicate that 
it might be a hereditary condition; for example, some researchers propose that a possible 
cause for this condition is a genetic mutation of the SNC9A gene (Cox et al., 2006). 
However, regardless of the cause that explains congenital pain insensitivity, what is at 
stake for us now is what is happening with these people at the experiential level. Could it 
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be that what is actually happening is that congenital pain insensitivity patients experience 
pains that are not unpleasant? There are different possibilities that must be considered and 
explained.  
It could be that congenital pain insensitivity patients are completely insensitive to pain, 
i.e., they have never undergone pain. If people with congenital pain insensitivity do not 
feel pain at all, this clearly isn’t a case of pain that is not unpleasant, it is simply an 
example of people who do not have pain, either unpleasant or not. Why should we 
consider this condition then? I think this condition is relevant because it is not crystal clear 
that congenital pain insensitivity patients do not have any type of pain experiences in their 
whole lives. It seems that congenital pain insensitivity patients do experience pain 
sometimes in their lives. Sternbach (1963) refers to a few of these cases. For example, he 
talks of “a 34-year-old male, [who] had felt pain once when he had a smashed finger and 
once when kicked in the testes.” (Sternbach, 1963, p. 254) Furthermore, the fact that 
congenital pain insensitivity individuals claim that they “don’t feel pain” could actually 
mean different things.  
This could mean that they are not conscious of any pain experience, while others would 
normally be conscious of feeling pain because something is happening to their bodies. 
Even if congenital pain insensitivity patients focused their attention and introspected while 
being burned or cut, there would not be any phenomenal pain experience that they could 
introspect. This seems partially correct, i.e., congenital pain insensitivity individuals do 
not seem to feel anything in some circumstances where others would feel pain. For 
example, Sternbach (1963) mentions the case of a woman who “was near death once from 
eclampsia at childbirth because she failed to recognise its symptoms (she had no 
headache).” (Sternbach, 1963, p. 260, my emphasis) Whereas other women would have 
consciously experienced a strong headache due to their physical condition, there was no 
introspectable headache for this woman, not even if she had focused her attention and tried 
to detect some pain experience of a headache.  
However, on some other occasions, congenital pain insensitivity individuals do report 
feeling something when they receive stimuli that would normally cause pain. They seem 
to at least be able to detect and distinguish various tactile sensations. Researchers have 
noted that “detailed neurological examinations revealed that each [congenital pain 
insensitivity individual] could correctly perceive the sensations of touch, warm and cold 
temperature, proprioception, tickle and pressure, but not painful stimuli.” (Cox et al., 
2006, p. 895) This suggests that whereas many people would have an unpleasant burn 
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experience, for example, a congenital pain insensitivity individual would only experience 
some sort of thermoception, a certain warm feeling, which is not a pain.  
Moreover, it is often reported that small children diagnosed with congenital pain 
insensitivity injure themselves by severely biting their fingers, lips, and tongue. However, 
with time they learn to avoid this damage, indicating that they are able to detect the 
pressure of their teeth against their skin. That is, these children have at least some form of 
tactile experience. For example, Juliao and Brotto (1955) reported a 3-year-old child who 
liked to play with fire, hit his head, and pull out his teeth. The only way of punishing him 
was by dousing him with a few drops of very cold water. This suggests that even if the 
child did not feel pain when pulling out his teeth, he had some form of tactile sensation 
when he was exposed to cold water. 
However, I think that there is an important possibility that has been left unexamined. It 
could be that congenital pain insensitivity patients are really having a pain experience that 
is not unpleasant, but that they do not report it as being ‘a pain’ since pain is taken to be 
fundamentally unpleasant. Since these patients have this condition from birth, they do not 
develop the concept of pain, where ‘pain’ means, among other things, an experience that is 
unpleasant. Consider the child who pulls out his own teeth and plays with fire. It could be 
that he is having a phenomenal pain sensation that is not unpleasant, but given that it is not 
unpleasant, no one suspects that it is a pain experience. When congenital pain insensitivity 
patients feel something while being stimulated with noxious stimuli, but do not react with 
aversion and do not complain, this suggests that their experiences are not unpleasant, but it 
does not entail that what they feel is not a pain-like experience.  
I think that there are two key points to conclude regarding cases of congenital pain 
insensitivity. First, contrary to what we might think, some people diagnosed with this 
condition do claim to experience pain in rare occasions in their lives, and these pains seem 
to be unpleasant — even if it also true that on some occasions congenital pain insensitivity 
patients do not seem to have any conscious experience, while others would experience an 
unpleasant pain. Second, it could be that congenital pain insensitivity patients experience 
pains that are not unpleasant, but that they do not report them as such because they learned 
that the word ‘pain’ is only used for unpleasant experiences. However, this possibility is 
not useful if we are looking for actual examples that confirm that people experience pains 
that are not unpleasant. Even if possible, there is no evidence suggesting that congenital 
pain insensitivity individuals have pain experiences that are not unpleasant. Even if 
congenital pain insensitivity cases do not provide us with evidence that people do 
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experience pains that are not unpleasant, there are other cases of pain insensitivity that are 
worth looking at. 
 
5.1.2 Acquired pain insensitivity  
There are other cases that suggest that people have lost their ability to experience pain, as 
against being born with that inability. They do not have a pain experience in the presence 
of noxious stimuli, or when their bodies are injured, as normal subjects would. These are 
the cases of acquired pain insensitivity. In these cases, it is due to different types of trauma 
or disease that people seem to stop being able to experience pain. However, as with 
congenital pain insensitivity, could it be that what is really happening with these cases is 
that people experience pains that are not unpleasant? In these cases people are normally 
capable of identifying pain experiences, so I think we should search in these cases for 
evidence of pains that are not unpleasant. 
One interesting example of acquired pain insensitivity is the injured soldiers who do not 
seem to experience pain right after being in the battlefield. Beecher (1956) brought 
attention to these cases through his work on injured soldiers in the Anzio Beachhead 
during World War II. Beecher was surprised by the difference between these soldiers and 
the general public; he wanted to explain why these injured soldiers did not complain about 
being in pain, even if they were severely injured, while civilians would normally complain 
much more about being in pain, even if they had less severe wounds. Beecher reasoned 
that the difference could be explained in virtue of a psychological factor: soldiers did not 
complain about their pain because they had some sort of analgesia due to the fact that the 
wounds meant something positive for them. Since the wounds meant something positive 
for these soldiers, the soldiers stopped feeling pain.  
In Beecher’s study the soldiers were asked the following question: as you lie there, are 
you having any pain?  And most soldiers answered ‘no’. From this, Beecher concluded 
that these soldiers said ‘no’ because they did not feel any pain in relation to their war 
wounds. That is to say, this meant that soldiers were not aware of any pain experience in 
relation to their injury, in a similar way to which congenital pain insensitivity patients 
seemed to be unable to have any conscious pain experience when injured. The soldiers 
were not conscious of any unpleasant pain in relation to their recent bodily damage from 
combat, even after careful introspection. Indeed, it does seem as if sometimes these 
soldiers did not have any conscious pain experience in relation to their war wounds. 
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According to Beecher, these wounds meant something positive for the soldiers - that they 
were now out of the battlefield and could return home - which explained their lack of pain. 
Not everyone agrees with Beecher’s explanation of why the soldiers didn’t feel pain. 
Klein points out that Beecher’s explanation is implausible given that “painless injury is 
also common even among people who view their injuries as entirely negative.” (Klein, 
2015b, p. 28, my emphasis) For example, a study on Israeli soldiers with traumatic 
amputations after the Yom Kippur War showed that wounded men reported that their 
initial injury was also painless even if they saw the consequences of their injury as 
negative. When talking about the injured Israeli soldiers, Wall (1999, p. 8) says that 
“[t]here was never a hint that anyone adopted the Darwinian approach that being wounded 
increased their chance of survival. No soldier reported a fleeting sense of relief that they 
have escaped alive from the killing fields.” That is to say, one does not have to interpret 
one’s wounds as positive in order to have some sort of analgesia regarding those injuries. 
On the contrary, one might experience analgesia even if the wounds mean something 
rather negative.   
Regardless of what the right explanation might be for why these soldiers were not feeling 
pain, we should verify if it is true that these soldiers really stopped experiencing any type 
of pain and, more precisely, any pain in relation to their battle wounds. In fact, the soldiers 
do not seem to have a general analgesia for any type of pain experience and, more 
importantly, it seems that they actually might experience pain in relation to their war 
wounds. As Beecher acknowledges, “these severely wounded men did not have a general 
block of the pain experience, for they complained in a normal manner at rough handling of 
their wounds, or at inept venipunctures [i.e., when they took a blood sample from the 
soldiers].” (Beecher, 1956, p. 1610) The soldiers’ complaints suggest that they were not 
completely incapable of experiencing pain, since they complain about badly taken blood 
samples. Moreover, since they complained “at rough handling of their wounds”, this may 
imply that they did experience some type of unpleasant pain in relation to their battle 
injuries. But if the soldiers seemed to be capable of having unpleasant pains, why did they 
answer that they didn’t feel pain?  
Here’s another possibility for what was happening. These soldiers still felt an unpleasant 
pain, but their pain was so mild that they were not bothered by it, they didn’t ask for 
treatment, or complain about it.21 When someone asked them if they felt pain and they 																																																								21 Bain (2013) suggests something along these lines. The soldiers feel unpleasant pains, but less unpleasant 
than a civilian would with the same injury. 
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said ‘no’, what this meant was ‘no, not enough to be complaining about it’. If this 
interpretation were correct, then soldiers’ pain was still unpleasant, even if it was not very 
intense. This interpretation, however, might be implausible since it would be inconsistent 
with the fact that soldiers do complain about other things such as the badly performed 
venipunctures. If these soldiers complained about the unpleasant experience caused by the 
badly performed extraction of blood, why wouldn’t they also complain about their war 
wounds if they caused them some kind of mild unpleasant pain experience? One possible 
explanation is that not complaining about battle wounds is more honourable that not 
complaining about a badly performed blood sample, or about the rough handling of their 
wounds. 
In any case, this is not what we are concerned with at the moment. The possibility we are 
interested in is whether soldiers answered that they did not feel pain, but what was really 
happening was that they had a pain experience that was not unpleasant, so they thought 
they did not need treatment for it. This, however, seems rather unlikely. It is possible, but 
not really plausible. There is no behavioural or testimonial evidence of the soldiers 
reporting that they do feel pain, but that it is not unpleasant at all. Even if it is possible that 
people with acquired pain insensitivity had pains that were not unpleasant, there is no 
evidence suggesting that this possibility is in fact correct. 
In conclusion, it does not seem like acquired pain insensitivity provides us with an 
example of a pain experience that is not unpleasant. It seems like people might enter into 
some state of complete analgesia in relation to major wounds. There might also be other 
forms of analgesia during the heat of the battle, where people might become incapable of 
experiencing any pain. However, it is hard to run a questionnaire about what exactly 
people feel in these conditions, for obvious reasons. In any case, beyond the explanation 
of why soldiers would have analgesia for some pains but not for others, we have not 
encountered yet a conclusive case of a pain sensory experience that is not unpleasant. Let 
us now look into cases where people do claim to experience pain, but do not show the 
normal reaction to it.  
 
5.1.3 Pain indifference due to surgery  
Some people do report experiencing pain without showing the typical reaction to it: they 
seem to be indifferent to their pain. They are indifferent in the sense that they stop having 
the typical reactions of avoidance to their pain experience, and stop showing the typical 
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behaviour in relation to pain, such as trying to eliminate it, even if they claim that they 
experience pain. This happens, for example, in cases of lobotomy. Sometimes people used 
to be given lobotomies when they suffered from a very intense chronic pain. In this 
procedure, also called prefrontal leucotomy, the nerve fibres of the frontal part were 
disconnected from the rest of the brain. Lobotomy cases have made philosophers consider 
whether these patients have pains that are not unpleasant (e.g. Dennett, 1978; Pitcher, 
1970). Lobotomy patients recognised their experience as ‘the same’ before and after the 
surgery, but for some reason they stopped showing distress and claimed that they were not 
bothered about the pain anymore after the procedure. In other words, it seems as if they 
became indifferent to their pain. This indifference is often explained as the consequence of 
pain not being unpleasant anymore.  
For example, Freeman and Watts (1946, p. 995) reported a woman who, after the 
operation, said that the pain was “exactly the same as it was before”; then, when they 
asked her about the fact that she was not complaining about the pain anymore, she 
answered that she “couldn’t do anything about it, so it doesn’t do any good to complain”. 
The same authors reported another case where, a year after the operation, “[t]he patient 
stated that the pain was just as it was before the operation. And yet she does not talk about 
it, she is rather carefree, and her arm is a nuisance, rather than a constant reminder of her 
permanent invalidism.” (Watts & Freeman, 1948, p. 717)22 How should we interpret the 
fact that these lobotomy patients say that the pain remains the same and yet they react so 
differently after the surgery? We could argue that something in their pain experience 
changed; even if they say that the pain is “exactly the same as it was before” and that it 
“was just as it was before the operation”, what they mean is that the pain remained the 
same qua its sensory phenomenology, yet that sensory pain experience lost its 
unpleasantness. This explains why “it doesn’t do any good to complain” and why the 
patient becomes “rather carefree”.  
In contrast to the previous cases of congenital pain insensitivity, I think we can rule out 
the possibility that lobotomy patients do not feel any conscious pain experience. Their 
verbal reports and some of the patients’ behaviour strongly suggest that they do feel 
something, and that what they feel is a pain experience. They were able to experience and 
distinguish pain experiences before the operation and they claim that they can still feel a 
pain after the surgery. Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting that they became 
incapable of using the term adequately, it is not as if they were completely incapable of 																																																								22 As cited in Trigg’s (1970, p. 131). 
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reporting that they have conscious phenomenal experiences. If they can report having 
other sensory experiences then there is no reason to think that they cannot report their 
pain. However, even if we do accept that these lobotomised patients still feel something, 
that they can feel pain, there are other ways of understanding what it is that they feel.  
First, it could be that all their pains stop being unpleasant after the surgery. Could this 
interpretation be correct? I don’t think so: lobotomy patients seemed to still complain 
about other pains. Even if there is not much evidence about the patients’ reaction to 
sources of pain that were not related to the ones for which they were lobotomised, “[i]t is 
certain that the sensory component of pain is still present because these patients may 
complain vociferously about pinprick and mild burn.” (Melzack, Wall, & Melzack, 1982, 
p. 169) Moreover, “they respond or sometimes over-respond to a normally painful 
stimulus.” (Melzack et al., 1982, p. 296, my emphasis) Second, it could be that only their 
chronic pains, the ones for which they were lobotomised, stop being unpleasant. Could 
this interpretation be correct? 
Lobotomy patients still sometimes complained when suffering from episodes of their 
chronic pain. For example, Freeman and Watts (1946, p. 955) report the case of a woman 
ten years after the procedure that “when she is asked about her sensations she puts on a 
long face and tells how terribly she feels, how much her back hurts, how she can hardly 
walk; and yet she never complains of these sensations to members of the family”. The fact 
that this patient does not complain to her family, does not show that she does not complain 
at all. After all, she says that she feels terrible. In fact, lobotomised patients do continue to 
complain about their chronic pain, even if their attitude changes about it. Given that 
patients seem to continue suffering, how can we explain their behavioural changes? 
I think that it is more likely that their pains are still unpleasant. Trigg (1970) offers a 
possible answer to explain why there might be behavioural changes in lobotomised 
patients about their chronic pain. He points out that lobotomised patients seem to have lost 
the capacity to fear and to be anxious about their pain. Given that the anxiety towards 
experiencing strong pain episodes seems to have been the main source of suffering for 
some of these patients, this would explain why they acquired indifference, i.e., why they 
complain so much less about their condition after the procedure. If lobotomy patients lost 
the capacity to fear and be stressed about their pain due to the lobotomy, they can now 
stand their still unpleasant pain and be somewhat indifferent about it, which does not 
imply that their pains are not unpleasant at all. Moreover, in line with Trigg’s explanation, 
Freeman and Watts claim that: 
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Prefrontal lobotomy relieves anxiety and emotional tension in rather specific 
fashion. It diminishes concern over consequences. It eliminates the fear of 
pain. Pain may be present; but, when it no longer arouses a mental picture of 
future disability and all that this may mean in terms of disaster to the person 
and his family, the experience can be borne with equanimity. Consequently, 
prefrontal lobotomy lends itself well to the relief of conditions in which the 
affective component of a painful disorder is equally important with the local 
condition… Psychosurgery alters the subject’s reaction to pain without 
materially changing his ability to feel pain. Pain may be present, but when 
divorced from its implications —insecurity, disability, guilt, death— it then 
becomes bearable and may be accepted with fortitude. (Freeman & Watts, 
1946, p. 954–955, my emphasis) 
This is a clear statement that confirms Trigg’s proposal. Given that the surgery does not 
change their ability to feel pain, why should we think that lobotomy patients’ pain has lost 
its unpleasantness? The main constant feature among lobotomised patients is that they lose 
some emotional response, such as stress and anxiety, to their chronic pain, which is what 
explains their change in behaviour, what accounts for their indifference. When Freeman 
and Watts talk about a lost “affective component”, this does not necessarily imply that 
pain has lost its felt unpleasantness, instead, it may mean that people have lost the 
affective emotions in relation to their still unpleasant pains. 
I think that Trigg’s proposal is convincing given that, in fact, lobotomised patients claim 
that their pains, when felt, remain the same. They do not claim that they feel the same type 
of pain but without their normal unpleasantness. People who reported on lobotomy cases 
also emphasise that a huge part of patient suffering was emotional; researchers describe 
that the clearest change after the surgery is in people’s attitude to their pain, not in the pain 
experience itself. It seems to me that this is a more consistent and intuitive interpretation 
than saying that lobotomised patients lost the felt unpleasantness of their pains.  
Moreover, other similar cases can be explained in the same fashion. This explanation can 
also be applied to cases where people stop having averse reactions to their pain 
experiences. For example, “patients who have been treated with morphine because of 
severe post-operative discomfort or extreme pain from cancer frequently tell their doctors, 
‘It’s a funny thing. The pain is still there, but it doesn’t bother me.’” (Snyder, 1996, p. 44) 
There is evidence suggesting that morphine relieves pain by relieving anxiety (Hill, 
Belleville, & Wikler, 1955). That is to say, in this case we could also make sense of the 
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change in the response to pain by attributing a change in the levels of anxiety, which is a 
possible effect of morphine use.23 Once more, the change is not in the phenomenal 
qualities of the pain. Rather, the change in anxiety explains why we can have such a 
different reaction to a still unpleasant pain.  
Another candidate for this kind of indifference can be found in patients who are 
hypnotised to treat their pain during surgery or other painful procedures. These hypnotised 
patients still describe the experience as a persisting pain, but now experience that pain 
from a distance and with no suffering or concern (Barber & Bejenke, 1996, p. 90–91). I 
take it that the felt distance and the lack of concern are rather explained in terms of 
changes in people’s attitude towards their felt experience, rather than a change in the 
phenomenology of the experience itself. This is not to say that it is impossible that 
hypnosis only takes away the unpleasant aspect from the sensory pain, but it is a less 
likely explanation of what is happening. I think it is more likely that hypnosis changes our 
attitude towards an unpleasant pain experience; we are able to change certain mental states 
such as beliefs and desires through hypnosis, and as a result of this we embrace our 
unpleasant pain. If we still have a conscious experience of pain, by thinking that it is fine 
to have that experience, or by managing to want it, we can obtain a different and much 
less aversive reaction to an unpleasant pain, especially if it is mildly unpleasant. This 
seems to be a more likely interpretation of what hypnosis is doing than thinking that 
hypnosis changes the phenomenology of an unpleasant pain by only vanishing its 
unpleasantness away.24 
All in all, I think that the most plausible interpretation for lobotomy cases is that if these 
people still have conscious experiences of pain, then these experiences remain unpleasant. 
What explains the change in people’s behaviour, their indifference, does not come from a 
change in the pain experience, but from a change in their emotions about those still 
unpleasant pains. I think that this is highly consistent with the reports from lobotomised 
patients. It is also a plausible explanation of the effects of morphine and hypnosis, and it is 
in line with pain being the paradigmatic example of an unpleasant experience. In the face 
of the evidence, I do not think there are enough reasons to drop the very strong intuition 
that pains are actually unpleasant. That said, I think it is time now to address the strongest 
candidate of a condition where people might have pains that are not unpleasant. 																																																								23 It is worth pointing out that Klein (2015a) defends that morphine cases and pain asymbolia should be 
understood similarly. I explain his view on pain asymbolia in the upcoming section of this chapter. 24 For more on the effects of hypnosis on the unpleasantness of pain a see Rainville et al. (1999). 
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5.1.4 Pain indifference due to lesion: pain asymbolia  
Pain asymbolia is a neurological condition that has drawn a lot of attention in the 
philosophical discussion about pain (see Bain, 2013; Corns, 2014; Grahek, 2007; Gray, 
2014; Klein, 2015a; Vignemont, 2015). This condition, some philosophers think, provides 
strong evidence of the existence of pains that are not unpleasant. In other words, there 
might be mental states that instantiate the phenomenal property of being a pain but 
without instantiating any phenomenal property of unpleasantness. Asymbolics do not react 
in the usual way to harmful stimuli that would normally cause pain, yet they claim that 
they feel pain. Moreover, they say their pains do not hurt and sometimes start smiling or 
laughing when such noxious stimuli is applied to them. Schilder and Stengel (1928) 
provide the case of a woman diagnosed with pain asymbolia.  
[She] displays a striking behavior in the presence of pain. She reacts either not 
at all or insufficiently to being pricked, struck with hard objects, and pinched... 
Pricked on the right palm, the patient smiles joyfully, winces a little, and then 
says, “Oh, pain, that hurts". She laughs, and reaches the hand further toward 
the investigator…” (Schilder & Stengel, 1928, p. 147)25 
This rare condition is explained as the result of a lesion in the posterior insula, typically 
caused by strokes and brain tumours in adulthood (Berthier, Starkstein, & Leiguarda, 
1988). Grahek (2007) brought philosophical attention to these cases; he thinks that pain 
asymbolia proves the existence of pains that are not unpleasant. According to Grahek, 
normal pain experiences have many components. Among these, there is a sensory 
component, which is associated with the detection of stimuli harmful for the body, and an 
affective/motivational component, which constitutes the unpleasant and motivational 
aspect of pain. That is, an unpleasant pain is composed of: i) the sensory pain aspect and 
ii) an unpleasant aspect. Grahek thinks that people with pain asymbolia have the former 
aspect but lack the latter, i.e., they do have a pain experience, but their pain is not 
unpleasant and, therefore, they are not motivated to avoid the stimuli responsible for their 
pain. In other words, asymbolics have a mental state that only instantiates the sensory 
aspect of pain, and given that it is in virtue of being unpleasant that a normally unpleasant 
pain motivates action, the lack of unpleasantness explains the lack of avoidance behaviour 
to harmful stimuli. 
																																																								25 From Klein (2015b, p. 142). 
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Not everyone agrees with Grahek. Klein (2015a) argues for a different interpretation of 
pain asymbolia. Klein thinks that asymbolics’ lack of motivation in the presence of pain 
experience is due to losing “a general capacity to care about their bodily integrity” (Klein, 
2015a, p. 493). That is to say, the lesion caused after a stroke or a tumour is responsible 
for a general lack of care about one’s own bodily integrity. Asymbolics do not care about 
their body so they are not motivated to act in relation to their pains, even if they are still 
unpleasant; “patients are indifferent to pain not because the pain has changed, but because 
they no longer appreciate it as a command worth following.” (Klein, 2015a, p. 512) 
Another way of putting this is that care is a necessary condition for motivation, and since 
asymbolics lack the relevant care, their unpleasant pains are not motivational. If 
asymbolics have lost the care for their body integrity, the idea goes, they have also lost the 
care for the unpleasantness of their pains.  
Klein’s explanation of pain asymbolia is similar to Trigg’s regarding lobotomy. That is to 
say, both think that pains are felt in the same way as usual. The explanation in Trigg’s and 
Klein’s proposals consists in a change in the patients who have pain experiences that are 
still unpleasant, not in the experience itself. According to Trigg, the lack of anxiety and 
emotional response explains the indifference of lobotomised patients to their unpleasant 
pains; Klein thinks that the lack of bodily care accounts for the indifference in asymbolics 
to their own unpleasant pains. This general lack of bodily care, Klein thinks, is confirmed 
by asymbolics’ behaviour more generally. This behaviour is sometimes neglected in the 
explanations of pain asymbolia. For example, asymbolics fail to show a normal response 
when matches are struck close to their face and eyes, and when they are presented with 
loud noises or strong flashes. Klein argues that his explanation is better that Grahek’s 
because the lack of bodily care also explains asymbolics’ general lack of motivation to 
avoid many threats and dangerous situations. According to Klein, asymbolics' general lack 
of care about the integrity of their bodies also explains that having matches struck close to 
their face is not enough to motivate action.  
However, not everyone agrees with Klein. Namely, we could argue that precisely because 
asymbolics lack that care, their pains stop being unpleasant (Bain, 2013). Bain thinks that 
pain is not unpleasant for asymbolics precisely because they have lost their capacity to 
care about their body integrity, which also explains more generally their strange behaviour 
in the presence of danger. Let us recall that Bain defends a form of mental content 
theories, BAP, as we explained in Chapter One. He defends a form of evaluativism, the 
idea that pain’s unpleasantness consists in representing a bodily disturbance as being bad; 
a pain is unpleasant insofar as the bodily disturbance is represented as being bad. 
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According to Bain, Klein is right to think that asymbolics have lost their capacity to care 
about their body integrity, which thus explains why they don’t care about bodily damage 
either and why they do not react normally in the presence of dangerous stimuli. However, 
this lack of care also implies that asymbolics stop representing their bodily disturbances as 
being bad. That is to say, pain, for asymbolics, stopped being unpleasant. 
De Vignemont (2015) offers an interesting turn. If she is right, both Klein and Bain must 
be wrong. She argues that the lack of bodily care does not imply that pain stops being 
unpleasant for asymbolics. De Vignemont discusses the cases of somatoparaphrenia: 
people who experience pain in an ‘alien’ part of their body, i.e., a part that they do not 
identify as their own. These patients, she argues, do not care about the alien part of their 
body or about the pain felt in the alien part of their body. In short, somatoparaphrenia 
patients do not care about the integrity of their alien body parts. However, they still feel 
pain and are motivated to avoid it, which implies that they still have unpleasant pains and 
are thus motivated in relation to this experience. For example, a somatoparaphrenia patient 
may identify her right hand as not being really hers; however, even if this patient says that 
such a hand is not really hers and that the felt unpleasant pain isn’t hers either, she 
nonetheless still acts in order to protect the hand from the stimuli that causes the 
unpleasant pain. 
If this is correct, it challenges Bain and Klein’s idea that the lack of bodily care explains 
asymbolics' strange behaviour in relation to pain: somatoparaphrenia cases show that one 
could experience an unpleasant pain and react normally to it, even if one does not care 
about one’s own body. In others words, the somatoparaphrenia cases that de Vignemont 
points out show that Bain is wrong, i.e., care is not necessary for having unpleasant pain 
experiences, one might not care and still have an unpleasant pain. This goes against Bain 
since he thinks that if we do not care about our own body, then the pain is not unpleasant. 
Somatoparaphenia patients show exactly the opposite: one could have an unpleasant pain 
without caring about one’s own body. Somatoparaphrenia also shows that Klein is wrong, 
i.e., care about our body integrity is not necessary for motivation in relation to an 
unpleasant pain. Klein thinks that if one does not care, then one won’t be motivated, 
however, somatoparaphrenia cases show the opposite. Somatoparaphrenia patients do not 
care about their own body and yet they are still motivated to avoid their pains.26  
																																																								26 See Klein (2017) for a recent response to de Vignemont’s critique regarding motivation. Even if Klein’s 
response were correct, this does not entail the existence of non-unpleasant pains.  
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So where are we? How can we account for asymbolics' odd behaviour in the presence of 
noxious stimuli, together with the fact that they claim to feel pain? If de Vignemont’s 
mention of somatoparaphrenia undermines Klein and Bain’s interpretations of pain 
asymbolia, should we conclude, as Grahek did, that asymbolics experience pain without 
unpleasantness? Is there another alternative explanation for pain asymbolia? Yes, it could 
be that asymbolics do not actually experience pain at all. Gray (2014) proposes this 
possibility based on an intensive theory of pain. He defends that pain is not a sensory 
modality like vision, hearing, touch, etc., that provides us with information from physical 
stimuli. Instead, pain “has the role of warning us of excessively intense physical stimuli.” 
(Gray, 2014, p. 95) We experience pain when we receive stimuli through other sense 
modalities, and when we represent that the stimuli are so intense that it would normally 
cause harm, then we feel pain.  
For example, when we represent an intense change in temperature or pressure, we 
experience pain. More precisely, a pain is the representation of a change in temperature or 
pressure that is so intense that it might result in bodily damage. This could be understood 
as what constitutes the phenomenal property of being a pain. Based on this account, Gray 
(2014) thinks about asymbolics that: 
The threshold at which stimuli cause pain is raised in asymbolics such that 
stimuli that previously exceeded the threshold and triggered the experience of 
pain no longer do so. Asymbolics still think of their experiences in terms of 
pain because they remain very intense. (Gray, 2014, p. 95) 
In other words, we could understand pain asymbolia as an example of acquired 
insensitivity. That is, if we accept Gray’s interpretation of pain asymbolia, we could 
explain that asymbolics were able to experience pain, but due to a lesion after a stroke 
they become incapable of experiencing pain. Their threshold for detecting that a stimulus 
is dangerous is so high that they do not experience pain anymore. They become unable to 
represent when stimuli detected in other sensory modalities are so intense that they may 
lead to injury. Moreover, if we accepted Gray’s account of pain asymbolia, we could 
explain that this is also coherent with asymbolics’ general strange behaviour: they do not 
react to other dangerous stimuli because they have lost a general capacity to represent 
danger. One of the results of this general loss of the ability to represent damage is that 
they cannot feel pain, since having a pain consists in representing when stimuli from other 
sensory modalities would cause injury, viz., when the stimuli becomes dangerous. In 
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short, if we accept Gray’s proposal, we could argue that pain asymbolia is actually a case 
of acquired pain insensitivity. 
However, we could still wonder: why do asymbolics claim to feel pain while other pain 
insensitives do not? People who were born with congenital pain insensitivity and the 
soldiers coming from the battlefield have said that, at least generally, they did not feel 
pain. In contrast, asymbolics clearly say that they do. How can we explain such 
difference? I think we can answer that asymbolics confuse their intense experiences of 
other sensory modalities with pain. In contrast to other cases like congenital pain 
insensitivity, asymbolics could normally experience pain before they suffered their lesion. 
They were used to having intense experiences that resulted in unpleasant pains, and now 
they still have experiences as intense as the ones that resulted in pain, but without the pain 
that used to accompany these intense experiences from other sensory modalities; they 
continue to call intense experience like this ‘pain’. 
Let me try to be clearer. The idea is that asymbolics confuse: i) intense experiences that 
are not unpleasant coming from another sensory modality such as pressure or 
thermoception with ii) having a pain that is not unpleasant. They call the intense 
experience of another sensory modality ‘a pain that is not unpleasant’. They get confused 
because such intense experience of touch, say, used to be accompanied by an unpleasant 
pain. For instance, when an asymbolic was burned before the lesion, she would feel an 
intense thermal experience, a sensation of warmth, and eventually a pain. However now, 
after the lesion, she only continues to feel the intense sensation of warmth. This translates 
into her saying that she still has a pain that is not unpleasant. If this looks like an eccentric 
explanation, pain asymbolia is a very uncommon condition, so it shouldn’t be too 
shocking to have an odd solution for a strange phenomenon. 
There is a remaining question to be asked: how do we explain the difference between pain 
asymbolia and cases of acquired pain insensitivity such as in the wounded soldiers? Why 
don’t these soldiers also say that they feel pain? I think we can give an explanation for 
this. Let us recall that the wounded soldiers only stopped feeling pain in relation to their 
major wounds. However, for obvious reason, the doctors and nurses did not apply intense 
noxious stimuli to the areas where these soldiers were significantly injured to investigate 
if they still felt pain. If they did, maybe the soldiers would have given similar reports to 
the asymbolics’ and say that they felt pain in those areas, but that it was not unpleasant. 
However, in the lack of evidence, I think that it is a plausible explanation to argue that 
pain asymbolics do not feel pain.  
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I think that in order to decide how to best interpret pain asymbolia, we should recapitulate 
what has been discussed so far. We have seen four interpretations of pain asymbolia: i) 
Grahek’s, who thinks that asymbolics have pains that are not unpleasant, which explains 
their odd behaviour; ii) Klein’s, who thinks that they still have pains that are unpleasant, 
but that they lost their capacity to care about their body integrity which explains their odd 
behaviour; iii) Bain’s, who thinks that asymbolics’ pains are not unpleasant, but they are 
not unpleasant because they have lost their capacity to care; and iv) Gray’s, who thinks 
that asymbolics have lost their capacity to feel pain, which could be explained, I think, as 
a general lost capacity to represent danger. Klein’s and Bain’s approaches were 
disqualified as possible explanations by de Vignemont’s cases of somatoparaphrenia, that 
show that care is not necessary for motivation and it is not necessary for pain being 
unpleasant either. So we have to decide between Grahek’s view, and what I take to be a 
more developed version of Gray’s approach. 
I think that we should opt for the latter for a simple yet strong reason: pain is the 
paradigmatic example of an unpleasant experience. That is to say, there is a very strong 
intuition that pain might entail, or at least usually involve, unpleasantness. If X is 
paradigmatically an example of Y, we should have very strong evidence to make us 
change our mind. However, I don’t think we have very strong evidence to accept the 
actual existence of pains that are not unpleasant. Let me offer an analogy. I take it that 
rape is a paradigmatic example of something wrong, something that should not be done. 
That is, it is very hard to find a scenario where rape can be conceived as something that is 
not wrong. Maybe one could say that, in a very utilitarian way, if we could save humanity 
at the cost of one rape, then that rape would not be that wrong. However, we could argue 
that, all else being equal, i.e., beyond some ultimate calculation of costs and benefits, rape 
is in itself wrong. The main idea is that if we have the intuition that rape is a paradigmatic 
example of something wrong, we have to be confronted with a very strong 
counterexample to be willing to drop our intuition. In analogy, we would have to be 
confronted with quite indubitable evidence of a pain experience that is not unpleasant to 
accept that this actually occurs. After careful examination of possible cases of pain that 
might not be unpleasant, I do not think that the evidence is strong enough to renounce the 
intuition of pain being in fact always unpleasant.  
Finally, even in pain asymbolia, which is meant to be the clearest example of a pain 
experience that is not hedonic, Schilder and Stengel’s patient says “Oh pain, that hurts”. 
That might imply that, whatever she is feeling, it is unpleasant, and thus shows that it 
cannot be a pain that is not unpleasant. So, whether or not she is feeling a pain, as long as 
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her experience is unpleasant, it is not a case that puts into question the paradigmatically 
unpleasant nature of pain. Pain asymbolia seems to be the clearest example of a pain that 
is not hedonic, but the evidence is not conclusive about asymbolics feeling pains that are 
not unpleasant.27 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed the possibility of experiences instantiating the property of 
being a pain without also being unpleasant. After careful consideration, I think that there 
is not strong enough evidence to renounce the intuition that pains are always, in fact, 
unpleasant. This is supported by the general idea that pain is the paradigmatic example of 
an unpleasant experience. This analysis allows us to have a better understanding of 
different situations where people experience pain and the relation between pain and 
unpleasantness. There is one last important candidate of a pain experience that is not 
unpleasant that should be considered. So far we have examined the possibility of a pain 
experience not being hedonic, i.e., being neither pleasant nor unpleasant. In the upcoming 
chapter I will focus on masochism and the possibility of having pains that are pleasant 
rather than unpleasant. 
																																																								27 There is an interesting possibility of unpleasant experiences without having the normally associated pain 
aspect. Ploner, Freund, and Schnitzler (1999) present a case like this. I will go into more detail about this 
possibility in Chapter Seven.  
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CHAPTER 6: MASOCHISM 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Masochism is an interesting case for understanding the nature of pain and unpleasantness. 
It is interesting in the sense that it seems to entail two inconsistent things: i) pain is 
unpleasant and we should avoid it because of such unpleasantness, and yet ii) masochists 
are attracted to pain experiences, they pursue these experiences even if they are 
unpleasant. How can we explain that masochists seek out pain experiences if, as we 
established in the previous chapter, it seems that all actual instances of pain are 
unpleasant? Are there instances of pains that are only pleasant? If there are examples of 
pains that are only pleasant, this would explain why masochists are attracted to these pain 
experiences and show that there are non-unpleasant pains. 
I will delineate different scenarios where people seek out pain experiences and make sense 
of them. I will refer to all these as masochistic cases. In doing this, I will show that the 
term ‘masochism’ has been used to refer to many different circumstances. My main aim is 
to describe the different scenarios where people seek out pain experiences, and explain the 
reasons why they might do so. By analysing these cases, we will understand the reasons 
why we might intentionally pursue pain, and confirm whether there are instances where 
people seem to experience pains that are only pleasant, i.e., that people experience pains 
that are non-unpleasant.  
First, I will discuss means-ends masochism. This is the most common explanation of what 
is occurring during scenarios where people seek out pain. Broadly, people might pursue 
pain even if it is unpleasant because it is the means for something else that is what is really 
being pursued. I will argue that these are cases where the pain is pursued because it is 
unpleasant. I think that there are two clear examples of this in the literature about 
masochism: i) when a pain is pursued as a means for the feeling of submission, and ii) 
when a pain is pursued as a means for punishment.  
Second, I will consider side effect pains. These cases might seem very similar to the 
previous category. However, in these situations people have pain experiences without the 
pain having an instrumental role. Going to the dentist is a typical example where this 
occurs, i.e., we might have to put up with an unpleasant pain in order to have better dental 
health, but it is not in virtue of feeling this pain that our health improves. The pain is a 
side effect, it does not play an instrumental role in itself; it is rather collateral damage. I do 
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not think that these are cases of masochism because the pain experience is not sought out, 
i.e., the pain is not intentionally pursued. I think these cases should be pointed out so they 
are not confused with means-end masochism. For example, some cases that are considered 
as sexual masochism, I think, fall under this category. 
Third, I will give an account of end-in-itself masochism. In these cases pain is pursued as 
an end, which might suggest that it is not unpleasant. I will divide this category into two 
sub-categories. First, I will explain context masochism. In these cases a pain might be 
pursued as an end in the sense that the pain is an essential part of a whole. It is the whole 
that is sought out, strictly speaking; however, since a pain partially constitutes the whole, 
then the pain is also pursued as an end. A good example of something like this is, I think, 
when we want our food to be spicy. The second type of end-in-itself masochism is 
masochistic pleasures. These cases can be understood as people having token experiences 
that are pleasant and unpleasant simultaneously (Klein, 2014). According to Klein, the 
unpleasantness of a pain might be pleasant under certain circumstances.  
Different authors have proposed various ways of understanding what masochism is, but I 
think that what they were really doing was to describe different types of masochism, 
different versions of a common phenomenon. The common feature in all these types of 
masochism is that people seek out the feeling of pain. However, the reasons why they seek 
out these experiences may differ. Moreover, it does not seem like people seek out pain 
experiences that are only pleasant. There is no conclusive evidence of non-unpleasant 
pains in the literature on masochism. 
 
6.1 Means-end masochism 
The most common attempt in the philosophical literature to explain masochism is to argue 
that masochists do not really want to have a pain for itself. Rather, what is really 
happening during masochism is that someone may pursue pain "as a means to some end... 
backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism.” (Nagel, 1986, pp. 156–157) In 
this first section I will show different ways in which pains may have instrumental value, 
which explain why we engage in such experiences because they are unpleasant.  
The term ‘masochism’ was first introduced in medicine by Kraft-Ebing (1892) as a 
psychiatric condition, together with other terms such as ‘homosexuality’ and ‘fetishism’. 
The word was inspired by the name of the writer Leopold Sacher-Masoch. Severin, the 
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main character in Sacher-Masoch’s book Venus in Furs (1870),28 could be characterised 
as what Kraft-Ebing called a masochist. The fact that Kraft-Ebing was creating a 
classification of abnormal sexual behaviour is responsible, I suspect, for associating 
masochism with some form of pathological sexual behaviour. According to Kraft-Ebing, 
the key feature of masochism is not that pains are a means for sexual gratification, as 
masochism is often understood. Instead, pains were a means for feeling submissive. 
According to Kraft-Ebing, masochism is “a peculiar perversion of the psychical vita 
sexualis, in which the individual affected, in sexual feeling and thought, is controlled by 
the idea of being completely and unconditionally subject to the will of a person of the 
opposite sex; of being treated by this person as by a master —humiliated and abused.” 
(Krafft-Ebing, 1892, p. 89) In the original understanding of masochism, a masochist is not 
someone who seeks out pain for its own sake, pains is rather sought out as a means for 
something else. I think that the key feature in these cases is that it does not seem like pain 
experiences are not unpleasant. On the contrary, these cases suggest that the pains 
involved must be unpleasant. It is important that the pains are unpleasant because this 
helps to achieve the feeling of submission. When masters inflict pain on masochists, 
masochists would not feel that that their masters are really controlling them, that they are 
being humiliated and abused, if their pains were not unpleasant. For masochists to feel 
submissive, it is important that the pains inflicted on them are unpleasant.  
Kraft-Ebing distinguished masochism from sexual bondage; the latter is, in fact, much 
closer to what the current medical definitions take masochism to be, and what we often 
have in mind when we think of masochism. Sexual bondage was understood as the use of 
pain as a means for some form of sexual satisfaction. According to Kraft-Ebing, in sexual 
bondage people use pain, or other unpleasant experiences, as a means for sexual pleasure. 
In his words: 
Sexual bondage is not a perversion and not pathological; the elements from 
which it arises - love and weakness of will - are not perverse… In masochism, 
which is decidedly abnormal and a perversion, this is all very different… I 
repeat that the decisive points, in the differentiation of simple passive 
flagellation from flagellation dependent upon masochistic desire, are that, in 
the former, the act is a means to make coitus, or at least ejaculation, possible; 
																																																								28 See reprinted version (Sacher-Masoch, 2004). 
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and that, in the latter, it is a means of gratification of masochistic desires. 
(Krafft-Ebing, 1892, p. 144–147) 
Kraft-Ebing says that in sexual bondage flagellation is “means to make coitus, or at least 
ejaculation, possible”, but is not clear about what it is in flagellation that makes these 
possible. Is it the experience of a pain in itself that makes ejaculation possible? It is not 
obvious how this might be. As opposed to what Kraft-Ebing describes as masochism, it is 
not clear that in sexual bondage the pain experience plays an instrumental role. It could be 
that what is making the ejaculation possible is not the pain sensation itself, strictly 
speaking, but the arousal produced by the flagellation. 
This lack of precision about the role of the pain experience is shared with the 
contemporary psychiatric definitions of masochism. According to these, an unpleasant 
pain might be desired and pursued as a means to obtain sexual pleasure. Masochists, it is 
claimed, use pain, and other typically unpleasant practices like being bound, beaten, 
asphyxiated, and humiliated, as means to sexual satisfaction.29 However, these approaches 
to masochism do not clarify how pain plays an instrumental role in achieving sexual 
satisfaction. In fact, I think that in these cases the pain experience is not a means for 
sexual satisfaction, rather, they should be explained as examples of side effect pain. I will 
come back to these cases to argue that they do not seem to involve pains that are not 
unpleasant and, contrary to what might be thought, the pain experiences involved are not a 
means, they do not play an instrumental role for sexual pleasure. Whereas in masochism, 
as understood by Kraft-Ebing, the pain experience does seem to have an instrumental role 
for achieving the feeling of submission, it is not clear how the feeling of pain has an 
instrumental role in order to achieve sexual satisfaction in sexual bondage.  
There is another example where people seek out pains, and these experiences do have an 
instrumental role. Goldstein (1983) offers this case. He argues that masochism is better 
understood as an example of irrational and abnormal self-punishment; masochism consists 
in using an unpleasant pain as a means for undeserved self-punishment. In his words: 
[T]here is some pain and unpleasantness which the masochist does want, 
namely, that which he deliberately inflicts… At the moment when Lise is 
slamming the door on her finger she is desiring that pain. Though there might 
be some pleasure and happiness which she does desire, namely, that which she 																																																								29 Two good examples of these contemporary accounts of masochism are the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), and the 10th revision of the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10). 
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feels upon punishing herself… Philosophers sometimes think of the masochist 
as a calculating hedonist… Though there may be strains of reason in 
masochism, the concept of masochism entails irrationality and abnormality. 
(Goldstein, 1983, p. 223) 
I take it that Goldstein thinks that it is in virtue of pain’s unpleasantness, and the fact that 
unpleasantness is bad, that pain may be a means for punishment. If pain were not 
unpleasant and bad, it would not be a means for punishment. The fact that pain is 
unpleasant has an instrumental role for constituting a way of punishment, including self-
punishment. Moreover, there might also be an element of pleasure involved, since 
punishment may relieve guilt and this might feel good. In either case, the unpleasantness 
of pain plays an instrumental role for punishment, regardless of such punishment 
additionally entailing some form of pleasure through relief. Goldstein argues that not all 
cases of self-punishment that involve pain are masochistic, though. He thinks that the 
difference between a normal case of self-punishment and masochism is that the latter is 
irrational self-punishment. Masochism is the infliction of an unpleasant pain as a means 
for self-punishment, where there is no good reason to be punished. If, for example, you 
punish yourself for something that you did not do by hurting yourself, this would count as 
masochism according to Goldstein.  
All in all, an unpleasant pain might be pursued because we think of it as means, i.e., 
because we think that the unpleasant pain plays an instrumental role for getting something 
else that we want. Since we believe that an unpleasant pain is a means for something else 
that we want, that unpleasant experience is desired, which explains why people might seek 
out an unpleasant experience. In this way we can explain the motivation to engage in an 
unpleasant pain even if it is unpleasant: we might be motivated to pursue an unpleasant 
pain because we believe that such unpleasant pain will bring about something else that we 
desire, it is in virtue of desiring a pain as a means that we can explain why we sometimes 
seek out an unpleasant pain.  
We can also be justified to seek out an unpleasant pain. That is to say, there might be 
some circumstances where it may be desirable to engage in an unpleasant pain as a means. 
For instance it could be that, all things considered, the final outcome of engaging in an 
unpleasant pain is good enough to compensate for its badness. I do not think that we need 
to enter into the details of what would constitute an end that is good enough to justify an 
unpleasant means. However, this can help us to understand how it might be worth seeking 
out unpleasant experiences as a means. If the final outcome is good enough, the end may 
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justify the means, even when the means is an unpleasant pain. I think that the crucial 
feature in means-end masochism is that people intentionally pursue an unpleasant pain 
because such experience is desired as a means for something else, whether or not there are 
good reasons to seek out that unpleasant pains as a means.  
 
6.2 Side effect pains 
There is a different type of case that might be easily mistaken for means-end masochism. 
People might willingly and knowingly put up with unpleasant pains, but without the 
experience really being a means. Rather, the pain is sometimes a side effect of what is 
really being pursued. We are aware that certain activities will result in a pain experience, 
yet we still engage in such activities; however, after more careful analysis, we can notice 
that pain is not playing an instrumental role. This may appear strange; why would 
someone engage in an activity that entails an unpleasant pain if unpleasantness is bad? 
And why would one do so if the unpleasantness of the experience is not a means to an 
end? The explanation is that, sometimes, unpleasant experiences are a side effect of other 
things that we might pursue as a means or as an end. That is to say, we sometimes engage 
in activities that involve unpleasant pains because they are an unavoidable side effect of 
something that we intentionally pursue. I think that Armstrong is an example of a theorist 
running different cases together:30 
It is true that we may endure pain, some even enduring it quite gladly, for the 
sake of something else. But this does not imply that we have a favourable 
attitude to the pain itself… [T]he case of the masochist, and also the type of 
neurotic who ‘seeks punishment’, may be raised here ... What happens, I 
think, is that he finds certain features of some situations so pleasurable that he 
willingly puts up with the pain for the sake of that pleasure. If this is correct, 
then we all act like masochists when we deliberately swallow scalding hot tea 
in order to warm ourselves up, or get into what is initially a hot bath. All 
these things involve a good deal of ‘hedonic sophistication’: we have to brace 
ourselves to some degree to do these things for the ultimate pleasure they 
bring. (Armstrong, 1962, p. 90–91, my emphasis) 
																																																								30 See Trigg’s (1970, p. 157-162) discussion on the “enjoyment of pain” for a list of cases where, I think, 
means-end masochism is run together with side effect pains.  
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When Armstrong considers the cases of the “neurotic who ‘seeks punishment’”, this looks 
quite similar to what Goldstein had in mind: one might put up with an unpleasant pain 
because the unpleasant pain is taken to be a means. In contrast, when Armstrong talks 
about putting up with an unpleasant experience produced by drinking scalding hot tea, this 
does not imply that the unpleasant experience in itself is a means to an end. More 
precisely, an unpleasant pain may be an unavoidable consequence of the real means. The 
unpleasantness of this experience is playing no instrumental role in achieving the pursued 
end, in contrast to means-end masochism. When one puts up with the scalding water that 
burns one’s tongue in order to warm up, it is not in virtue of one’s tongue being burned, or 
of that burning experience being unpleasant, that one gets warmer; one gets warmer 
because the water that one drinks is hot, which has some bodily consequences that result 
in one feeling warmer. The fact that drinking scalding water might entail an unpleasant 
experience is a side effect of the means in order to get warm through drinking such hot 
water. Burning one’s tongue and this being unpleasant is not a means; it is a side effect of 
the real means, where the end is to get warmer. 
Many other cases might look as if some unpleasant pain, or its unpleasantness in 
particular, is a means to an end, but it is rather a side effect of the actual means. Going to 
the dentist would be a clear example of something like this. We do not go to the dentist 
because it hurts, we go even if it hurts. Most medical procedures that cause unpleasant 
pain take this form, I think. For example, you might need an injection in order get 
analgesics and, as a consequence, feel better. You really dislike injections because they 
hurt, but, at the same time, you feel really bad and finally get the injection that produces 
an unpleasant pain. In a sense, you want the unpleasant pain produced by the injection, 
that is, you are willing to put up with the unpleasant pain in order to feel better, which 
does not mean that feeling this unpleasant pain plays an instrumental role in making you 
feel better. In other words, if the injection were painless, it would still constitute the means 
to its end. If the unpleasantness of the experience produced by the injection were needed 
for feeling better, then such unpleasantness would be a means, but this is not the case. 
Similarly, we are willing to put up with the unpleasant pains of many medical procedures 
because such procedures are the means for something else. However, it is not in virtue of 
these procedures being painful that we get better. The same happens with an unpleasant 
tooth extraction with the dentist. It is not because the extraction hurts that we get the 
extraction. The unpleasant pain is only a side effect of a means. 
There is another kind of case in which we might put up with an unpleasant pain as a side 
effect: the unpleasant experience might be a side effect of an end. We might be willing to 
	 136	
put up with an unpleasant experience because it is the result of something else that we 
want. However, in this case, the thing that we want might not necessarily be a means. For 
example, suppose that you want to celebrate that you finished your PhD thesis by drinking 
a whole bottle of champagne. Let us suppose that drinking a bottle of champagne is, as a 
way of celebration, an end in itself. However, you know that you always get a really bad 
hangover and your head hurts intensely when you drink alcohol. You are really joyful and 
finally decide to drink the whole bottle for celebration’s sake. Why would you do this if 
you know it is going to be unpleasant to have a really bad headache afterwards? A good 
way to explain this is that when you take the decision, you are willing to put up with the 
consequences of your end. There are, indeed, many things that we want and for which we 
are willing to put up with the possible unwanted side effects, where unpleasant pains are 
one of those side effects.  
We can explain the motivations behind these two different types of cases. We could shed 
light on why we engage in activities that involve unpleasant pains by appealing to our 
desires about our means or our ends, even if we know there are unavoidable unpleasant 
consequences of our means and of our ends. Moreover, it might be sometimes sensible to 
put up with the unpleasantness of a pain in order to achieve certain means or certain ends. 
It seems that it is often rational to go to the dentist, for instance. When we go to the 
dentist, the benefits in terms of health outweigh the badness of the unpleasantness that we 
might have to endure, and the same can be said for many medical procedures. 
Going back to the psychiatric definitions of masochism and of sexual bondage, it is not 
obvious in these cases how the experience of pain plays an instrumental role in order to 
achieve sexual satisfaction. If these so called masochists would prefer to experience the 
same sexual satisfaction without having to experience pain, this would show that 
masochism as understood by the medical definitions is rather a case of side effect pain. If 
we do not consider that going to the dentist is masochism, we might want to stop 
considering people who pursue certain activities that involve pain as a means for sexual 
satisfaction as masochists. However, we might think that there is a fundamental difference 
between these scenarios. One might think that only masochism entails an element of 
irrationality, or of abnormality. Again, we could want to draw a distinction between side 
effect pain cases, like going to the dentist, and ‘real masochism’, which implies 
irrationality or abnormality. We might have the intuition that there is something abnormal 
about masochism, whereas it is very common and even desirable to put up with certain 
unpleasant experiences, like when we go to the dentist or undergo other medical 
procedures. We might have this intuition because the term ‘masochism’ implies some sort 
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of deviation, which probably comes from its psychiatric origins. Some cases of side effect 
pains might involve irrationality, of course, and we might want to identify these as 
‘masochistic’. I can think of two clear cases. 
First, it would be irrational if we could achieve an end without having to put up with the 
unpleasantness of a means, yet we chose to experience that means, which involves an 
unpleasant experience. This type of scenario would be equivalent to going to the dentist 
for a tooth extraction and choosing to have no sedation, even if this would not bring about 
any benefit. Second, it would also be irrational if the goodness of the end were not good 
enough to compensate for the badness of the means, yet we choose to go through the 
unpleasant consequences of the means. For example, it would not be desirable to have a 
tooth extracted with no analgesia, in order to take care of a minor decay. We might think 
that the cases of sexual masochism, such as the ones considered by psychiatry, involve 
irrationality, and that is why only these are masochistic. In contrast, going to the dentist 
normally involves good reasons, which explains why it is not masochistic.  
I think that we should not worry too much about which cases deserve to be called 
‘masochism’, as long as we notice that there is a distinction to be drawn. The question of 
how we should call each of these cases is terminological and, even if it might be 
important, it is not the main focus of this chapter. In some occasions we put up with the 
unpleasantness of experiences such as a pain because it is the side effect of either a means 
or an end. We might be motivated to put up with such unpleasantness because we desire 
the means or the end, even if we think that the unpleasant experience is an unavoidable 
consequence of our means or of our ends. Further, there are occasions where we might 
have good reasons to put up with such unpleasantness, and in other cases we might not 
have good reasons for enduring it, it is not desirable. I think that it is intuitive to call 
‘masochistic’ the situations where we seek out pain, whether we have good reasons to do 
so or not. In this sense, if someone is putting up with a pain as a side effect in order to get 
sexual satisfaction, and even if there were no good reasons for doing it, that person is not 
seeking out the pain experience. In this way, I do not consider these cases as masochistic, 
since pain is not sought out, strictly speaking.  
In conclusion, none of these cases seem to suggest the existence of pain experiences that 
are not unpleasant. In all side effect cases, the fact that we are willing to put up with pain 
shows that these experiences are unpleasant. Side effect pains are not sought out at all, so 
they do not seem to be examples of purely pleasant pain, i.e., cases of non-unpleasant 
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pains. In contrast, in the next section I will consider cases of pain experience that are 
sought out as an end. 
 
6.3 End-in-itself masochism 
Even if many cases that involve unpleasant pains can be explained by showing that the 
unpleasant experience is not what is pursued in itself, there are other instances that call 
this into question. Numerous examples suggest that people sometimes desire, and 
intentionally pursue, unpleasant pain experiences as an end in itself. But how could it be 
that someone wants to experience something such as pain as an end, if pain is unpleasant, 
if pain is bad in itself? Could there be instances of pains that are pleasant? I think there are 
different ways in which pain can be an end in itself. These are two that appear in the 
philosophical literature about masochism: i) an unpleasant pain can be a part of a pursued 
whole, or ii) an unpleasant pain might be also pleasant. I will now develop each of these 
possibilities. 
 
6.3.1 Contextual masochism 
Some philosophers have noticed that, sometimes, something unpleasant might be a part of 
a whole that is sought. This is different from the previous cases. The unpleasant 
experience is not a means to something else or a side effect; instead, it is a constitutive 
part of a whole, where the whole is sought. The pain does not play an instrumental role in 
order to obtain something distinct, the pain is not a means. The pain is not a side effect 
either; it is not something that one is willing to put up with, and that has no instrumental 
role, in order to obtain something else. Instead, the pain is a part of a whole, and it is the 
whole that is desired as an end in itself. Pitcher (1970), for example, thinks the following 
about masochism:  
It is important to note that the masochist does not just put up with the pain, 
enduring it merely because the rest of the scene is so wonderful: on that 
account, we would all be masochists when we had a tooth removed or drank 
some ghastly medicine. No, the situation would lose its appeal for the 
masochist if the pain were to be removed from it. (Pitcher, 1970, p. 484, my 
emphasis) 
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I think that there are a few points to make about what Pitcher says. First, “putting up with 
the pain” may mean two different things: i) it could be that the pain is a side effect, where 
the pain does not have an instrumental role, or ii) it could be that the pain is sought as a 
means, where the pain plays an instrumental role. It is not obvious that Pitcher notices 
these two different cases. That said, he has arguably identified yet another kind of case 
where people seek out a pain experience. People want to feel pain because, otherwise, “the 
situation would lose its appeal”. I think that Pitcher uses the term ‘masochism’ in a 
different way than the previous authors, and I think he offers a good example of the type 
of scenario that would count as contextual masochism:  
The notion of "liking (or disliking) something in itself” or of "finding 
something pleasant (or unpleasant) in itself" is a tricky one, and not at all so 
clear as it might superficially look to be. Suppose Agnew heartily dislikes 
olives, but is fond of paellas that contain them. And we are to imagine not that 
he barely tolerates the presence of the loathed olives in his paella; so that he 
loves the dish despite them: on the contrary, we are to suppose that he regards 
the olives as constituting a necessary ingredient in a really good paella —
without them, it would be far less interesting. (Pitcher, 1970, p. 484, my 
emphasis) 
There are a few things that I think should be said about Pitcher’s example. First, paellas 
don’t really have olives! But more importantly, this example provides us with an idea of 
what it may mean to seek out, desire, like, engage in, etc. a pain experience when it comes 
to contextual masochism. That is to say, in this scenario Agnew dislikes olives in 
themselves, but he likes them when they are part of paella. Why does Agnew only like 
olives when they are part of paella? This could be interpreted in different ways. It could be 
that olives taste different to Agnew when eaten as part of paella. It could be that now they 
have a pleasant taste. This could be possible. However, I think that Pitcher’s intuition is 
that whether or not olives’ flavour changes in some respect for Agnew, the important thing 
is that the taste of olives remains unpleasant. 
The taste of olives is unpleasant for Agnew when he eats them on their own, in isolation 
from other flavours; he dislikes olives because their taste is unpleasant. However, when 
Agnew eats olives in paella, that olives’ taste, together with its unpleasantness, is worth 
being pursued when it is accompanied by a myriad of other flavours, textures, aromas, etc. 
that occur when Agnew eats a paella. When the taste of olives is isolated, it is unpleasant 
and not worth pursuing for Agnew; nonetheless, it is an essential ingredient of good 
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paella, according to him. This does not mean that the olives’ taste is no longer unpleasant 
for Agnew when he eats them in paella. Rather, that same unpleasant taste experience is 
an essential part of the whole paella-eating episode. By ‘episode’ I mean a series of 
events, such as different phenomenal experiences, that constitute a whole. The olives in 
paella maintain some of their unpleasantness, which explains why without them, eating 
paella would be far less interesting for Agnew. 
Similarly, other cases where people engage in unpleasant experiences can be analysed as 
contextual masochism. For example, someone may find the whole episode of running a 
marathon worth pursuing. This is not so in the sense that the whole marathon episode is a 
distinctive sensory pleasure, but in the sense that there is something about the whole of 
running a marathon that is worth pursuing. This whole episode has, and must have, certain 
periods of intense unpleasant pain. The moments when one experiences an unpleasant pain 
are essential for the whole marathon episode to be worth pursuing: if running a marathon 
was not hard at some stages, it would not be worth engaging in it for some people. Let us 
illustrate this. 
Suppose that you are running a marathon and you feel a strong pain in your leg at 
kilometre thirty-eight. This unpleasant pain, and particularly its felt unpleasantness, is not 
a means to finish the marathon. It is not in virtue of this unpleasantness that you can get 
the experience of running a full marathon. The unpleasantness of this pain is not tolerated 
as a side effect either. In this particular case, you do not want to run a whole marathon in 
spite of having that pain. Rather, for it to be worth you running a marathon, you must 
overcome certain difficulties such as to continue running despite having unpleasant 
experiences. The felt unpleasantness of pain at kilometre thirty-eight is constitutive, 
according to yourself, of the worthwhile whole marathon episode. You would not want to 
have such unpleasant pain experience in isolation, but in this context the unpleasant pain is 
embraced and is essential to the whole. This does not mean that such pain is not 
unpleasant or bad in itself, but that this pain is wanted as an end because it is constitutive 
of the marathon episode, which is sought out as an end.  
Let us have a look into another culinary example. This one, in contrast with the olives 
case, is an example that involves an unpleasant pain. Contextual masochism may also 
occur with the experience produced by eating spicy food. In the same way that some 
dishes are partially constituted by spicy chilly peppers, the experience resulting from 
eating these dishes is partially constituted by the burning feeling in our mouths as we eat 
the dish. The burning feeling in our mouths that we sometimes feel when we eat spicy 
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food is caused by the capsaicin that some chilly peppers contain. This ingredient is 
partially constitutive of chilly peppers and, therefore, it is also partially constitutive of 
some spicy dishes.31 Some spicy dishes are partially constituted, therefore, by ingredients 
that will cause one to get the feeling of a burn in one’s mouth. The burning feeling is not 
pleasant in itself. The burning feeling caused by spicy chillies is actually unpleasant, but it 
is also a constitutive part of the whole episode of tasting certain spicy dishes. Again, in 
this example the burning feeling in one’s mouth is not the means to obtain some form of 
pleasure, nor does one put up with the burning feeling just in order to taste the other 
flavours of the dish. Instead, the burning feeling is a constitutive aspect of the whole spicy 
food episode. The whole episode of tasting a spicy dish includes an unpleasant burning 
pain as one of its essential parts and, in those terms, such unpleasant experience is pursued 
as an end.  
Once we take this into account we can explain one way in which we might purse 
unpleasant pains as an end. We might be motivated to engage in an experience that is 
partially unpleasant because, all things considered, we believe that the whole episode is 
worth pursuing and desire the episode as a whole. It is in virtue of our beliefs and desires 
about the whole that we can render intelligible one’s behaviour. If the unpleasant pain felt 
while running a marathon were taken out of this context, we would not engage in such an 
experience. But given that it is a constitutive part of an end, we also pursue that unpleasant 
pain as an end. If the end as a whole is actually worth pursuing, that is, if the end is good 
enough, we will then also be justified in engaging in something that is partially composed 
of an unpleasant experience. If the whole is in fact good enough, this would not only 
explain why we might engage in these unpleasant experiences, but it would also constitute 
a good reason for pursuing the whole as an end.  
There might also be circumstances where it might not be worth pursuing the whole. There 
might be situations of irrational contextual masochism. If we eat a spicy dish partially 
because of the burning feeling, or if we run a marathon partially because of the unpleasant 
parts within it, we still might have a good reason to engage and pursue these activities 
because the overall outcome is good enough to compensate the badness that it involves. 
These kinds of behaviour are quite frequent. We might think that there might be, in 
contrast, an irrational version of contextual masochism: the goodness of the overall 
outcome is not heavy enough to tip the balance to the positive side. In these cases, we 
might think that there are no good reasons to actually seek out activities that involve 																																																								31 For more on the effects of capsaicin see Wood (1993). 
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unpleasant experiences. I think this might be possible. There might not be good enough 
reasons for some people to run a marathon. That said, whether it is rational or not, in cases 
of contextual masochism people seek out unpleasant pains that are essential parts of a 
whole. 
So does the fact that we seek out pain in these contexts show that there are non-unpleasant 
pains? These pains are not sought as a means, so we might think that these pains are not 
unpleasant. However, the fact that pain is not sought as an end simpliciter, but as an 
essential part of a broader end, suggests that the pains involved in contextual masochism 
are unpleasant. There seems to be no reason to doubt that these pains, like the ones that we 
have when eating spicy food and while running marathons, are not unpleasant. There 
might be different reasons for seeking out these pains, but the reason does not seem to be 
that they are only pleasant. In the next section I will consider a case where pains are 
claimed to be pleasant.  
 
6.3.2 Masochistic pleasures 
Klein (2014) argues for another type of masochistic scenario. This is another possible type 
of scenario in which we might seek out a pain experience. According to Klein, some token 
experiences such as pain can be both pleasant and unpleasant. Klein calls these masochist 
pleasures. These pleasures might not be sexual and don’t have to be pathological or 
abnormal. He proposes that these masochist pleasures might include experiences such as 
the ones we have when getting body modifications (piercing and tattoos), performing 
hardcore sports (like running a marathon), pleasantly dwelling on one’s anger or jealousy, 
wiggling a loose tooth, enjoying the aesthetic ambivalence of a horror film, eating spicy 
food, being whipped (both in sexual and non-sexual contexts), etc. Klein thinks that 
masochistic pleasures, including pain, are pleasant in addition to being unpleasant and 
because they are unpleasant. In his words: 
To make this more concrete, suppose someone takes pleasure in being 
spanked. The current account says that there will be three distinct features that 
jointly characterize the experience. There is a first-order sensory state, the 
bodily pain, that arises from the spanking itself. That sensory state is painful. It 
hurts. That quality of painfulness is pleasant. The distinctive contribution of 
the penumbral account is to explain just when and why painfulness can be 
pleasant. (Klein, 2014, p. 52) 
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It is worth pointing out that Klein’s terminology is slightly different from the one I have 
been using. What he calls “first order sensory state” is equivalent to the phenomenal 
experience of being a pain, what he calls “painfulness” is what I refer to as being 
unpleasant, and what he calls “pleasant” remains the same in my terminology. According 
to Klein, a pain can be a masochist pleasure when the pain is just within the boundary of 
being bearable. This is the penumbral theory. When an unpleasant experience is just 
within the limits of being bearable, the unpleasantness of such experiences may become 
additionally pleasant. 
There are different reasons that explain why the unpleasantness of pain can also be 
pleasant in these situations, Klein thinks. For example, the unpleasantness of a barely 
bearable pain experience can become pleasant: i) if it is novel, ii) if it allows us to exercise 
self-control, iii) if it stands for special intimacy with someone, iv) if it pushes our own 
boundaries helping us to grow and change, etc. For example, when one is wiggling a loose 
tooth and it is a novel experience, then the unpleasantness of this experience can become 
additionally pleasant; “finding the edge of unbearability might be pleasant precisely 
because it is a surprising and novel discovery.” (Klein, 2014, p. 50, my emphasis) If 
someone is being whipped and this causes an unpleasant pain, but it stands for a special 
intimate relation or pushes one’s own boundaries, the unpleasantness of the pain caused 
by the whipping can become additionally pleasant. These experiences are unpleasant, yet 
they are pursued for themselves, insofar as the unpleasantness of these pains is also 
pleasant.  
There are a few things that I think we must stress about Klein’s view. First, masochistic 
pleasure is not contextual masochism. Klein insists that we should not misunderstand his 
proposal and think pleasantness is predicating the whole, which is partially constituted by 
an unpleasant pain. If this were the case, then masochistic pleasures would actually be a 
case of contextual masochism, i.e., we would judge the whole experience, that includes an 
unpleasant pain as a part, as pleasant and thus worth pursuing. Instead, Klein insists that 
self-control, novelty, intimacy, etc., together with the fact that an unpleasant pain is within 
the limits of being bearable, are the reasons in virtue of which only the unpleasantness of a 
pain might become additionally pleasant.  
It is also important not to confuse Klein’s proposal with means-ends masochism. That is, 
one does not pursue a masochistic pleasure because such experience will bring about 
something else that is pleasurable or pursued as a further end. Instead, some form of 
pleasure partially constitutes the masochistic pleasures, i.e., a masochistic pleasure is 
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composed by being unpleasant and by that unpleasantness being pleasant. One might be 
tempted to think that you wiggle your tooth and seek out pain because this gives you a 
pleasurable “sense of novelty” or a pleasurable “sense of control”. This might be possible, 
but it is not the type of case that Klein considers a masochistic pleasure, which seem to be 
possible too. Finally, the unpleasant pain is not, clearly I think, a side effect of something 
else that is pursued, since the pain is sought out, rather than being something collateral.  
There are a few last remarks about masochistic pleasures that I think are important. First, 
we could have the opposite situation, that is, the pleasantness of an experience being 
additionally unpleasant. I will not go into the details of these cases because it is not very 
clear which experiences could be an example of this; more importantly, these would still 
be unpleasant pains, and we are looking for instances of non-unpleasant pains. Second, 
Klein thinks that masochistic pleasures are very common, which shows that not everybody 
thinks that masochism implies some form of abnormality. Again, what I take to be the 
commonality in all cases of masochism is that people seek out pain experiences. 
Masochistic pleasures illuminate a different reason why we might seek out pains, i.e., we 
might seek out pains that are unpleasant if their unpleasantness is also pleasant. 
It is because of this pleasantness that we can explain why we might be motivated and even 
have a good reason to engage in such masochistic pleasures. Additionally, masochistic 
pleasures may also include other aspects that explain why it may be worth pursuing them. 
For example, in order to have a masochistic pleasure we might also exercise self-control, 
stand in special intimacy with someone, or push our own boundaries thus helping us to 
grow personally. If seeking out pain experiences in masochistic pleasure is good enough, 
all things considered, we might be justified in pursuing masochistic pleasures, even if they 
entail unpleasantness. If the goodness of a masochistic pleasure does not outweigh the 
badness of the unpleasantness that it entails, all things considered, then we would not be 
justified in engaging in such masochistic pleasure. Again, the crucial feature of 
masochistic pleasures is that the unpleasantness of some experiences is additionally 
pleasant. 
So, are there any instances of non-unpleasant pains in masochism? If we had found a case 
of masochism where one seeks out pains that are only pleasant, we could have concluded 
with no doubt that being a pain does not entail being unpleasant. However, I have not 
found any examples that point towards this direction. I do not think that there is clear 
evidence of people for who pain is only pleasant. If this were the case, they would act in 
extremely odd ways and they would be very unlikely to survive. Maybe some people 
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could experience a few pains that are only pleasant. Are there examples of this? I cannot 
think of any crystal clear cases of purely pleasant pains. Moreover, since pain is 
paradigmatically unpleasant, I think that all pains experiences that we have are, in fact, 
unpleasant.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explained a wide diversity of possible masochistic scenarios that 
appear in the philosophical and psychiatric literature. The unifying feature among all of 
them is that they include an experience that is unpleasant, i.e., an experience that is bad in 
itself. We can explain and account for the reasons in virtue of which one might seek out 
such unpleasant experiences. Moreover, we can also explain the situations in which we 
might even be justified to engage in unpleasant pain experiences. Once we analyse the 
different circumstances, we can dissolve the apparent contradiction. We can make sense of 
the different reasons why we might pursue an unpleasant pain. The analysis of all these 
masochistic scenarios sheds light on our interactions with pain and unpleasantness. 
Moreover, it also illuminates the diverse reasons why we might seek out something that is 
bad in itself.  
Even if there are no concrete instances of non-unpleasant pains, not even in masochism, it 
seems at least to be possible that there could be. The fact that we can conceive pain as not 
being hedonic, as we did during the last chapter, and that pain can be purely pleasant, 
suggests that we should have a theory of unpleasantness that allows this possibility. In the 
next chapter I will propose a theory that is able to capture this possibility, while also being 
able to account for the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences, and having other 
advantages in contrast to the content and desire theories.  
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CHAPTER 7: THE HEDONIC DETERMINABLE-DETERMINATE 
THEORY 
7.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I propose a theory that has many virtues. This view maintains the strong 
intuition that unpleasantness is something felt, something phenomenal; it can account for 
the possibility of non-unpleasant pains; it can account for the ploner case, i.e., an example 
for which it is claimed that an unpleasant experience lacks only its pain phenomenal 
aspect; it can easily explain how two sensory experiences can vary only hedonically, i.e., 
one is pleasant and the other unpleasant; and finally, this theory is able to account for the 
heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. This is the hedonic determinable-determinate 
theory (HDDT). In order to explain and defend this theory, I will proceed as follows. 
I will contrast HDDT with the developed version of Crisp’s proposal from Chapter Four. I 
will show how HDDT is a superior theory in many respects. The main difference between 
these theories is that in HDDT, unpleasantness is understood as a determinable property 
that has multiple determinates, i.e., multiple ways of being unpleasant that vary non-
additively; however, being a pain is not one of these ways of being unpleasant. A sensory 
unpleasant experience such as an unpleasant pain is a mental state composed by two 
phenomenal properties: i) the phenomenal property of being a pain, and ii) the 
phenomenal property of being unpleasant in a certain way u1, u2, u3, etc. I will explain in 
detail what this means. 
However, HDDT faces two important difficulties. First, it needs to account for the 
phenomenal variation among different ways of being unpleasant. In other words, if all 
unpleasant pains belong to the same kind, how can we explain that they feel so different 
from one another? I think that HDDT is able to capture this feature. For this, we need to 
explain which might be the dimensions along which different ways of being unpleasant 
may vary. The general idea is that in the same way that different ways of being coloured 
may vary along its dimensions (e.g., hue, saturation, and brightness), unpleasantness also 
has essential dimensions. The variation along these dimensions is what accounts for the 
variations among different ways of being unpleasant, different unpleasantnesses.  
Finally, I will consider a second problem for HDDT. How can we account for the intrinsic 
badness of unpleasantness? To put it simply, it is not obvious why the phenomenal 
property of unpleasantness entails badness. HDDT does not offer a reductive account for 
the unpleasantness of pain, and does not explain why unpleasantness entails badness. 
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However, I will argue that even if HDDT does not offer an explanation of why an 
unpleasant experience is bad in itself, it stands in an overall better position than the 
theories discussed in previous chapters regarding the nature of unpleasantness. All in all, 
HDDT is the best available account for understanding the unpleasantness of pain. 
 
7.1 The hedonic determinable-determinate theory (HDDT) 
Let us quickly remember the last proposal from Chapter Four. This theory was able to 
account for the heterogeneity of unpleasantness using the determinable-determinate 
distinction. According to this view, being a pain is understood as a determinate of being 
unpleasant. This means that being a pain is a way of being unpleasant. Different 
phenomenal properties, e.g., being a pain and being an itch vary non-additively from each 
other. This means that they differ along the same dimensions, whichever these might be. 
This explained how this theory could account for the heterogeneity of unpleasant 
experiences, as I explained in Chapter Four. The fundamental problem with this view is 
that being a pain entails being unpleasant. As we saw in the previous chapters, there are no 
conclusive cases of non-unpleasant pains. However, the discussion about these cases 
shows that even if there are no actual cases, it is possible that there might be. It seems at 
least conceivable that pain experiences could exist without being unpleasant. In fact, some 
authors accept pain asymbolia as an actual example of this possibility. If it is possible to 
have non-unpleasant pains, a theory of unpleasantness should be able to capture this 
possibility. 
I think that there is a straightforward way of dealing with this problem; this will be 
fundamental in offering a solution to this and many other problems concerning 
unpleasantness. If one uses the determinable-determinate distinction in order to account 
for the heterogeneity of hedonic experience, one should dissociate the property of being a 
pain from the property of being unpleasant. That is to say, we should apply the 
determinable-determinate distinction to the unpleasantness of pain, but being a pain 
should not be understood a way of being unpleasant. Instead, an unpleasant pain involves 
a certain way of being unpleasant. This is what HDDT proposes to account for unpleasant 
pains experiences. 
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The hedonic determinable-determinate theory for the unpleasantness of 
pain  
An unpleasant pain experience has two phenomenal properties: i) the 
phenomenal property of being a pain, and ii) a phenomenal determinate 
property (u1, u2, u3, etc.) of the unpleasantness determinable.32 
In this way, we can easily account for the possibility of asymbolics having pain 
experiences that are not hedonic at all. That is, they would have a mental state with the 
phenomenal property of being a pain, but without the phenomenal property of being 
unpleasant. Even if we accept that the evidence is not as conclusive as we might have 
thought to declare without doubt that asymbolics have non-unpleasant pains, the 
discussion about asymbolics is evidence of the possibility of non-unpleasant pains. If we 
accept HDDT’s proposal for the unpleasantness of pain, we can accommodate this 
possibility. Similarly, in this way we could account for the possibility of pains being only 
pleasant, this is a possible form of masochism where people might seek out pain as an end. 
Even if there is no obvious evidence of instances of masochism along these lines, we can 
now account for the possibility. We could have an experience that instantiates the 
phenomenal property of being a pain, and the phenomenal property of being pleasant in a 
certain way pl1, pl2, pl3, etc., that vary non-additively from one another.  
Another advantage of dissociating the property of being a pain from the property of being 
unpleasant is that we can account for cases where, presumably, someone has an 
experience that is unpleasant, without being a pain or a phenomenal experience in any 
other way. Some think that we could have phenomenal experiences that are just 
unpleasant, and that there is an actual example of this. For instance, some researchers 
claim that their “results demonstrate, for the first time in humans, a loss of pain sensation 
with preserved pain affect.” (Ploner, Freund, & Schnitzler, 1999, p. 211) This is based on 
a single case of a man who, after a stroke, lost to a good extent the capacity to experience 
sensory experiences, such as the ones produced by thermal stimuli. According to this 																																																								
32 I should thank Dr. Jennifer Corns for various aspects of this proposal that come from her unpublished 
work, “Hedonic Independence”, and other drafts of related papers in progress, as well as due to personal 
communication. That is, she defends that: i) there is at least one distinct hedonic quality space (i.e. distinct 
from any sensory, or even cognitive, quality spaces); ii) that each such hedonic quality space may be 
empirically discovered and constructed through “just noticeable” qualitative judgements, as I will explain in 
more detail in Section 7.2.1; and iii) that the unpleasant quality of each unpleasant experience is constituted 
by the values it takes for each dimension in the relevant hedonic quality space. 	
	 149	
study, “[i]n the patient reported here, clinical examination and cutaneous laser stimulation 
revealed… loss of sensory discriminative pain component and preserved motivational-
affective dimension of pain.” (Ploner, Freund, & Schnitzler, 1999, p. 213) This case does 
not put into question the existence of non-unpleasant pains, these are not pain experiences 
after all, it is claimed. However, if this case is real, or even possible, HDDT allows us to 
incorporate it.  
HDDT has another advantage: we can easily explain how different sensory experiences 
may vary only hedonically. We can explain how the same type of sensory experience can 
sometimes be pleasant and at other times unpleasant. Take, for instance, the gustatory 
experience of tasting chocolate; this experience is one of tasting chocolate in virtue of a 
phenomenal property chocolate-taste-feeling-ness, say.33 We can have chocolate-taste-
feeling experiences that are sometimes pleasant, and at other times unpleasant. How can 
we explain this? These two experiences, the one that is pleasant and the one that is 
unpleasant, seem to be ways of being chocolate-taste-feeling experiences. However, it 
does not seem that we can account for these experiences being different by appealing to 
the determinable-determinate distinction. It looks like the pleasant chocolate-taste-feeling 
experience and the unpleasant chocolate-taste-feeling experience vary additively. These 
experiences are chocolate-taste-feeling plus something else, i.e., they are either pleasant or 
unpleasant.  
The solution is quite simple once we understand hedonic sensory experiences as being 
composed of distinct phenomenal properties. The pleasant experience of tasting chocolate 
is composed of two properties: i) the chocolate-taste-feeling-ness property, and ii) a 
determinate way of being pleasant that I will call chocolate-pleasantness. Then, the 
unpleasant experience of tasting chocolate is composed of two properties: i) the chocolate-
taste-feeling-ness property, and ii) a determinate way of being unpleasant that I will call 
chocolate-unpleasantness. Two different sensory experiences that only vary hedonically 
are not different determinates of a common determinable; this is so because they vary 
additively. However, the pleasantness, or unpleasantness, of these particular pleasant and 
unpleasant sensory experiences, are determinate properties. For example, chocolate-
unpleasantness is a determinate of unpleasantness, it is a way to be unpleasant. 
Unpleasantness is a determinable phenomenal property that has certain determinates such 
as chocolate-unpleasantness —although one could also call these ways of being 																																																								33 I call the phenomenal property of having an experience of eating something that tastes like chocolate 
chocolate-taste-feeling-ness, as opposed to the property chocolate-taste-ness. Whereas the former is a 
property of mental states, the latter is a property of things that taste like chocolate, such as a cake.  
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unpleasant u1, u2, u3, etc. Something very similar applies to chocolate-pleasantness, 
which is a determinate property of the determinable pleasantness, but one could also call 
these ways of being pleasant pl1, pl2, pl3, etc. This, I think, should be enough to 
understand how two different sensory experiences can vary only hedonically, i.e., when 
one is pleasant and the other unpleasant.34  
Finally, we should explain how HDDT deals with the heterogeneity of unpleasant 
experiences. The heterogeneity problem consisted in explaining how unpleasant 
experiences all feel unpleasant, yet they feel unpleasant in very different ways. We did not 
seem to be able to account for all the variations in the ways of being unpleasant by 
appealing to a unitary feeling of unpleasantness, as we saw in Chapter Three, not even 
when this feeling has different intensities, as we saw in Chapter Four. According to 
HDDT, unpleasantness is phenomenal, but there is no unitary feeling of unpleasantness 
because different unpleasantnesses vary non-additively. HDDT is in line with the intuition 
behind the heterogeneity problem.  
More precisely, following HDDT for unpleasantness, all unpleasant experiences qualify as 
unpleasant in virtue of instantiating unpleasantness as a determinable property. All 
unpleasant experiences are unpleasant in a certain way, u1, u2, u3, etc. and each of these 
ways of being unpleasant, each of these unpleasantnesses, varies from the others non-
additively. In other words, u1, u2, u3, etc., vary along the same essential dimensions.35 
Once we take into account that being unpleasant is a determinable property, we can 
explain how unpleasant pains vary in terms of their unpleasantness, even if there is not a 
unitary unpleasant-feeling that is shared among all unpleasant pains. HDDT maintains the 
intuition that unpleasantness is a phenomenal property, while successfully dealing with the 
heterogeneity of unpleasantness. In the same way that there might be different ways of 
being red, without all of them sharing a unitary redness plus something else, there are 
different way of being unpleasant, without all of these ways of being unpleasant sharing 
some unitary unpleasantness.  																																																								34 I leave open whether pleasantness and unpleasantness are determinates of a common determinable. This 
will depend on whether these properties vary non-additively, i.e., if pleasantness and unpleasantness share 
the same essential dimensions of variation. In either case, I will consider in further detail what might be the 
dimensions of variation of unpleasantnesses in the next section of this chapter.  35 One could argue that there are also different ways of being a pain, and that being a pain is also a 
determinable property. That is, that there are different ways of being a pain experience that are determinates 
of a common determinable. If this were correct, this would imply that there are different determinates of 
being a pain, pa1, pa2, pa3, etc. These would be phenomenal properties and would vary from one another 
non-additively. This could be a way to deal with heterogeneity concerning the pain aspect of certain 
experiences. However, I do not think that we need to get into the details of this in order to deal with the 
heterogeneity problem, since it focuses only on the unpleasantness of experiences.  
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Experiences can be hedonic in various ways; there might be different ways of being 
pleasant or of being unpleasant, and these differences are not only regarding their 
intensity. I am not the first to allow for the possibility that there might be various ways of 
being unpleasant. Labukt (2012), for example, argues in favour of a pluralistic version of 
hedonic tone.  
The view even looks fairly attractive. It retains the phenomenological 
plausibility of the hedonic tone approach… and avoids the difficulties of the 
alternatives, while at the same time being immune to the heterogeneity 
objection. Now we should not feel particularly confident that strong pluralism 
[i.e., the claim that there are different ways to be pleasant or unpleasant] is 
correct until we have some fairly well-founded ideas about what the different 
hedonic tones are. (Labukt, 2012, p. 199) 
The good news is that I think we do have a fairly well-founded idea of what these hedonic 
tones are: they are phenomenal determinates, they are different ways of being unpleasant, 
or pleasant, and they vary from each other non-additively. While Labukt acknowledged 
that we should allow the possibility of there being different ways of being unpleasant in 
order to give an answer to the heterogeneity problem, HDDT provides the details of what 
these different ways of being hedonic are: they are phenomenal properties that should be 
understood based on the determinable-determinate distinction.  
 
7.2 Two final problems for HDDT 
Even if HDDT looks like a promising theory to understand the structure of unpleasant 
experiences, there are still some details that need to be filled in. I will focus on two 
important aspects of the theory that I think need to be developed before we can conclude 
that it is the best available candidate to account for the unpleasantness of pain. First, it is 
important to explain how different ways of being unpleasant belong to the same kind, i.e., 
how different determinates of unpleasantness may vary non-additively from one another. 
In the same way that we can account for different triangles belonging to the same kind, or 
different shades of red all being determinates of redness, we should be able to account for 
the different ways of being unpleasant. Second, we also need to say something about two 
very important aspects of unpleasantness: the fact unpleasantness is motivational and 
normative in itself. It is in virtue of an experience being unpleasant that we have reasons, 
and even good reasons, to perform various actions in relation to the unpleasant experience. 
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I will show that even if HDDT does not have an explanation for why this is so, it stands in 
a better position, all things considered, vis-à-vis its competitors from previous chapters.  
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7.2.1 The different ways of being unpleasant 
HDDT is capable of solving the heterogeneity problem. However, we have not yet 
explained what could account for the variations among the different ways of being 
unpleasant. In order to give a more substantial account of HDDT, we need to clarify how 
we could know which are the essential dimensions of unpleasantness. This would explain 
how unpleasant experiences share a common phenomenal property, even if there is so 
much diversity regarding the different ways of being unpleasant. I will not provide the 
specific essential dimensions of variation for unpleasantness, but I will motivate the idea 
that unpleasantness should be understood as a determinable and that it must have essential 
dimensions that we can identify. I will proceed as follows. 
First, I explain how other determinates of a common determinable can share the same 
dimensions. Second, I will show how the notion of a dimension can also be used to 
account for differences among phenomenal qualities. I will focus on how we can create a 
quality space based on the essential dimensions of colour experience. The quality space of 
the experience of colour is a map of the different dimensions that constitute the experience 
of being coloured. Finally, I will suggest that we could also create a quality space for 
different ways of being unpleasant. The quality space for unpleasantness would illuminate 
how different determinates of the unpleasantness determinable could vary from each other 
non-additively.  
Let us start with the essential dimensions of being triangular. In what do different ways of 
being triangular consist in? In the case of the determinable property being triangular, or 
triangularity, one way of accounting for the different determinates of triangularity is to 
refer to the variations along the three essential angles of a shape. If there is a variation in 
one of these angles, we obtain a different way of being triangular. If there is no variation 
along these angles, there is no variation in the way of being triangular. Each way of being 
triangular is a determinate of triangularity, and each different determinate varies from the 
others non-additively. The difference in ways of being triangular does not consist in being 
triangular plus something else. Rather, all the different ways of being triangular are the 
results of variations along the same dimensions, i.e., variations in relation to the three 
angles that compose a shape.  
One important feature of understanding triangularity as a determinable is that it allows us 
to see how we can provide different accounts of the dimensions of a determinable. That is 
to say, there might be other ways of explaining the variations among different ways of 
being triangular. For instance, we could account for different ways of being triangular by 
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referring to the length of the three essential sides of a shape. In this case, we specify that 
being triangular means to be a shape composed by three sides, and the variations along the 
length of these sides accounts for various determinates of triangularity being different. 
The difference between being equilateral, isosceles, and scalene is based on variations 
along the lengths of the three essential sides of a shape. Being equilateral means to be a 
shape with all three sides of the same length, being isosceles means to have two sides of 
the same length, and being scalene consists in having all sides with different lengths. So, 
even if referring to the change in angles is a more accurate way of specifying different 
ways of being triangular, this shows that there are different ways of specifying the 
essential dimensions of a determinable, i.e., there might be different ways of specifying 
what it means for determinates of a common determinable to vary non-additively.  
The fact that we can account for the essential dimensions of a determinable in different 
ways is important. It is relevant because this means that we do not have to commit to just 
one possible way of describing the dimensions of variation in order to show that a 
determinable must have certain dimensions. Further, even if we have an account for the 
dimensions of a determinable such as being triangular, these dimensions do not have to be 
the correct ones, or the only possible description of these dimensions, in order to show 
that being triangular is a determinable property. Whatever the dimensions of a 
determinable might be, it is variations along these dimensions that explains the variations 
among determinates of a common determinable. The fact that we can describe different 
ways of being belonging to a common group by referring to variations along the same 
dimensions, strongly suggests that these different ways of being are determinate properties 
of a common determinable. I think it is relatively clear which might be the dimensions of 
triangularity, but how can we find out which are the dimensions of phenomenal 
properties?  
In order to answer this, I think we can appeal to the notion of quality space. The idea is the 
following. We have a good conception of the dimensions along which determinates of 
being coloured may vary from one another, i.e., hue, saturation, and brightness. When we 
considered the determinable coloured-feeling-ness, the dimensions of this determinable 
are surely phenomenal derivatives of the dimensions of being coloured, i.e., something 
like felt hue, felt saturation, and felt brightness. Rosenthal’s (2015) notion of quality 
spaces seems to vindicate this idea. He focuses on the quality space of the experience of 
colour. In order to build this quality space, subjects are confronted with different colour 
samples which vary in their hue, saturation, or brightness, and they are asked to 
distinguish the just noticeable differences between the samples. The structure of a quality 
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space is built on these distinctions. The creation of the quality space is purely based on the 
judgments that people make regarding the just noticeable differences within their 
experiences of colour. Modifying the samples across the dimensions of colour generates 
the changes in colour perception in the subjects, and the quality space is built. 
Different samples are instantiating different ways of being coloured and, the idea goes, 
different changes in perception are instantiating different phenomenal properties of ways 
of being coloured, differences regarding coloured-feeling-ness. The quality space is not 
meant to account for the differences in the colour of the samples, but to reflect the 
experienced differences. In other words, the quality space of colour is reflecting the 
experienced hue, saturation, and brightness. The creation of a colour quality space unveils 
the dimensions of coloured-feeling-ness, i.e., the dimension along which the coloured-
feeling determinates may vary: experienced hue, experience brightness, and experienced 
saturation. The difference between a colour experience of Coca-Cola red and of Ferrari 
red is that these experiences are instantiating different phenomenal properties; the 
difference between these phenomenal properties is explained in terms of a variation along 
their experienced hue, saturation, and brightness. 
According to Rosenthal (2015) we can apply the same methodology to different sensory 
modalities. However, it might be much more difficult to create quality spaces for other 
sensory modalities. Colour experience is relatively easy for creating a qualitative space, 
since the experience of being coloured seems to have very few dimensions that are rather 
easy to control for experimentation. Rosenthal thinks that we can create quality spaces for 
other sensory modalities, at least in principle. For example, the same methodology has 
been used to try to create a quality space for olfactory experiences (Young, Keller, & 
Rosenthal, 2014). It is much more difficult to create an olfactory quality space because 
there are many more possible combinations of molecules that can result in noticeable 
olfactory differences. The olfactory experience determinable, or olfactory-feeling-ness, 
would have many more felt dimensions and it would be much harder to make well-
controlled samples that mirrored and instantiated these felt dimensions. Nevertheless, we 
could in principle create a quality space by providing subjects with a wide range of 
combinations of molecules to smell, and we could map the variations among different 
ways of being an olfactory experience. If we could create a quality space for olfaction, it 
would not be a map of the different molecules that produce smell experiences; instead, it 
would be a model that would mirror the different dimensions along which the different 
olfactory determinates may vary.  
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Going back to unpleasantness, I think that there are in fact different ways of being 
unpleasant, different unpleasantnesses, and that, in principle, these variations could be 
explained by appealing to changes in their essential felt dimensions. The way in which the 
feeling of nausea is unpleasant seems to be quite different from the way in which the 
experience of a cramp in one’s leg feels unpleasant. Similarly, the way in which feeling a 
numb limb is unpleasant is quite different from the way in which having a migraine is 
unpleasant. This is what we should read as lying behind the intuition of the heterogeneity 
problem. How can we explain that all these experiences are unpleasant, yet feel so 
different? We could think that unpleasantness is not a feeling, as desire theories suggest in 
Chapter Two, and explain the phenomenal differences without appealing to different ways 
of feeling unpleasant. However, if we think that unpleasantness must be phenomenal, and 
we also think that that there is no unitary way of being unpleasant, then we must accept 
that there are different ways of being unpleasant, various unpleasantnesses — even if we 
find ourselves incapable of delineating at a first glance the precise categories and types of 
ways of being unpleasant. 
I think we could apply a similar strategy to build a quality space for unpleasantness, at 
least in principle. The quality space of unpleasantness would show the essential 
dimensions of this phenomenal determinable property, and would help us identify 
different unpleasantnesses. We could vary the different stimuli that normally cause the 
unpleasantness of unpleasant experiences and map the noticeable differences produced by 
these different stimuli. The quality space of unpleasantness will not be a map of the 
different stimuli that normally cause the unpleasantness of unpleasant experiences. Rather, 
it would be a map of the different experienced unpleasantnesses. Moreover, the variations 
in stimuli that produce the unpleasantness of experiences would translate into noticeable 
differences of unpleasantness, they would show us which are the felt dimensions of 
unpleasantness. Similar to the felt dimensions of smell experiences, the felt dimensions of 
unpleasantness might be much more complex than the three-dimensional model that we 
can create for colour experience. However, the space quality model of unpleasantness 
could be created, at least in principle. 
As we saw in Chapter Four, intensity might be one of these dimensions. That is to say, a 
mild unpleasant headache and an excruciating unpleasant headache vary in the way they 
are unpleasant. Intensity is, I believe, one of the dimensions along which different 
determinates of unpleasantness may vary. However, intensity would not be the only 
dimension of unpleasantness, since there are differences in the ways of being unpleasant 
that cannot be reduced to variations in intensity. Even if the model that would map the 
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variations of different ways of being unpleasant may be quite complex, I do not see why 
this could not be done in principle. So, what could these precise dimensions of 
unpleasantness be?  
I do not know which would be exactly the kind of stimuli that could result in just 
noticeable differences regarding the ways in which an experience can be unpleasant. 
However, for illustration sake, let us accept that being dull and being sharp are different 
ways in which a headache might be unpleasant. If this were correct, the differences 
between being dull and sharp are not variations in the sensory component of an unpleasant 
pain, but differences regarding their unpleasantness. If we accept this, we could try to find 
the stimuli responsible for the noticeable differences between being dull and being sharp, 
and then this would allow us to identify the shared dimensions along which dullness and 
sharpness may vary.  
Similarly, if intensity is a dimension of unpleasantness, we could identify the stimuli 
responsible for increases in the intensity of unpleasantness in order to create the quality 
space of unpleasantness. Even if this is an oversimplification of what the dimensions of a 
quality space of unpleasantness might look like, I do think that this is enough to make a 
more relevant point: that given that there are different ways of being unpleasant, and that 
these different ways could be explained by variations along shared dimensions, this 
confirms that unpleasantness is a determinable property. In the same way that we can 
create a quality space for the experience of colour, we could do so for unpleasantness. Just 
by trying to create a quality space of unpleasantness, we could come up with a more 
refined vocabulary about the different ways of being unpleasant u1, u2, u3, etc. 
Experimenting with different ways of being unpleasant, I think, would also shed light on 
the dimensions along which these different unpleasantnesses may vary from one another 
non-additively. 
Even if we do not know exactly which are the dimensions along which unpleasantnesses 
may vary, we can accept that unpleasantness’ dimensions exist. At the end, I think it is 
quite easy to accept that many different unpleasant experiences do feel different qua their 
unpleasantness. In an analogy, just as we can appreciate and accept the variation of 
different visual or olfactory experiences, even if we know nothing about their precise 
dimensions of variations, we can accept that there are different ways of being unpleasant, 
without yet knowing which are the precise dimensions along which unpleasantnesses 
might vary. As Funkhouser puts it: 
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[T]he concept of a determination dimension is quite general and it applies to 
various kinds — kinds with essences that are phenomenological, functional, 
qualitative, etc. We can certainly disagree over the determination dimension 
of a particular kind, but so long as this disagreement is reasonable, the very 
existence of such disagreement helps confirm that we share an intuitive 
understanding of the concept of determination dimension and the task of 
discovering them. Determination dimensions are simply those essential 
dimensions of a kind along which instances of that kind can vary. Scientific 
kinds are of particular interest to the metaphysicians and I assume that the 
determination dimensions for such kinds typically are to be discovered by a 
posteriori investigation. In particular, the science of a given kind should 
provide us with the determination dimension for that kind. (Funkhouser, 2014, 
p. 30, my emphasis) 
If Funkhouser is right, it is probably an empirical affair to discover which are the precise 
felt dimensions of unpleasantness as a kind, in the same way that it is rather an empirical 
affair to discover the dimensions along which being an experience of colour, or of odour, 
may vary. However, it is a philosophical affair, it seems to me, to point out that the 
determinable-determinate distinction helps us to understand the structure of 
unpleasantness in order to address the heterogeneity of unpleasantness. In conclusion, 
HDDT is the best candidate to account for the heterogeneity of unpleasantness if we think 
that unpleasantness is phenomenal. Furthermore, this approach opens the possibility of an 
empirical research that explains the variability among the large diversity of different ways 
of being unpleasant. However, HDDT has an important limitation shared with most other 
theories of the unpleasantness of pain, as we will see in the next section. 
 
7.2.2 The intrinsic badness of unpleasantness  
I will now move on to the final important problem for HDDT, and for any other theory 
that takes an unpleasant pain to be motivational and normative in virtue of its 
unpleasantness. This is particularly problematic for the theories that take unpleasantness to 
be something felt, that is, that an unpleasant pain is motivational and normative in virtue 
of feeling unpleasant. The problem is to explain why unpleasantness entails non-
instrumental badness, and how if unpleasantness is phenomenal, this phenomenal property 
entails such badness. It is by appealing to this intrinsic badness that we can explain why 
some felt experiences motivate and justify actions merely in virtue of feeling the way they 
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do, while other phenomenal experiences do not motivate or justify action in virtue of 
feeling the way they do. For example, a headache seems to motivate and justify certain 
actions because of how it feels, in virtue of feeling unpleasant, i.e., because having an 
unpleasant headache is bad in itself because it feels bad. In contrast, other phenomenal 
experiences are not bad in themselves; the experience of seeing something red does not 
seem to motivate or justify action merely because of how this experience is phenomenal, 
this experience is not motivational or normative in virtue being red-feeling. 
The intrinsic badness is an important yet usually unexplained feature of unpleasantness. It 
is important because being motivational and normative are two crucial features of 
unpleasant experiences such as unpleasant pains. The fact that unpleasant pains are bad in 
themselves gives them a special position regarding action in contrast to other phenomenal 
experiences. Furthermore, the fact that unpleasant pains are normative in virtue of being 
bad makes these experiences very important in relation to moral issues. For instance, it 
seems that at least one of the reasons why it is morally relevant to consider pain infliction 
as a form of torture is because unpleasant pains are bad in themselves. We care about 
which creatures experience unpleasant pains, and thus have at least one form of moral 
relevance, also because unpleasant experiences seem to be bad in themselves. In contrast, 
there are other phenomenal experiences that do not instantiate badness, and these kind of 
phenomenal mental states are not morally relevant in themselves.  
I will not offer an account of why unpleasantness entails intrinsic badness. If we think 
unpleasantness is phenomenal, I will not explain why only certain phenomenal properties 
entail badness, and why unpleasant experiences are motivational and normative in virtue 
of such intrinsic badness. I take it as a brute fact that unpleasantness entails non-
instrumental badness. The experiences that instantiate unpleasantness have motivational 
and normative force because having one of these experiences is bad in itself. Hedonic 
experiences that are pleasant or unpleasant are both motivational and normative. That is, it 
because of certain experiences being hedonic that we can render certain related actions 
intelligible, that these hedonic experience are motivational, and that we can also justify 
related actions, i.e., hedonic experiences may constitute good or bad reason for actions, 
hedonic experiences are also normative.  
Most authors, including myself, take as a given that unpleasantness entails non-
instrumental badness. It seems clearly true that unpleasant experiences are bad in 
themselves. However, none of the considered theories about unpleasantness provides a 
developed explanation of why having an unpleasant experience is bad in itself. I take the 
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badness of unpleasantness to be primitive, i.e., there seems to be no more fundamental 
explanation of why this is so. All theories that take the non-instrumental badness of 
unpleasantness as a primitive do not explain what accounts for unpleasantness to entail 
badness. The problem with most content theories is not that they accept this badness as a 
given.36 The problem for content theories is that they fail to account for unpleasantness’ 
badness by appealing to the mental content that is supposed to constitute such 
unpleasantness. The main virtue of content theories was to illuminate unpleasantness by 
appealing to mental content, but mental content cannot shed light on the non-instrumental 
badness of unpleasantness. This is precisely what is shown by the messenger-shooting 
problem.  
HDDT is similar to most content theories in the sense that it accepts that unpleasantness is 
phenomenal and bad in itself. Since experiences that are unpleasant feel bad, we can 
explain why unpleasantness is motivational and normative. Why did you take a painkiller 
for your headache? Because the headache was unpleasant, it felt bad; the unpleasant pain 
is motivational in virtue of being unpleasant. Do you have a good reason to take a 
painkiller? Yes, the fact that unpleasantness is bad in itself provides us with a good reason 
to take a painkiller and thus get rid of the unpleasant pain; the unpleasant pain is 
normative in virtue of being unpleasant. Both HDDT and content theories agree that 
unpleasant pains are motivational and normative because they are mental states that 
instantiate unpleasantness, and a mental state that is unpleasant is bad in itself. HDDT and 
most content theories are in an equal situation regarding the fact that they accept that felt 
unpleasantness entails badness. So how does HDDT do any better? 
First, HDDT is preferable to content theories regarding the structure of unpleasantness, 
i.e., regarding the heterogeneity of unpleasantness. Content theories take all unpleasant 
pains to be unpleasant in the same way, as if unpleasantness was a unitary feeling, as if it 
was a clear ingredient that all and only unpleasant experiences have, including unpleasant 
pains. This is not the case, as the heterogeneity problem shows. HDDT is better because it 
gives an account for the heterogeneity of unpleasantness. However, one may think, could 
content theories use HDDT as a blueprint in order to account for the heterogeneity of 
unpleasantness? One might think that content theories could accept HDDT in order to 
explain the diversity within unpleasant experiences and then explain such diverse 																																																								36 Martínez (2015) does not think that unpleasantness is non-instrumentally bad. He thinks that 
unpleasantness is only instrumentally bad, which I think is counterintuitive, as I explained in Chapter One. 
When I mention content theories that take unpleasantness as non-instrumentally bad, I do not include 
Martínez’ theory. 
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phenomenology by appealing to mental content. Different mental content would account 
for different ways of being unpleasant, as long as these differences were explained non-
additively.  
However, I do not think that this strategy is available for content theories very clearly. Let 
us start with evaluativism, also referred to as BAP. According to this view, the 
determinable unpleasantness would consist in representing a bodily disturbance as being 
bad for oneself. What would the determinates of this determinable be? The determinates 
should consist in different ways of a bodily disturbance being represented as bad for 
oneself. However, if it is not very clear in this approach what it means for bodily 
disturbances to be bad, it is even less obvious what it means for bodily disturbances to be 
bad for oneself in many different ways; what would one’s multiple badness consist in? I 
do not think that the HDDT strategy is clearly available for BAP.  
Let us consider the two versions of imperativism. According MAP, the unpleasantness of 
pain consisted in the command “See to it that bodily damage d does not exist”. If the 
determinable unpleasantness is constituted by this command, what would the determinates 
consist in? I do not think it is clear what it would mean to not exist in different ways. After 
all, according to MAP, the notion of unpleasantness seems to assume a unitary feeling of 
unpleasantness. Finally, according to KAP, the unpleasantness of pain consisted in a 
command about another sensation. The unpleasantness determinable would consist in the 
command “Don’t have that sensation!”. Which could be the determinates of this 
command? Are there different ways of not having a sensation? I think that content theories 
could, at least in principle, benefit from HDDT in order to explain the heterogeneity of 
unpleasantness. However, it is not very clear to me how they could actually implement 
HDDT in terms of mental content.  
Second, HDDT does better than content theories regarding the nature of unpleasantness. 
The advantage to invoking evaluative or imperative content was to explain the 
phenomenology of unpleasantness, and all that comes with this, in terms of mental 
content. Among the things to be explained was the motivationality and normativity of felt 
unpleasantness. However, these theories fail to account for motivationality and 
normativity by appealing to mental content. So, the idea that unpleasantness consists in 
such content is unmotivated. More importantly, one of the main purposes of content 
theories was to explain the intrinsic badness of unpleasantness by appealing to mental 
content. However, one cannot explain the intrinsic badness of an unpleasant pain in terms 
of something that is not bad, as the messenger-shooting problem shows. Content theories 
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fail to accomplish one of their mains aims. As a result of this, it is better not to explain 
such intrinsic badness at all. HDDT does not offer a reductive account of unpleasantness, 
and, in not doing so, it does not have to commit to inconsistencies such as saying that a 
headache is unpleasant and bad in itself, but that we do not have non-instrumental reasons 
to take a painkiller to stop feeling the headache.  
Let us now compare HDDT with the desire theories from Chapter Two. In this case, both 
HDDT and desire theories are able to account for the heterogeneity of unpleasant 
experiences. Desire theories can explain the great diversity of unpleasant experiences by 
pointing out that such unpleasantness is not actually something phenomenal, some unitary 
felt quality of experience, but merely the fact that certain phenomenal experiences are 
desired not to occur. Being unpleasant, according to desire theories, is not something felt. 
The fact that unpleasantness is not something felt allows them to avoid the heterogeneity 
problem: in this way they do not have to commit to the idea that unpleasantness is a 
unitary feeling. These theories still have to say something about unpleasantness entailing 
badness, since they also take unpleasantness to be bad in itself. In contrast to all the 
discussed theories, desire theories do not have to explain that it is a feeling that is bad in 
itself, because they do not take unpleasantness to be phenomenal. In fact, and to be fair, 
desire theories can say something about the intrinsic badness of unpleasantness by 
appealing to the intrinsic badness of desire frustration. If desire theories and HDDT can 
assess the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences, and if desire theories can say 
something more about the intrinsic badness of unpleasantness, why should we prefer 
HDDT then? I think we should prefer it because it maintains the very strong intuition that 
unpleasantness is phenomenal, that it is something qualitative, something felt. 
The strength of HDDT becomes more visible when we consider desire theories’ 
Euthyphro dilemma, when we consider whether i) a pain is unpleasant in virtue of the fact 
that we desire not to have that pain, as desire theories postulate, or if ii) we desire not to 
have a pain because it is unpleasant, as HDDT suggests. More precisely, desire theories 
explain that what constitutes pain’s unpleasantness is that we desire a hedonically neutral 
pain sensation not to occur. An unpleasant pain is unpleasant because we have a sid-desire 
not to have a pain sensation.37 Desire theories could explain why it is instrumentally good 
to have these sid-desires by referring to a teleological evolutionary explanation. However, 
as I explained in Chapter Two, there seems to be no motivating reason or non-																																																								37 Just as a reminder, in Chapter Two I explained what a sid-desire is, i.e., a simultaneous, intrinsic, de re 
desire about a sensory experience. 
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instrumental reason to have sid-desires for hedonically neutral pain sensations not to 
occur, because, according to desire theories, there’s nothing intrinsically bad about a 
hedonically neutral pain sensation. 
In contrast, HDDT can give a rather straightforward justification for our desires in relation 
to pain and unpleasantness. According to HDDT, we are justified in desiring not to have 
an unpleasant pain because unpleasantness is bad in itself, because unpleasant pains feel 
bad. Unpleasantness in this view is bad in itself and phenomenal. Both HDDT and desire 
theories give an answer to the heterogeneity problem, but HDDT is preferable because it 
maintains the strong intuition that unpleasantness is something felt and thus can 
rationalize in a simple way the desires about pain experiences. We desire pain not to occur 
because pains are always in fact unpleasant, and because unpleasantness is a phenomenal 
property that entails badness.  
Desire theorists could try to borrow HDDT and argue that the different ways of feeling 
unpleasant can be explained in terms of desires. They could try to argue that different 
ways of feeling unpleasant are constituted by different sensory experiences plus a sid-
desire for that sensory experience not to occur. However, these different ways of feeling 
unpleasant would not be determinates of a common determinable because they would vary 
additively from one another. If desire theorists tried to argue that unpleasantness is 
phenomenal and that such phenomenology is somehow explained in terms of sid-desires, 
it seems that they would have to argue that there is a unitary feeling of unpleasantness, 
and that this unitary unpleasantness is constituted by the same kind of sid-desire. As I 
have argued, there seems to be no unitary feeling of unpleasantness among all and only 
unpleasant experiences. Furthermore, even if desire theorists accepted that there are 
different phenomenal ways of being unpleasant, it is not clear how different ways of being 
unpleasant could be explained in terms of variations of sid-desires, since a sid-desire is 
precisely one way of desiring. For all this, it seems like the best way of making sense of 
desire theories is to argue that unpleasantness is not phenomenal. However, HDDT allows 
us to deal with the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences while maintaining the intuition 
that unpleasantness is phenomenal. 
Finally, HDDT is in a much better position than any of the other theories that take 
unpleasantness as a phenomenal property without giving a reductive account of it. In 
comparison to the distinctive feeling theory, from Chapter Three, and the hedonic 
dimension theory, from Chapter Four, HDDT can offer an account for the heterogeneity of 
unpleasantness. The developed version of Crisp’s proposal was also able to deal with the 
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heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. However, HDDT is in a better position regarding 
the relation between pain and unpleasantness. It is also capable to account for: i) the 
possibility of pains not being hedonic, ii) experiences being unpleasant without being 
sensory, as the ploner case suggests, and iii) different sensory experiences varying only 
hedonically. I conclude, therefore, that HDDT is the best available account to understand 
the nature of pain and unpleasantness. 	
 
7.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued for HDDT as being the best available theory to account for 
the unpleasantness of pain. The proposal is, broadly, to understand that an unpleasant 
pain is constituted by two phenomenal properties: i) being a sensory pain, and ii) being 
unpleasant in a determinate way u1, u2, u3, etc. I think that the best way to understand 
unpleasantness is as a determinable phenomenal property that entails badness. This 
theory is able to account for the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences, the fact that 
unpleasant experiences feel in a certain way, that unpleasantness motivates and justifies 
certain actions, and that it is possible to experience non-unpleasant pains, even if all the 
pain experiences that we have seem to be, in fact, unpleasant.  
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CONCLUSION 
Let me end this journey by briefly restating each of the chapters. 
In Chapter One, I argued that even if content theories provide an interesting reductive 
account of the phenomenology of the unpleasantness of pain, these theories fail to 
illuminate various aspects of unpleasantness. First, the representational indicative content 
theories fail to illuminate why the unpleasantness of pain is motivational. The imperative 
content views try to explain this feature in terms of imperative content, which is meant to 
be inherently motivational. However, content theories face a more fundamental problem. 
If the unpleasantness of pain is bad in itself, which explains why we are justified in doing 
something to stop feeling an unpleasant pain such as taking a painkiller, content theories 
cannot capture this feature by appealing to the content that unpleasantness is supposed to 
consist in. Moreover, if content theories accept that felt unpleasantness entails badness, 
and given that we have the very strong intuition that it does, then they are committed to 
saying that we do not have non-instrumental reasons to take a painkiller in virtue of felt 
badness, even if the felt unpleasantness of pain is bad in itself and should provide a non-
instrumental reason for action. 
In Chapter Two, I explained the desire theories for the unpleasantness of pain. According 
to this view, an unpleasant pain experience is unpleasant if and only if it is composed by 
two components: i) a pain sensation that is inherently hedonically neutral, and ii) a 
simultaneous, intrinsic, de re desire of that pain sensation that it not to be occurring, i.e., a 
sid-desire. This theory has some important positive features. It can illuminate, for 
instance, why unpleasantness is bad by referring to the badness of the frustration of the 
sid-desire that constitutes unpleasantness. This approach can also shed light on the 
heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. It can explain that unpleasant experiences qualify 
as such even if there is no unitary feeling of unpleasantness that is shared among all and 
only unpleasant experiences. Instead, what unifies unpleasant experiences is that they are 
partially composed by a sid-desire. However, in doing this, desire theories abandon the 
intuition that unpleasantness is something felt. Moreover, they cannot account for a 
motivating reason or a non-instrumental justification for sid-desires about hedonically 
neutral pain sensations, since these pain sensations are not bad in themselves.  
In Chapter Three, I accounted for the distinctive feeling theory. According to this 
approach unpleasantness is phenomenal, and it is a unitary feeling that is shared among all 
and only unpleasant experiences and by dint of which these experiences qualify as 
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unpleasant. This theory has the advantage over desires theories, I propose, that it can claim 
that unpleasantness is phenomenal and that it entails badness. Given that pains are 
unpleasant, this view provides a straightforward explanation for our desires in relation to 
pain. We desire pain experiences not to occur because they feel unpleasant. However, this 
theory faces a fundamental problem: the heterogeneity problem. After careful 
introspection, there seems to be no unitary feeling that is shared among all and only 
unpleasant experiences. I argued that the distinctive feeling theory is incapable of showing 
that there is such a unitary feeling of unpleasantness and, therefore, this theory should be 
rejected.  
In Chapter Four, I analysed two more theories that take unpleasantness to be a 
phenomenal property. The difference between these and the distinctive feeling theory is 
that they appeal to the notion of dimension. First, the hedonic dimension theory compares 
the unpleasantness of an unpleasant pain to the volume of a sound. This allows us to 
account for the variations of different unpleasant experiences in terms of intensity. 
However, this is insufficient to account for the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences, 
since the intensity of unpleasantness does not seem to be the only type of variation 
regarding unpleasantness. Second, we can make use of the determinable-determinate 
distinction and argue that being a pain is a determinate of the unpleasantness 
determinable. This means that being a pain is a way of being unpleasant, and different 
ways of being unpleasant vary from one another non-additively, i.e., that they are different 
because they vary along their shared essential dimensions. Unpleasantness in this view is a 
phenomenal property, but there is no unitary feeling of unpleasantness. According to this 
view, being a pain entails being unpleasant, just as being scarlet entails being red. 
However, there are actual cases that suggest that being a pain does not entail being 
unpleasant. 
In Chapter Five, I turned to analysing the relation between being a pain and being 
unpleasant, by considering various cases that suggest that there are experiences of pain 
that are not hedonic, i.e., that are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. I divided these cases into 
two categories: i) pain insensitivity and ii) pain indifference. Pain asymbolia seems like 
the clearest example that involves pains that are not hedonic. In fact, some authors think 
that pain asymbolia confirms this. However, I show that there is no consensus about the 
interpretation of this condition regarding the existence of pains that are not hedonic. 
Moreover, I think that pain asymbolia could be interpreted as an instance of pain 
insensitivity. Given that pain is the paradigmatic example of an unpleasant pain, and since 
the evidence about the existence of pains that are not hedonic is not definitive, I concluded 
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that it seems like all pains that we actually have are hedonic. More precisely, all 
unpleasant experiences that we actually have seem to be unpleasant. 
In Chapter Six, I considered a different possibility for pains that are not hedonic: 
masochism. The fact that people sometimes seek out pain suggests that these experiences 
are pleasant rather than unpleasant. If this were the case, this would show the existence of 
non-unpleasant pain experiences. I delineate different scenarios where people might 
intentionally pursue an activity that involves pain. First, in means-end masochism people 
might seek out an unpleasant pain experience because this experience is desired as a 
means to an end. Second, in side effect pain we might put up with pain experiences 
because they are the side effect of either our means or our ends. Third, in end-in-itself 
masochism people might seek out pain experiences because they are either an essential 
part of a whole that is desired as an end, or because pain is pleasant in addition to being 
unpleasant. Even if there is no conclusive evidence of pain experiences that are only 
pleasant, i.e., of non-unpleasant pains, we can shed light on the different reasons why we 
might seek out activities that involve unpleasant pains. 
In Chapter Seven, I proposed a theory that is able to account for the possibility of non-
unpleasant pains, while also illuminates the heterogeneity of unpleasant experiences. This 
is the hedonic determinable-determinate theory (HDDT). According to HDDT an 
unpleasant pain experience is composed of two phenomenal properties: i) the phenomenal 
property of being a pain, and ii) a phenomenal determinate property (u1, u2, u3, etc.) of 
the unpleasantness determinable. This theory, among other advantages, can account for 
the heterogeneity of the unpleasantness of unpleasant experiences without claiming that 
unpleasantness is a unitary feeling that is shared among all and only unpleasant 
experiences. Instead, unpleasantness is understood as a determinable with multiple 
determinates, different ways of being unpleasant, and the differences among each of these 
determinates can be explained in terms of variations along their shared essential 
dimensions, whichever these might be.  
Given the foregoing chapters, I hope the reader finds that HDDT is the best available 
theory to account for the unpleasantness of pain. According to this approach, 
unpleasantness is a phenomenal property that entails badness. Unpleasant pain experiences 
feel bad, and this explains why we are motivated and justified in avoiding unpleasant 
pains. The fact that unpleasant pains feel bad gives us a reason, and a good reason, to take 
a painkiller. This account allows for the possibility of non-unpleasant pains, even if all 
pain experiences that we have seem to be unpleasant. This account also allows us to 
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explain how different experiences from various sensory modalities might be pleasant or 
unpleasant. Finally, this theory allows us to account for the heterogeneity of 
unpleasantness, without claiming that unpleasantness is a unitary feeling that all and only 
unpleasant experiences share.  
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LE CARACTERE DESAGREABLE DE LA DOULEUR 
INTRODUCTION 
La douleur est désagréable. Étant donné que la douleur est l'exemple paradigmatique d'une 
expérience désagréable, mon but est de clarifier ce qui caractérise la douleur et le caractère 
désagréable. J’essaie notamment de comprendre ce que peut signifier qu’une douleur soit 
désagréable et ainsi d’élucider la structure des expériences désagréables. Ce faisant, 
j’aborde plusieurs aspects problématiques de la relation entre la douleur et le caractère 
désagréable des expériences. Je fournis également une compréhension générale de ce que 
signifie pour une expérience non nécessairement douloureuse d’être désagréable. Voici 
quelques questions essentielles que j'aborde concernant la douleur et le caractère 
désagréable : 
• En quoi consiste la douleur ? 
• Que veut-on dire lorsque l’on dit que la douleur est désagréable ? 
• Comment expliquer la diversité des expériences désagréables ? 
• Comment expliquer que le caractère désagréable de la douleur puisse motiver une 
action ? 
• Comment expliquer que le caractère désagréable de la douleur justifie une action ? 
• Pourquoi recherchons-nous parfois des expériences douloureuses ? 
• Une douleur est-elle toujours désagréable ?  
 
Ma thèse répond à chacune de ces questions en détail et s’organise dans ce but en sept 
chapitres correspondant à trois problématiques principales : i) qu’est-ce qui constitue le 
caractère désagréable de la douleur ? (Chapitres 1 & 2), ii) comment rendre compte de la 
grande diversité phénoménale du caractère désagréable des expériences ? (Chapitres 3 & 
4), et iii) dans quels cas la douleur n’est-elle pas désagréable ? (Chapitres 5 & 6). Dans le 
dernier chapitre (Chapitre 7), j'offre une réponse générale aux trois problématiques 
principales en proposant ma propre théorie sur le caractère désagréable de la douleur. 
D’après cette théorie, une expérience désagréable est une expérience ressentie, le caractère 
désagréable est défini comme une propriété phénoménale des états mentaux, et cette 
propriété doit être comprise en utilisant la distinction déterminable-déterminant. Mon 
travail fournit ainsi une compréhension détaillée de la nature de la douleur et du caractère 
désagréable. 
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CHAPITRE 1 : THÉORIES DU CONTENU 
 
Dans ce premier chapitre, j’explique et analyse les théories selon lesquelles la notion de 
contenu mental peut expliquer le caractère désagréable de la douleur. La première section 
porte sur les théories dites de contenu représentatif. Deux approches distinctes sont 
détaillées : la théorie de la douleur de la représentation du dommage (DD) et la théorie de 
la douleur d’après Bain (DB), aussi connu sous le nom d'évaluativisme. La deuxième 
section de ce chapitre est consacrée aux théories dites de contenu impératif, aussi connu 
comme impérativisme. Deux approches distinctes sont détaillées : la théorie de la douleur 
d’après Matrínez (DM) et la théorie de la douleur d’après Klein (DK).38  
Dans la troisième section du chapitre, je me concentrerai sur le problème principal de tout 
type de théorie du contenu. Toutes ces théories, peu importe leur version, doivent affronter 
un problème que je désigne comme « meutre du messager ». Les théories du contenu ne 
parviennent pas à clarifier une caractéristique cruciale de toute douleur désagréable en 
faisant appel au contenu qui est censé constituer ces expériences : une expérience 
douloureuse désagréable est mauvaise en soi et nous donne une bonne raison d'agir pour la 
faire stopper. C'est à cause de ce sentiment déplaisant que nous sommes justifiés de 
prendre des analgésiques, par exemple. Enfin, dans la quatrième section, j’étudie deux 
solutions possibles à l'objection de « meutre du messager ». 
 
1.1 Théories de la représentation 
Lorsque l’on pense à la douleur, on pense souvent aux dommages corporels. Par exemple, 
une définition standard de la douleur telle que celle fournie par l'Association 
Internationale de la Douleur (IASP) établit que la douleur est liée au dommage corporel. 
D’après une approche représentationnelle, une expérience douloureuse désagréable 
représente des lésions corporelles : 
																																																								38 Pour un développement de cette théorie concernant l'intensité de la douleur voir Klein et Martínez (à 
venir) , et pour la théorie impérative en termes de signaux de la douleur voir Martínez et Klein (2016).  
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Théorie de la douleur de la représentation du dommage (DD) 
Une douleur désagréable est une expérience mentale constituée par la 
représentation d'une partie de notre propre corps comme étant endommagée. 
Une douleur désagréable est la représentation de notre propre corps comme étant 
endommagé.39 Avoir une douleur et ressentir de la douleur comme telle consiste en la 
représentation d'une partie de notre propre corps comme étant endommagée, c'est-à-dire, 
la douleur est expliquée par la réception des informations de notre propre corps. Selon 
DD, si nous voulons expliquer pourquoi une douleur désagréable se ressent comme telle, 
par exemple, nous devrions faire appel au contenu de l’expérience. Ce contenu est ce que 
l’expérience de la douleur est censée être, et ce contenu devrait rendre compte de la 
phénoménologie d'une douleur désagréable. Cependant, il y a un problème fondamental 
pour DD. Cette théorie ne peut pas expliquer pourquoi les douleurs désagréables sont 
motivantes en soi, c’est-à-dire, pourquoi le contenu d’une expérience douloureuse 
désagréable peut nous motiver à faire quelque chose. En effet, il n’y a pas d’implication 
logique entre d’une part le fait de représenter quelque chose (de précis ou non) et d’autre 
part la motivation à faire quelque chose.  
Il y a une solution assez simple pour DD. On peut ajouter un composant évaluatif au 
contenu qui constitue une douleur désagréable. C'est en vertu de ce contenu évaluatif 
qu'on pourrait expliquer ce qui rend une expérience désagréable et motivante. Cette 
approche est également appelée évaluativisme (Bain, 2012).40  
La théorie de la douleur d’après Bain (DB) 
Le fait que le sujet ait une douleur désagréable consiste i) dans le fait que ce 
suject ait une expérience (la douleur) qui représente une perturbation d'un 
certain type et ii) que cette même perturbation soit représentée comme 
mauvaise pour soi-même dans le sens corporel. 
Ce virage évaluatif est destiné à expliquer pourquoi les douleurs désagréables sont 
désagréables et motivent ainsi à agir. Une douleur désagréable ne représente pas 
seulement une information neutre qui pourrait être précise ou pas. Une douleur 
désagréable consiste en la représentation d'informations évaluatives. Autrement dit, une 																																																								39 Voir aussi Tye (1995, 2006). 40 Bain n'est pas le premier à défendre une forme d'évaluativisme. Voir Helm (2001, 2002), par exemple. 
Cependant, je considère que Bain a la version la plus claire et paradigmatique du évaluativisme. 
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douleur désagréable transmet des informations sur des faits évaluatifs, elle représente des 
objets comme étant mauvais. Selon DB, une douleur désagréable est la représentation 
d'une perturbation corporelle qui est représentée comme mauvaise pour soi-même. Le fait 
que la perturbation corporelle soit représentée comme mauvaise est censé expliquer 
pourquoi l'expérience fait mal, est désagréable, et pourquoi elle est motivante en vertu de 
faire mal. 
Néanmoins, il y a un problème pour expliquer cette motivation en termes du contenu 
évaluatif. Ce que signifie pour un objet du monde d’être mauvais et, plus précisément, ce 
que signifie pour une partie de notre corps d’être mauvaise, n’est pas clair. Prendre en 
compte l'argument de la question ouverte de Moore (1903) permet de clarifier ce 
problème. Selon Moore, on ne peut pas donner une définition des concepts normatifs en se 
référant aux phénomènes purement naturels qui ne sont pas eux-mêmes normatifs. Les 
partisans de DB sont vulnerables à cette critique s'ils offrent une approche purement 
naturaliste du caractère désagréable de la douleur. Si nous acceptons l'argument de la 
question ouverte de Moore, alors DD et DB ont un problème assez similaire. Ces théories 
ne permettent pas d’expliquer comment des propriétés normatives, par exemple « être 
mauvais » pour, peuvent être motivantes en elles-mêmes, alors même qu’elles ne sont que 
la représentation de propriétés naturelles.  
 
1.2 Théories impératives 
Alors que les théories représentationalistes du contenu essayaient d'expliquer le caractère 
désagréable de la douleur simplement en termes indicatifs, en expliquant ce que 
représentent les expériences douloureuses désagréables, les théories imperativistes 
expliquent le caractère désagréable de la douleur à partir de ce que les expériences nous 
ordonnent de faire. Une bonne façon de souligner la différence entre ces deux types de 
contenu mental est de faire appel à la notion de direction d'ajustement (Anscombe, 1957; 
Searle, 1979). Selon la théorie impérativiste, nos expériences corporelles telles que la 
faim, la soif, les démangeaisons et les douleurs sont motivantes parce qu'elles sont 
constituées d'un contenu impératif (Hall, 2008). De la même façon que l'on pourrait penser 
que les désirs sont intrinsèquement motivationnels, étant donné qu'ils ont une direction 
d'ajustement du monde à l'esprit, si les douleurs désagréables sont conçues comme ayant 
une orientation similaire, alors les douleurs sont aussi intrinsèquement motivantes. Je 
propose ainsi une reformulation de la proposition de Martínez (2011, 2015): 
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La théorie de la douleur d’après Matrínez (DM)  
Une douleur désagréable est constituée i) d'un contenu indicatif : «Il y a une 
perturbation corporelle d dans votre propre corps», ce qui explique que 
l'expérience soit une douleur et ii) un aspect hédonique du contenu indicatif  
« Veillez que la perturbation corporelle d n'existe pas! », ce qui explique le 
caractère désagréable. 
Deux aspects de cette proposition sont particulièrement importants. Tout d'abord, en 
distinguant clairement les deux aspects d'une douleur désagréable, on fournit une 
explication simple de ce qui constitue le caractère motivationnel d'une douleur 
désagréable. Le fait qu'une douleur désagréable soit partiellement constituée par une 
commande explique pourquoi avoir une douleur désagréable est motivante. 
Deuxièmement, DM maintient l'un des principaux objectifs de Martínez, à savoir, le 
caractère désagréable de la douleur ne prescrit pas une action particulière. Le caractère 
désagréable de la douleur nous motive à agir, mais il y a beaucoup d'actions différentes 
qui pourraient être adéquates pour faire face à une expérience de la douleur. Cependant, 
DM doit également faire face à certaines difficultés. DM est censé expliquer ce qui 
constitue la dimension motivationnelle d'une douleur désagréable, mais un tel contenu 
impératif pourrait ne pas être suffisant en soi pour motiver l’action (Bain, 2011). 
Klein (2007, 2012, 2015b) propose une approche différente de la douleur et du caractère 
désagréable. Deux aspects de sa théorie peuvent être utiles pour expliquer le caractère 
motivant d’une commande. Le commandement i) doit provenir d'une source d'autorité, 
dans ce cas-ci, notre propre corps, et ii) nous devons nous soucier de la commande, car le 
commandement provient d'une source d'autorité. Selon Klein, les commandements dans le 
cas d’une douleur sont émis par nos propres corps, et vise notre intérêt. Par ailleurs, selon 
lui, nous traitons notre corps comme une autorité pratique et nous nous soucions des 
ordres émis par celui-ci, ce qui permet d’expliquer qu’une commande nous motive à agir.  
La théorie de la douleur d’après Klein (DK) 
Une douleur désagréable est constituée par deux impératifs : i) un ordre 
« Gardez B de E (avec priorité P)! », ce qui explique que l'expérience soit une 
sensation de douleur, et ii) un autre ordre « N'ayez pas cette sensation de 
douleur! », ce qui constitue le caractère désagreable de l'expérience. 
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Ce contenu est destiné à rendre compte de tous les aspects de la phénoménologie d'une 
douleur désagréable. D’après DK, nous pouvons expliquer comment différentes 
expériences douloureuses désagréables sont ressenties en se référant à des variations dans 
le contenu du premier impératif. Il y a trois éléments principaux qui constituent une 
expérience de douleur : « B représente une partie en particulier du corps, E est une phrase 
gérondive passive nominalisée et P une fonction de classement»41 (Klein, 2015b, p. 57). 
Lorsque vous ressentez de la douleur parce que vous vous êtes tordu la cheville, cette 
expérience consiste en un ordre « Gardez votre cheville de porter du poids ! », où cet ordre 
a une priorité par rapport à d'autres états mentaux motivationnels. 
Ces trois éléments ne permettent de rendre compte que de l'aspect sensoriel d'une douleur. 
Le caractère désagréable de l'expérience s'explique en vertu d’un commandement 
concernant un autre ordre. En particulier, le caractère désagréable de la douleur consiste 
en un ordre qui demande de faire stopper une sensation de douleur spécifique. C'est une 
différence importante entre DM et DK. Alors que DM comprend l'aspect sensoriel de 
l'expérience composé par un contenu indicatif, DK explique le même aspect de 
l'expérience avec un contenu impératif. Néanmoins, un problème majeur se pose pour 
toutes ces théories du contenu.  
 
1.3 Le problème de « meurtre du messager » 
Jacobson (2013) a formulé ce qu’il a nommé l’objection de « meurtre du messager ». 
Quand un messager apporte de mauvaises nouvelles au roi, il n'est pas rationnel pour le roi 
de tuer le messager comme un moyen de faire face à la mauvaise nouvelle. Recevoir le 
message n'est pas en soi mauvais, ce qui est mauvais est ce dont le message informe le roi, 
en supposant que les mauvaises nouvelles sont correctes. Si le messager informe que les 
gens dans le royaume sont en train de mourir, le message n'est pas mauvais : il est mauvais 
que les gens meurent. Alors qu'il serait rationnel d’agir pour empêcher les gens de mourir, 
il serait illogique de tirer sur un messager qui apporte de mauvaises nouvelles dans le but 
d’agir sur le contenu de ces nouvelles. Le roi n'a aucune bonne raison de tuer le messager, 
puisque le fait que quelqu'un donne de mauvaises nouvelles n'est pas en soi mauvais. 
DB est analogue à la situation du messager. Le simple fait de représenter quelque chose 
dans notre corps comme mauvais n'est pas mauvais en soi, car il n'est pas mauvais en soi 																																																								41 Traduit de l’anglais.  
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de recevoir un message sur quelque chose de mauvais. Ce qui est susceptible d'être 
mauvais est ce qui se passe dans notre corps, dans un cas, et que les gens meurent dans le 
royaume, dans l'autre. De la même manière qu'il n’est pas rationnel (ni nécessaire, ni 
souhaitable) de tirer sur le messager, dans le cas de DB, il ne serait pas rationnel de cesser 
de représenter le mal corporel, de faire cesser cette représentation.  
Or la théorie DB devrait pouvoir expliquer pourquoi il est en fait rationnel d’agir dans le 
but de faire cesser une sensation désagréable de douleur. Lorsque nous prenons un 
analgésique, c'est précisément ce que nous faisons : nous faisons cesser cette expérience. 
Si DB ne peut pas expliquer en quoi prendre un analgésique est rationnel, nous devons 
conclure que DB est incorrecte. Cet argument et ce problème du « meurtre du messager » 
se pose de la même façon pour les impérativistes. Recevoir un ordre n’étant ni bon ni 
mauvais en soi, les imperativistes ne peuvent pas non plus expliquer le caractère 
intrinsèquement mauvais d'une douleur désagréable. Ils sont également obligés de dire que 
la prise d'analgésiques n’est pas rationnelle.  
 
1.4 Solutions au problème du meutre du messager 
Pour répondre à ce problème, les imperativistes ont proposé qu’une douleur désagréable 
est mauvaise au sens où elle interfère avec d'autres activités et c'est à cause de cette 
interférence qu'il est rationnel d’agir par rapport à cette expérience, par exemple, de 
prendre un analgésique (Klein, 2015b; Klein & Martínez, à venir; Martínez, 2015). Selon 
les impérativistes, la prise d’analgésiques peut s’expliquer sans avoir à accepter que la 
douleur soit désagréable en soi. Au lieu de cela, c'est une raison instrumentale qui 
explique pourquoi nous prenons des analgésiques. Nous prenons un analgésique parce 
qu'une douleur désagréable interfère avec notre liste mentale de choses à faire. 
Néanmoins, la torture semble être un contre-exemple. Supposons que l’on soit torturé par 
le moyen d’une douleur désagréable ; c'est une très mauvaise situation. Si on pouvait 
prendre une pilule qui nous permettrait d’éviter ces douleurs, on aurait de bonnes raisons 
de la prendre. Il semble incorrect de penser que la seule raison pour laquelle il est mauvais 
d’être torturé soit que la douleur désagréable que l’on experimente interfère avec d'autres 
choses que l’on aimerait faire. Ressentir une douleur désagréable est instrumentalement 
mauvais, sans que cela implique qu’une douleur désagréable ne soit pas aussi mauvaise en 
soi.42 Je pense que le problème rencontré par les imperativistes pour rendre compte du 																																																								
42 Bain (2017) présente une intuition similaire. 
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caractère intrinsèquement mauvais des douleurs désagréables est structurel. 
L'impérativiste doit montrer qu'une douleur désagréable n'est pas mauvaise en soi, c'est-à-
dire, que le caractère intrinsèquement mauvais consiste seulement en une raison 
instrumentale. 
Les représentationalistes ont proposé deux stratégies principales afin de fournir une 
réponse au problème du meurtre du messager. Ces deux stratégies font appel à d'autres 
états mentaux. Il serait rationnel de prendre un analgésique en vertu de i) une émotion 
négative dirigée vers la douleur désagréable (Boswell, 2016) ou ii) parce que on a une 
aversion générale à la douleur désagréable (Cutter & Tye, 2014). La solution de Boswell 
repose sur des modèles empiriques de douleur selon lesquels une expérience normale de la 
douleur est constituée de trois éléments : i) une sensation de douleur brute (pas bonne ou 
mauvaise), ii) une composante affective, et iii) une composante émotionnelle négative.43 
D’après ce modèle, c'est en vertu de la composante émotionnelle de la douleur qu’il est 
rationnel de prendre un analgésique. Cette solution rencontre aussi des problèmes. 
Montrer qu'il y a des raisons instrumentales pour prendre un analgésique n'implique pas 
qu'il n'y a pas non plus de raisons non instrumentales. 
Cutter et Tye expliquent qu’on a une raison de prendre des analgésiques parce que l’on a 
une aversion pour les douleurs désagréables. Cette aversion peut-être formulées en les 
termes d’une con-attitude générale. Autrement dit, le caractère mauvais non instrumental 
de la douleur désagréable peut être expliquée en faisant appel au désir de ne pas avoir une 
douleur désagréable. Ce n'est pas une forme d'instrumentalisme parce que nous 
n'expliquons pas le caractère mauvais d'une douleur désagréable à partir du caractère 
mauvais d’un désir. L’approche de Tye et Cutter est la meilleure solution proposée par les 
théories du contenu pour répondre au problème du meurtre du messager.  
Il y a, néanmoins, au moins deux problèmes avec cette solution. Le premier est que si cette 
explication peut rendre compte de notre motivation pour prendre un analgésique, elle 
n’explique pas de façon claire la justification de cette action. L'aversion en elle-même 
n'implique pas une justification pour agir. Le deuxième problème est que cette théorie 
n'est plus capable d'expliquer en quoi le caractère mauvais d'une douleur désagréable 
réside dans sa phénoménologie. Autrement, il n’est plus possible d’expliquer le caractère 
mauvais de la douleur désagréable en utilisant la notion d’un contenu mental. 
 																																																								43 Voir par exemple Fields (1999), Gracely (1992) et Price (2000). 
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CHAPITRE 2 : THÉORIES DU DÉSIR 
 
Ce deuxième chapitre traite d’une autre manière de rendre compte du caractère degréable 
de la douleur. Cette approche prend appui sur les désirs afin d'expliquer ce qui constitue le 
caractère désagréable de la douleur et d'autres expériences déplaisantes (Armstrong, 1962; 
Brady, 2017; Pitcher, 1970). Je clarifierai d’abord ce que ces théories du désir entendent 
par désir. Ensuite, j'expliquerai comment ces théories utilisent la notion de désir pour 
rendre compte du caractère desagréable de la douleur. Je me concentrerai sur la 
proposition de Heathwood (2006, 2007, 2011). Enfin, une fois cette théorie du désir 
clarifiée, je soulignerai deux problèmes rencontrés par cette approche. Le premier 
problème a été identifié par Bramble (2013) ; selon lui les théories du désir ne peuvent pas 
expliquer ces cas où on a des expériences désagréables inconscientes. Le second 
problème, que je considère comme une objection fondamentale aux théories du désir, est 
souvent présenté sous la forme d’un dilemme d'Euthyphron. Je montrerai que bien que les 
théories du désir aient une réponse à ce dilemme, leur réponse reste problématique. 
 
2.1 Le caractère désagréable de la douleur compris comme un désir 
Une bonne façon de comprendre ce que sont les désirs est de les comparer aux 
croyances44. La différence entre ces deux types d'états mentaux est souvent expliquée en 
termes de direction d'ajustement, distinction que l’on doit à Anscombe (1957, §32).45 Les 
croyances et les désirs ont une nature très différente : alors que les croyances ont une 
direction d'ajustement de la parole vers le monde, les désirs ont une direction d'ajustement 
du monde vers la parole. Les théories du désir ont une approche réductionniste du 
caractère désagréable. Les expériences désagréables sont constituées par deux états 
mentaux plus fondamentaux : i) une expérience sensorielle hédoniquement neutre, c'est-à-
dire, une sensation qui n'est ni agréable ni désagréable, et ii) le désir de ne pas avoir cette 
expérience sensorielle (Heathwood, 2007). D’après les théories du désir, une expérience 
douloureuse désagréable est constituée par et ce réduit à ces deux éléments. Ils sont 
nécessaires et suffisants pour avoir une douleur désagréable. 
																																																								44 Pour plus des détails sur la notion du désir voir Schroeder (2017, 2004). 45 Voir Searle (1979) pour la terminologie de direction d'ajustement [direction-of-fit]. 
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Les théories du désir  
Une expérience de douleur désagréable est désagréable si et seulement si elle 
est constituée par deux composants : i) une sensation de douleur 
intrinsèquement neutre, et ii) un sid-désire, i.e., désir simultané, intrinsèque, 
de re, de ne pas avoir cette sensation de douleur. 
L'un des principaux avantages des théories du désir est qu'elles peuvent expliquer 
l'hétérogénéité des expériences désagréables. Feldman (2004) fournit un bon exemple de 
cette intuition : « les plaisirs sensoriels sont tous des «  sentiments », mais ils ne sont pas 
« ressentis de la même manière » » (Feldman, 2004, p. 79)46. Cette intuition se retrouve 
pour les expériences désagréables. Si vous pensez à plusieurs expériences désagréables 
que vous pourriez avoir, comme ressentir de la douleur, ressentir des étourdissements, 
ressentir des démangeaisons, de la faim, de la soif, etc., il n'y a rien de phénoménal, pas de 
sentiment unitaire conscient, en vertu duquel toutes et seulement ces expériences peuvent 
être regroupées comme appartenant au même type d'expérience. Par example, Korsgaard 
(1996) écrit : « Qu'est-ce que la nausée, la migraine, les crampes menstruelles, les coups 
d'épingle et les picotements ont en commun qui nous fait dire qu'elles sont 
douloureuses? » (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 148). 
Le problème de l’hétérogénéité 
Nous avons une intuition très forte que : i) toutes les expériences désagréables 
et seulement ces expériences sont ressenties comme désagréables ; c'est en 
vertu d’être ressenties comme désagréable qu'elles qualifient en tant que telles. 
Cependant, après une introspection minutieuse, il y a aussi l'intuition forte 
que : ii) il n'y a rien de qualitatif, rien de phénoménal, pas de sentiment 
unitaire, que toutes les expériences désagréables partagent et en vertu duquel 
elles sont désagréables. 
Je pense que la façon la plus simple et la plus élégante pour les théories du désir de 
confronter le problème de l’hétérogénéité est de dire que le caractère désagréable n'est pas 
qualitatif, que ce n'est pas quelque chose de phénoménal : le caractère désagréable n'est 
pas un sentiment. Plutôt, les théories du désir peuvent expliquer que ce qui unifie toutes 
les expériences désagréables, ou au moins toutes les expériences sensorielles désagréables, 
est qu'elles sont partiellement constituées par un sid-désir. Le problème avec cette solution 
est qu’on doit sacrifier l’intuition que le caractère désagréable est en effet quelque chose 																																																								46 Toutes les traductions sont personnelles.  
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ressenti, que le caractère désagréable est un sentiment. L'avantage, par contre, est qu’on 
peut expliquer d'une manière simple ce qui unifie toutes les douleurs désagréables et 
toutes les expériences sensorielles désagréables. 
Si on pense qu'un état mental est motivant si on peut expliquer un comportement en 
référant au tel état mental, alors nous pourrions expliquer comment la douleur désagréable 
est motivante. Pour cela, on compte sur le fait que les douleurs désagréables soient 
constituées par un désir. De plus, étant donné qu'il est mauvais en soi d'avoir des désirs 
frustrés et que la douleur désagréable est constituée par des désirs frustrés, alors il est 
mauvais en soi d'avoir des douleurs désagréables. Nous sommes donc justifiés à agir pour 
ne pas avoir de douleur désagréable et ainsi éviter d’avoir des désirs frustrés. 
 
2.2 Problèmes pour les théories du désir 
Bramble (2013) soulève un premier problème pour ces théories du désir. L'argument est 
que i) nous pouvons avoir des expériences désagréables inconscientes, mais ii) nous ne 
pouvons pas avoir des désirs sur des expériences inconscientes et, par conséquent, iii) ce 
qui explique le caractère désagréable de ces expériences inconscientes ne peut pas être un 
désir. Les théories du désir sont censées rendre compte des expériences désagréables, mais 
elles ne peuvent pas expliquer pourquoi des expériences inconscientes peuvent être 
désagréables. Haybron (2008) propose un exemple d'expérience sensorielle auditive 
inconsciente désagréable : 
Peut-être avez-vous vécu avec un réfrigérateur qui gémissait souvent à cause 
d'un mauvais roulement. Si c'est le cas, vous pourriez avoir constaté qu’avec le 
temps, vous avez complètement cessé de le remarquer. Mais parfois, lorsque le 
compresseur s'est arrêté, vous avez remarqué le silence soudain et glorieux ... 
Bref, vous aviez eu une expérience désagréable sans le savoir.47 (Haybron, 
2008, p. 222)  
Même si nous acceptons que nous puissions avoir des expériences inconscientes 
désagréables, l'argument de Bramble n'est pas tout à fait convaincant. Il n’y a pas de 
raison de penser qu’on ne puisse pas avoir des désirs à propos de telles expériences 
désagréables, même inconscientes. En fait, ces désirs peuvent être soutenus soit au niveau 
conscient ou inconscient, c'est-à-dire que nous pourrions avoir conscience d'avoir ces 
																																																								47 Traduction de l’anglais.  
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désirs ou pas. Heathwood (à venir) a récemment offert une réponse similaire. Selon lui, le 
type d'exemple que Bramble a en tête implique qu’une sensation soit inconsciente en un 
sens restreint, et dans ce sens restreint ou faible, nous pouvons avoir des désirs à propos 
d'expériences dont nous sommes pas conscients. 
Le deuxième problème des théories du désir prend la forme d'une version du dilemme 
d'Euthyphron : la douleur est-elle désagréable parce que nous désirons ne pas l'avoir, ou 
est-ce que nous désirons ne pas avoir de la douleur parce que celle-ci est désagréable ? En 
gros, alors que les théories du désir prennent la première option du dilemme, la deuxième 
option semble être beaucoup plus intuitive mais pas disponible pour les théories du désir. 
Les théories du désir offrent cette solution initiale au dilemme : 
Celui qui réduit le plaisir sensoriel au désir répond « Oui et Oui». Oui, nous 
désirons des sensations agréables parce qu'elles sont agréables (autrement dit, 
nous les désirons d'avance parce que nous savons que nous les désirerons 
quand nous les aurons). Et oui, les sensations agréables sont qualifiées comme 
agréables parce qu'elles sont intrinsèquement désirées.48 (Heathwood, 2007, p. 
39)  
Le dilemme d'Euthyphro reste problématique. Heathwood veut répondre « oui » aux deux 
options du dilemme, mais il n'a pas vraiment pu dire « oui » aux deux. La réponse de 
Heathwood est insatisfaisante parce que, s’il peut effectivement expliquer les désirs de 
douleur dirigés aux douleurs désagréables, il ne peut pas expliquer les désirs simultanés 
dirigés aux douleurs qui sont hédoniquement neutres. Il n'a pas expliqué les raisons pour 
lesquelles on n'aurait pas envie de quelque chose qui n'a rien de mauvais en soi-même. 
Il y a une autre stratégie disponible pour essayer de résoudre le dilemme d'Euthyphron. 
Cette stratégie consiste à dire que ce n'est pas la sensation de douleur qui possède la 
propriété d'être désagréable, mais plutôt le composé de la sensation de la douleur qui est 
hédoniquement neutre et du désir dirigé vers cette sensation de douleur (Brady, 2017). 
Cette solution offre une explication de ce qui constitue une douleur désagréable, sans 
impliquer que quelque chose qui n’est pas désagréable en soi devienne désagréable parce 
qu’on désire de ne pas l’avoir. 
Si nous acceptons cette explication, il n'y a plus de dilemme. Néanmoins, il y a encore un 
problème non résolu. La proposition des théories du désir n'a pas encore pu rendre compte 																																																								48 Traduction de l’anglais. 
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du désir même qui constitue une douleur désagréable. La solution proposée par Brady 
rencontre un problème similaire à celui rencontré par la solution de Heatwood : dans les 
deux cas, on ne peut expliquer pourquoi il est possible d’avoir des désirs envers une 
sensation de douleur hédoniquement neutre. 
Les théories du désir peuvent proposer une explication évolutionniste à ce problème. 
Selon cette explication, le désir de ne pas avoir des sensations douloureuses 
hédonistiquement neutres fait partie d'un processus de sélection naturelle. Il n'y a rien 
d'intrinsèquement mauvais ou horrible dans les expériences de la douleur, mais nous 
avons évolué pour ne pas les désirer intrinsèquement ; « L'évolution a très bien fait son 
œuvre, et presque toutes les créatures vivantes du règne animal trouvent désagréables les 
sensations qui accompagnent presque tous les mécanismes de nociception. » (Hall, 1989, 
p. 648)  
L'explication évolutionniste 
Il est utile que des créatures comme nous désirons (avec un sid-désir) de ne 
pas avoir de sensations de douleur hédoniquement neutres, parce que de cette 
façon nous évitons les dommages corporels et nous sommes donc plus 
susceptibles de survivre et de rester en bonne santé. 
Cependant, même si l'explication évolutionniste fournit une justification instrumentale des 
raisons pour lesquelles nous pourrions avoir des désirs de ne pas avoir des sensations de 
douleur hédoniquement neutres, elle demeure insuffisante : i) nous n'avons pas encore 
expliqué la raison qui nous motive à avoir ces désirs, et ii) nous n'avons pas fourni des 
raisons non instrumentales  qui expliquent que l’on ait ces désirs. Ceci est problématique 
notamment si l’on considère comme fortement intuitif le fait que ce sont ces types de 
raison que la douleur offre par rapport au désir. Il semble particulièrement intuitif que les 
désirs concernant la douleur soient motivés et justifiés d'une façon qui n’est pas 
instrumentale, la douleur étant une raison motivante,  une bonne raison de vouloir ne pas 
ressentir de la douleur. Or l'explication évolutionniste offre seulement une justification 
instrumentale de tels désirs et va à l’encontre de cette intuition. 
Indépendamment des difficultés mentionnées ci-dessus, il y a une raison plus simple de 
rejeter les théories du désir. L'autre option du dilemme d’Euthyphro est toujours 
disponible. Pourquoi désirons-nous éviter des douleurs désagréables ? Parce que les 
douleurs désagréables sont ressenties comme désagréables et ce sentiment désagréable est 
mauvais en soi. 
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CHAPITRE 3 : LA THÉORIE DU SENTIMENT DISTINCTIF 
 
Dans ce troisième chapitre, j'expose la théorie du sentiment distinctif. J'expliquerai le 
premier problème rencontré par cette théorie. Il s’agit d’expliquer comment le sentiment 
désagréable distinctif peut être une raison motivante et normative d'agir. Je défends l’idée 
que pour rendre compte du fait que le désagréable est motivant et normatif, on doit 
comprendre cette propriété comme mauvaise en soi. Le problème principal de cette théorie 
est donc un problème d'hétérogénéité. La théorie du sentiment distinctif établit que toutes 
les expériences désagréables sont désagréables en vertu d'une propriété phénoménale 
partagée qu’ont toutes les expériences désagréables. Cependant, selon le problème de 
l'hétérogénéité, il n'y aucun aspect qualitatif, il n’existe aucune propriété phénoménale 
unitaire parmi toutes les expériences désagréables, et en raison de laquelle ces expériences 
sont qualifiées comme désagréables. 
 
3.1 La théorie du sentiment distinctif 
Selon Bramble (2013), les expériences sensorielles agréables et désagréables sont 
respectivement agréables et désagréables en vertu d'un sentiment distinctif. Un sentiment 
distinctif est une qualité distinctive, c’est-à-dire un aspect phénoménal en vertu duquel une 
expérience sensorielle est qualifiée comme agréable ou désagréable. Une bonne façon de 
comprendre ce que Bramble a en tête est de dire qu'un sentiment distinctif désagréable est 
une propriété phénoménale des états mentaux telles que les expériences sensorielles. Je 
pense que nous pouvons comprendre ce sentiment de deux façons : i) en termes de 
sentiment unitaire, c'est-à-dire, c’est un même sentiment en vertu duquel toutes les 
expériences sensorielles désagréables sont qualifiées comme telles, et ii) le sentiment est 
accessible à l'introspection, c'est-à-dire, le sentiment distinctif fait partie de notre 
expérience consciente, au moins dans des circonstances normales. 
Cependant, un des problèmes de la théorie est d'expliquer exactement comment le 
sentiment désagréable distinctif peut expliquer la force motivationnelle et normative des 
expériences hédoniques. Sobel (2005), par exemple, souligne le cas problématique des 
expériences agréables. Si des expériences agréables fournissent des raisons d'agir en vertu 
d'être phénoménales, il n’est pas évident de comprendre comment le fait d’être 
phénoménal explique pourquoi ces expériences nous donnent des raisons d’agir. Alston 
(1967) a une intuition similaire. 
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Je pense que la meilleure stratégie pour une théorie qui souhaite expliquer le caractère 
désagréable comme une propriété phénoménale est d'établir qu'une telle propriété 
phénoménale est mauvaise en soi. Autrement dit, d’établir que la différence entre le 
caractère désagréable et d'autres propriétés phénoménales consiste en ce que les 
expériences désagréables fassent mal. Comme le dit Smuts, « « être ressenti comme 
agréable » est aussi proche d'une expérience primitive que possible »49 (Smuts, 2011, p. 
11). Bramble n'a pas besoin d’expliquer les douleurs désagréables liées à la motivation et 
à la normativité en faisant appel à des croyances normatives, par exemple. Être 
désagréable est une propriété phénoménale intrinsèquement motivationnelle et normative 
car elle implique quelque chose de mauvais en soi. Ceci est donné. On n'a pas à expliquer 
pourquoi c'est comme ça, et il n'y a peut-être pas d’explication de cet état de fait. 
 
3.2 Le problème de l’hétérogénéité pour la théorie du sentiment distinctif  
L'hétérogénéité des expériences désagréables est un problème fondamental pour la théorie 
du sentiment distinctif. Selon le problème de l'hétérogénéité, même si toutes les 
expériences désagréables sont désagréables, il n'y a pas une propriété phénoménale 
unitaire, pas de sentiment unitaire, en vertu duquel toutes les expériences désagréables, et 
seulement elles, peuvent être qualifiées comme désagréables. La théorie du sentiment 
distinctif affirme le contraire, à savoir que toutes les expériences désagréables et elles 
seulement sont qualifiées comme désagréables parce qu'elles partagent le même et unique 
sentiment distinctif unitaire. Selon le problème de l’hétérogénéité, si on fait une liste de 
toutes les expériences qui sont désagréables et qu’on en fait l’introspection, on ne pourra 
pas trouver un seul sentiment distinctif de ces expériences qui explique ce en vertu de quoi 
ces expériences sont désagréables. 
Bramble refuse une partie du problème de l'hétérogénéité : selon lui, même s'il semble 
qu'il n'y ait pas un sentiment unitaire parmi toutes les expériences désagréables et 
seulement elles, il existe en fait un tel sentiment. Cependant, ce sentiment n'est pas facile à 
identifier parce qu'il « imprègne » les expériences sensorielles. Ce caractère pénétrant du 
sentiment vise à expliquer pourquoi, après une introspection simple, il semble qu'il n'y ait 
pas une propriété phénoménale distincte qui unifie toutes les expériences sensorielles 
plaisantes ou désagréables, respectivement. En d'autres termes, le sentiment distinctif est 
là, c'est juste que nous ne pouvons pas en faire facilement l’introspection. Néanmoins, la 																																																								49 Traduction de l’anglais. 
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notion de pénétrabilité, chez Bramble, pose problème. En bref, il est assez étrange 
d’affirmer que quelque chose est distinctif quoiqu’il passe inaperçu. Si quelque chose est 
distinctif, cela semble vouloir dire que ce quelque chose est tout du moins perceptible. 
C'est précisément l'un des avantages initiaux de la théorie du sentiment distinctif. Une 
introspection consciencieuse nous montre qu'il n'y a pas de sentiment désagréable unitaire 
partagé parmi toutes nos expériences désagréables. 
La théorie du sentiment distinctif est utile pour illustrer un type d’approche non 
réductionniste du caractère désagréable comme propriété phénoménale. Nous pouvons 
expliquer que nous prenons un analgésique parce que le caractère désagréable de la 
douleur est mauvais en soi. Le caractère désagréable de la douleur étant mauvais, cela 
rend nos actions intelligibles, notamment car cela explique pourquoi une douleur 
désagréable est une raison motivante d’agir. Le caractère mauvais du caractère 
désagréable explique aussi pourquoi il est souhaitable de prendre un analgésique, pourquoi 
il est bon de faire cesser une expérience désagréable. Cependant, même si on accepte 
qu’une expérience avec cette propriété phénoménale est mauvaise en soi, la théorie du 
sentiment distinctif n'a pas réussi à rendre compte de l'hétérogénéité des expériences 
désagréables. 
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CHAPITRE 4 : LES THÉORIES DIMENSIONNELLES DU 
CARACTERE DÉSAGRÉABLE 
 
Dans ce chapitre, j’expose d'autres théories qui partent de l’idée que le caractère 
déságréable est une propriété phénoménale. Ces théories, contrairement à la théorie du 
sentiment distinctif, ajoutent la notion de « dimension ». Selon une première théorie, la 
théorie de la dimension hédonique, le caractère désagréable est une dimension dans 
laquelle les expériences sensorielles peuvent varier. L'idée vient de Kagan (1992), même 
s’il utilise cette idée dans le cas des expériences agréables. Vu que la théorie de la 
dimension hédonique n'est pas capable de résoudre le problème de l'hétérogénéité, je 
considérerai une seconde théorie, qui donne une réponse à ce problème en utilisant la 
distinction entre déterminable et déterminant (Crisp, 2006). J'expliquerai la solution de 
Crisp au problème de l’hétérogénéité, qui se fonde sur la distinction déterminable-
déterminant. Cependant, cette théorie rencontre elle aussi  une difficulté fondamentale : 
elle ne peut pas rendre compte des cas de douleurs qui ne sont pas désagréables. 
 
4.1 La théorie de la dimension hédonique 
La théorie de la dimension hédonique propose que le caractère désagréable soit compris 
comme une dimension selon laquelle des expériences de douleur peuvent varier. Cette 
théorie repose sur une analogie : le volume du son est similaire à l'aspect agréable ou 
désagréable des états mentaux sensoriels (Kagan, 1992). La caractéristique principale de 
l'idée de Kagan est que si le volume est une dimension du son, alors le volume peut avoir 
des intensités différentes. Analogiquement, si le caractère désagréable est comme le 
volume, alors une expérience sensorielle peut avoir des intensités différentes. 
Selon Bramble (2013), l'analogie de Kagan ne fonctionne pas. « Considérez que, pour la 
plupart des expériences, on puisse réduire complètement leur aspect agréable, tout en 
laissant l'expérience intacte, alors qu'on ne peut jamais réduire complètement le volume 
d'une expérience auditive et se retrouver avec l’expérience auditive en 
question”50(Bramble, 2013, p. 209). Il y a cependant une façon simple et élégante de 
comprendre l'analogie de Kagan, en évitant cette critique de Bramble. Nous pourrions 
interpréter son analogie en comparant le caractère désagréable des expériences 																																																								50 Traduction de l’anglais.  
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désagréables avec le volume du son. Si le volume est essentiel au son, nous pouvons 
affirmer qu'être désagréable est essentiel aux expériences mentales désagréables. 
Il existe cependant un autre problème beaucoup plus important pour la théorie de la 
dimension hédonique : on ne peut pas rendre compte de l'hétérogénéité des expériences 
désagréables. Le problème avec la théorie de la dimension hédonique est que les variations 
du caractère désagréable ne peuvent pas être seulement expliquée en termes d'intensité. 
Alors que le volume du son varie seulement en intensité, le caractère désagréable des 
expériences ne varie pas seulement en intensité. La théorie de la dimension hédonique doit 
montrer que toutes les expériences désagréables et elles seulement sont unifiées en vertu 
d'être désagréables, en vertu d'avoir la même unité phénoménale, la même dimension 
phénoménale et que la seule variation parmi toutes ces expériences désagréables est en 
termes d’intensité. La théorie de la dimension hédonique n'est pas capable de répondre à 
cette intuition, et c'est pourquoi l'hétérogénéité des expériences désagréables est un 
problème pour cette théorie. 
 
4.2 La solution au problème de l'hétérogénéité 
Pour faire face à ce problème, tout en maintenant l'intuition que le caractère désagréable 
est quelque chose de ressenti, il a été proposé d'expliquer comment les expériences 
peuvent être agréables ou désagréables en faisant appel à la distinction déterminable-
déterminant: 
Les expériences agréables diffèrent les unes des autres... Mais il y a une 
certaine qualité commune... elles sont vécues comme agréables... La 
distinction déterminable-déterminant nous aide aussi à clarifier le rôle du 
« vécu » dans cette analyse: être vécu comme agréable en tant que 
déterminable n'est pas un type particulier de sentiment vécu déterminé.51 
(Crisp, 2006, p. 109) 
Je propose qu'une bonne manière de comprendre cette distinction c’est d’expliquer que les 
différentes déterminations d’un déterminable commun varient d’une façon non additive. Je 
propose que cette compréhension de la distinction déterminable-déterminant est très 
importante. Si être coloré est un déterminable, cela veut dire que ses différents 
déterminants, les propriétés de couleur, diffèrent les uns des autres de façon non additive : 																																																								51 Traduction de l’anglais. 
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la différence entre être rouge et être bleu ne consiste pas à être coloré plus être X, pour être 
rouge, ou être coloré plus être Y, pour être bleu. Par contraste, considérons la propriété 
d'être un jeune animal. Tous les éléments qui appartiennent à cette catégorie ont un 
ingrédient distinctif, c'est-à-dire, être jeune, plus quelque chose d'autre. Par exemple, être 
un chaton signifie être jeune plus être un chat ; être un ourson, être jeune plus être un ours 
; etc. Les propriétés d'être un chaton ou un ourson sont différentes façons d'être un jeune 
animal, et ils diffèrent les uns des autres d'une manière cumulative ; ils ne sont pas des 
déterminants d'un déterminable en commun. 
Si nous essayons de comprendre l'idée de Crisp, on devrait établir que le caractère 
désagréable est un déterminable avec divers déterminants comme être une démangeaison, 
être une douleur, être une crampe, etc. C'est-à-dire qu'être une démangeaison et être une 
douleur ne partagent pas un ingrédient commun du désagréable plus quelque chose d'autre 
qui les rend différents. Ces sont des manières différentes d'être désagréables d’une façon 
non additive. Si nous comprenons le désagréable comme un déterminable, avec la 
compréhension non-additive que j'offre pour la distinction déterminable-déterminant, le 
problème de l'hétérogénéité est dissolu. Être une douleur ou être une démangeaison sont 
des façons d'être désagréables qui diffèrent de façon non additive : être une démangeaison 
et être une douleur ne partagent pas un sentiment désagréable unitaire. Nous pouvons 
expliquer qu'être désagréable est une propriété phénoménale qui est mauvaise en soi 
d'avoir, et aussi accepter qu'être désagréable n'est pas un ingrédient commun à toutes et 
seulement les expériences désagréables.52 
Les dimensions sont les propriétés essentielles des déterminables et en vertu de ces 
dimensions chaque déterminant d’un déterminable en commun est différent du reste. 
Quand on parle de différentes manières d'être pour différents déterminants d'un 
déterminable commun, on fait référence aux variations parmi ces dimensions. Comparez 
cela aux différentes façons d'être un jeune animal. Les différences entre ces propriétés sont 
expliquées en termes de variations parmi différentes dimensions essentielles : seulement la 
propriété d'être un chaton implique être un chat, seulement la propriété d'être un ourson 
implique être un ours, etc. Si être une douleur et être une démangeaison sont des 
déterminants d'un déterminable commun, cela veut dire que ces propriétés partagent les 
mêmes dimensions essentielles. 
																																																								52 Pour plus sur la distinction sur determinables-déterminates voir Johnson (1921), Prior (1949), et Wilson 
(2009, 2017). 
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4.3 Les douleurs qui ne sont pas désagréables 
Cette façon de comprendre la douleur par rapport au caractère désagréable implique que la 
douleur est nécessairement désagréable. Cependant, il ne semble pas nécessaire que la 
douleur soit désagréable. Les propriétés déterminées impliquent leurs déterminables. Si 
être écarlate est une propriété déterminée d’être rouge, être écarlate implique d'être rouge. 
Si le fait d'être une douleur est une propriété déterminée d’être désagréable, alors être une 
douleur implique d'être désagréable. Cela veut dire qu'être une douleur sans être 
désagréable est impossible, de la même manière qu’il est impossible d'être écarlate sans 
être rouge. Au contraire, il y a des cas qui suggèrent qu’il est possible d’éprouver des 
douleurs qui ne sont pas désagréables. 
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CHAPITRE 5 : EST-CE QUE LES DOULEURS SONT TOUJOURS 
DÉSAGRÉABLES ? 
 
Dans ce chapitre, j'analyserai divers cas qui suggèrent que la douleur pourrait ne pas être 
désagréable. Si ces cas impliquent des expériences de douleur qui ne sont pas 
désagréables, cela montre que la douleur n'est pas nécessairement désagréable. Si être une 
douleur n'implique pas d'être désagréable, être une douleur ne peut pas être une 
déterminée du déterminable « être désagréable ». L’asymbolie à la douleur est l'exemple le 
plus clair où il semble que les gens ont des douleurs qui ne sont pas hédoniques, c'est-à-
dire, des douleurs qui ne sont ni agréables ni désagréables. Cependant, je montrerai que 
l'idée qu'il existe  des douleurs qui ne sont pas hédoniques peut être remise en question. Le 
fait que la douleur soit paradigmatiquement désagréable suggère que toutes les douleurs 
sont en fait toujours désagréables. 
 
5.1 Douleurs non hédoniques 
Certains philosophes ont émis l'idée que le caractère désagréable est une caractéristique 
nécessaire de la douleur: si ce n'est pas désagréable, ça ne peut pas être une douleur. 
Pitcher (1970), par exemple, a examiné divers cas qui remettent en question l'idée que la 
douleur soit nécessairement désagréable. Il soutient que ces cas pouvaient être expliqués 
par un certain modèle de la douleur  - la théorie de la douleur de Melzack et Wall's 
(1965)53 - et il a conclu qu'il ne trouvait aucun exemple de douleur qui n'était pas 
désagréable. Cependant, tout le monde n'était pas d'accord avec lui. Hall (1989), par 
exemple, a soutenu qu’on pouvait « avoir exactement les mêmes sensations que lorsqu'on 
est coupé, brûlé ou meurtri, et qu'elles ne seraient pas désagréables » (Hall, 1989, p. 643). 
Dans la suite, j’examinerai plusieurs cas qui suggèrent qu’on peut avoir des expériences 
de douleur non désagréables.  
Il y a différents syndromes où il semble que les gens ne ressentent jamais de la douleur. 
Ces cas peuvent être considérés comme une insensibilité congénitale à la douleur (Cox et 
al., 2006; Juliao & Brotto, 1955; Sternbach, 1963). Il y a deux points clés concernant les 
cas d'insensibilité à la douleur congénitale. Tout d'abord, contrairement à ce que nous 
pourrions penser, certaines personnes diagnostiquées avec ce syndrome ressentent de la 
																																																								53 Voir la réimpression (Melzack & Wall, 1996).	
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douleur dans de rares occasions de leurs vies, et ces douleurs semblent être désagréables. 
Deuxièmement, il est possible que les patients souffrant d'insensibilité à la douleur 
congénitale aient des douleurs non désagréables. Cependant, cette éventualité n'est pas 
utile si nous cherchons des exemples concrets qui confirment que les gens peuvent avoir 
des douleurs non désagréables. Même si c’est possible, il n'existe aucune preuve 
concluante confirmant que les personnes souffrant d'insensibilité congénitale à la douleur 
aient des expériences douloureuses non désagréables. 
D'autres exemples suggèrent que l'on peut perdre notre capacité à ressentir de la douleur, 
bien qu'étant nés avec cette capacité. Ce sont les cas d'insensibilité acquise à la douleur. 
Un exemple intéressant d'insensibilité acquise à la douleur est celui des soldats blessés qui 
ne semblent pas ressentir de douleur juste après avoir été sur le champ de bataille. Beecher 
(1956) a attiré l'attention sur ces cas grâce à son travail sur les soldats blessés à Anzio 
pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (par exemple : Bain, 2013; Klein, 2015b; Wall, 
1999). Néanmoins, il n'y a aucune preuve de comportement ou de témoignage de soldats 
rapportant qu'ils ressentent de la douleur, mais que cette douleur n'est pas désagréable du 
tout. Même s'il est possible que les personnes ayant une insensibilité acquise à la douleur 
aient des douleurs qui ne soient pas désagréables, rien n'indique que ce soit effectivement 
le cas. 
En outre, quelques personnes rapportent qu'ils ressentent de la douleur sans montrer la 
réaction typique: elles semblent être indifférentes à leur douleur. Par exemple, les cas de 
lobotomie, qui ont pour objectif de supprimer des douleurs insupportables, ont amené des 
philosophes à se demander si ces patients ont des douleurs non désagréables (e.g., 
Dennett, 1978; Pitcher, 1970). Les patients lobotomisés reconnaissent que leur expérience 
était similaire avant et après l'opération, mais ils cessent de manifester de la détresse et 
déclarent qu’ils ne sont plus dérangés par ces douleurs (Freeman & Watts, 1946; Watts & 
Freeman, 1948). Ils semblent devenus indifférents à leur douleur. Cette indifférence est 
expliquée par le fait que la douleur n'est plus désagréable. Néanmoins, je pense qu’une 
explication plus probable est que leurs douleurs sont encore désagréables. Par exemple, 
Trigg (1970) offre cette réponse pour expliquer les changements de comportement chez 
les patients lobotomisés par rapport aux leurs douleurs chroniques. Il souligne que les 
patients lobotomisés semblent avoir perdu la capacité de craindre et de s'inquiéter par 
rapport aux leurs douleurs. Étant donné que l'anxiété de vivre de forts épisodes douloureux 
semble avoir été la principale source de souffrance pour certains de ces patients, cela 
expliquerait pourquoi ils ont acquis de l'indifférence. 
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Si les patients lobotomisés perdent leur capacité à la crainte et au stress à la suite de leur 
lobotomie, ils peuvent maintenant être confrontés à leurs douleurs désagréables et être 
indifférents, ce qui n'implique pas que leurs douleurs ne sont pas désagréables. De plus, 
d’après l'explication de Trigg, Freeman et Watts affirment que: « La psychochirurgie 
modifie la réaction du sujet à la douleur sans changer matériellement sa capacité à 
ressentir de la douleur. La douleur peut être présente, mais elle est séparée de ses 
implications. »54 (Freeman & Watts, 1946, p. 954–955). Ce qui explique leur changement 
de comportement, leur indifférence, n’est pas un changement par rapport à leurs 
expériences de la douleur, mais un changement dans leurs émotions à propos de ces 
douleurs qui restent désagréables. 
Finalement, l’asymbolie à la douleur est une affection neurologique qui a attiré beaucoup 
d'attention dans la discussion philosophique sur la douleur (voir Bain, 2013; Corns, 2014; 
Grahek, 2007; Gray, 2014; Klein, 2015a; Vignemont, 2015). Les asymboliques rapportent 
que leurs douleurs ne leur font pas mal et parfois même ils sourient quand on leur applique 
des stimuli nocifs (Schilder & Stengel, 1928). Les asymboliques ne réagissent pas de la 
manière habituelle aux stimuli nocifs qui causeraient normalement de la douleur, même 
s’ils ressentent de la douleur. Cette pathologie est expliquée comme le résultat d'une lésion 
de l'insula postérieure, typiquement causée par des accidents vasculaires cérébraux et des 
tumeurs cérébrales à l'âge adulte (Berthier, Starkstein, & Leiguarda, 1988). Ce syndrome, 
pensent certains philosophes, fournit des preuves solides de l'existence de douleurs qui ne 
sont pas désagréables. Autrement dit, il pourrait y avoir des états mentaux qui instancient 
la propriété phénoménale d'être une douleur mais sans instancier aucune propriété 
phénoménale du caractère désagréable.  
 Plus précisément, quatre interprétations ont été données pour ce syndrome : i) celle de 
Grahek (2007), qui pense que les asymboliques ont des douleurs qui ne sont pas 
désagréables, ce qui explique leur comportement étrange; ii) celle de Klein (2015a), qui 
pense que les asymboliques ont encore des douleurs désagréables, mais qu’ils ont perdu 
leur capacité à se soucier de leur intégrité corporelle, ce qui explique leur comportement 
étrange; iii) celle de Bain (2013), qui pense que les douleurs des asymboliques ne sont pas 
désagréables, mais que les douleurs ne sont pas désagréables du fait que les asymboliques 
ont perdu leur capacité à se soucier de leur intégrité corporelle; et iv) celle de Gray (2014), 
qui pense que les asymboliques ont perdu leur capacité de ressentir de la douleur. Les 
solutions de Klein et de Bain semblent être disqualifiées en tant qu'explications possibles 																																																								54	Traduction de l’anglais. 	
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par les cas de somatoparaphrénie soulevés par De Vignemont (2015). Ces cas montrent 
que se soucier de son corps n'est pas nécessaire pour la motivation, contrairement à Klein, 
ni nécessaire pour que la douleur soit désagréable, contrairement à Bain. Nous devons 
donc décider entre l’interprétation de Grahek et celle de Gray. 
Je pense qu’on doit opter pour la dernière pour une raison simple: la douleur est l'exemple 
paradigmatique d'une expérience désagréable. C'est-à-dire, il y a une intuition très forte 
que la douleur peut impliquer, au moins habituellement, le caractère désagréable. Si la 
douleur est paradigmatiquement un exemple d’une expérience désagréable, on doit avoir 
des preuves très convaincantes pour nous faire changer d'avis. Je pense que ce n’est pas le 
cas.  
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CHAPITRE 6 : MASOCHISME 
 
Le masochisme est un cas intéressant pour comprendre la nature de la douleur et du 
caractère désagréable. C’est un cas intéressant car il semble impliquer deux choses 
contradictoires: i) la douleur est désagréable et nous devrions l'éviter à cause de ce 
caractère, et pourtant ii) les masochistes sont attirés par les expériences douloureuses, ils 
poursuivent ces expériences même si elles sont désagréables. L'existence de douleurs 
seulement agréables expliquerait pourquoi les masochistes sont attirés par ces expériences 
douloureuses et montrerait qu'il y a des douleurs qui ne sont pas désagréables. Plusieurs 
auteurs ont proposé différentes manières de comprendre ce qu'est le masochisme, mais je 
pense que ce qu'ils faisaient vraiment était décrire différents types de masochisme, 
différentes versions d'un phénomène commun. La caractéristique commune à tous ces 
types de masochisme est que les gens recherchent l’expérience de la douleur. Cependant, 
les raisons pour lesquelles les masochistes recherchent ces expériences peuvent varier. De 
plus, il ne semble pas que les gens recherchent des expériences douloureuses qui sont juste 
plaisantes. Il n'y a pas des preuves concluantes de l'existence de douleurs non désagréables 
dans la littérature sur le masochisme. 
 
6.1 Masochisme moyen-but 
La façon la plus courante dans la littérature philosophique d'expliquer le masochisme est 
de dire que les masochistes ne veulent pas vraiment avoir l'expérience de la douleur pour 
elle-même. En réalité, un masochiste est quelqu'un qui poursuit la douleur « comme un 
moyen de parvenir à quelque but... guidé par des raisons obscures comme la culpabilité ou 
le masochisme sexuel »55 (Nagel, 1986, pp. 156–157).  
Le mot « masochisme » a été introduit pour la première fois en médecine par Kraft-Ebing 
(1892). Le mot a été inspiré par le nom de l'écrivain Leopold Sacher-Masoch (1870).56 
D’après Kraft-Ebing, la caractéristique principale du masochisme n'était pas que les 
douleurs sont un moyen de gratification sexuelle, comme le masochisme est souvent 
																																																								55	Traduction de l’anglais.	56 Voir la version réimprimée (Sacher-Masoch, 2004).	
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compris.57 En fait, selon lui, les douleurs sont un moyen de se sentir soumis. Kraft-Ebing 
distinguait le masochisme du sexual bondage, ce dernier étant en fait beaucoup plus 
proche de ce que les définitions médicales actuelles comprennent par masochisme. Alors 
que dans le masochisme, tel que Kraft-Ebing le comprenait, l'expérience de la douleur 
semble avoir un rôle instrumental pour obtenir le sentiment de soumission, on en voit pas 
clairement comment la douleur a un rôle instrumental pour obtenir la satisfaction sexuelle 
dans le sexual bondage. 
Il y a un autre exemple où les gens recherchent des douleurs et où ces expériences ont 
aussi un rôle instrumental. Goldstein (1983) défend l'idée que le masochisme se comprend 
mieux comme un exemple d'autopunition irrationnelle et anormale; le masochisme 
consisterait dans l'utilisation d'une douleur désagréable comme un moyen d'autopunition 
non méritée. Goldstein soutient que tous les cas d'autopunition impliquant de la douleur ne 
sont pas masochistes. Il pense que la différence entre un cas normal d'autopunition et le 
masochisme est que ce dernier est une autopunition irrationnelle. Dans le masochisme il 
n'y a pas de bonne raison d'être puni. Si, par exemple, vous vous punissez pour quelque 
chose que vous n'avez pas fait, cela compterait comme du masochisme d’après Goldstein. 
Nous pouvons expliquer la motivation à s'engager dans une douleur désagréable, même si 
elle est désagréable: nous pourrions être motivés à poursuivre une douleur désagréable 
parce que nous croyons qu'une telle douleur désagréable apportera quelque chose d'autre 
que nous désirons. Nous pouvons également être justifiés à rechercher une douleur 
désagréable. Il peut y avoir des circonstances où il peut être souhaitable de s'engager dans 
une douleur désagréable comme un moyen. Je pense que le trait essentiel du masochisme 
moyen-but est que les gens poursuivent intentionnellement une douleur désagréable parce 
que cette expérience est désirée comme un moyen pour autre chose, même s'il n'y a pas de 
bonnes raisons de chercher ces douleurs désagréables comme moyen. 
 
6.2 Douleurs d'effet collatéral  
Il y a un autre type de cas qui pourrait facilement être confondu avec le masochisme 
moyen-but. Les gens peuvent supporter volontairement des douleurs désagréables, mais 
sans que l'expérience de douleur ne soit vraiment un moyen. Au contraire, la douleur est 
parfois un effet collatéral de ce qui est réellement poursuivi. Nous nous engageons parfois 																																																								57 Deux bons exemples de ces approches contemporains du masochisme sont le manuel diagnostique et 
statistique des troubles mentaux (DSM-V) et la dixième révision de la classification statistique internationale 
des maladies et des problèmes de santé (ICD-10).	
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dans des activités qui impliquent des douleurs désagréables parce qu'elles sont un effet 
collatéral inévitable de quelque chose que nous poursuivons intentionnellement. Après une 
analyse plus minutieuse, nous pouvons se rendre compte que la douleur ne joue pas un 
rôle instrumental dans ces cas. Aller chez le dentiste est un bon exemple : on ne va pas 
chez le dentiste parce que ça fait mal, on y va en dépit du fait que ça fait mal. 
Dans certaines occasions, nous supportons le caractère désagréable des expériences telles 
que la douleur parce que c'est l'effet collatéral d'un moyen ou d'un but. Nous pouvons être 
motivés à supporter un tel caractère désagréable car nous voulons le moyen ou le but, 
même si nous pensons que l'expérience désagréable est une conséquence inévitable de nos 
moyens ou de nos buts. En outre, il y a des occasions où nous pouvons avoir de bonnes 
raisons de supporter un tel caractère désagréable, et dans d'autres cas nous n'avons peut-
être pas de bonnes raisons de le supporter, ce n'est pas souhaitable. 
 
6.3 Masochisme de but en soi 
Il y a différentes façons dont la douleur peut être un but en soi. Deux cas qui apparaissent 
dans la littérature philosophique sur le masochisme sont : i) une douleur désagréable qui 
fait partie d'un ensemble poursuivi, ou ii) une douleur désagréable qui est aussi agréable. 
Certains philosophes ont remarqué que, parfois, quelque chose de désagréable peut faire 
partie d'un tout qui est recherché. Pitcher (1970) offre un bon exemple du type de scénario 
qui serait considéré comme du masochisme contextuel: 
Imaginons que Agnew n'aime pas les olives, mais il aime les paellas qui les 
contiennent. Et nous n'imaginons pas qu'il tolère à peine la présence des olives 
détestées dans sa paella; de sorte qu'il aime le plat malgré eux: au contraire, 
nous devons supposer qu'il considère les olives comme constituant un 
ingrédient nécessaire pour une paella vraiment bonne — sans les olives, ce 
serait beaucoup moins intéressant.58 (Pitcher, 1970, p. 484)  
Cet exemple nous donne une idée de ce que cela peut signifier de rechercher une 
expérience douloureuse quand il s’agit de masochisme contextuel. C'est-à-dire, dans ce 
scénario, Agnew n'aime pas les olives en elles-mêmes, mais il les aime quand elles font 
partie de la paella, même si le goût des olives reste désagréable. Le goût des olives est 
désagréable pour Agnew quand il les mange, à l'écart des autres saveurs; il n’aime pas le 																																																								58 Traduit de l’anglais.	
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goût parce que c’est désagréable. Cependant, quand Agnew mange des olives en paella, le 
goût de ces olives mérite d'être poursuivi lorsqu'il est accompagné d'une myriade d'autres 
arômes, textures, arômes, etc. 
Le masochisme contextuel peut également se produire avec l'expérience produite en 
mangeant de la nourriture épicée. De la même manière que certains plats sont 
partiellement constitués de piments épicés, l'expérience résultant de la consommation de 
ces plats est en partie constituée par la sensation de brûlure dans la bouche lorsque nous 
mangeons le plat. La sensation de brûlure dans nos bouches que nous ressentons parfois 
lorsque nous mangeons de la nourriture épicée est causée par la capsaïcine contenue dans 
certains piments. L'épisode de dégustation d'un plat épicé implique une douleur brûlante 
désagréable comme l'une de ses parties essentielles et, en ces termes, telle expérience 
désagréable est poursuivie comme un but en soi. 
Si le but dans son ensemble vaut vraiment la peine d'être poursuivi, c'est-à-dire, si le but 
est suffisamment bon, nous serons alors justifiés à nous engager dans quelque chose qui 
est partiellement composé d'une expérience désagréable. Si le tout est en effet assez bon, 
cela expliquera non seulement pourquoi nous pouvons nous engager dans ces expériences 
désagréables, mais cela constituera aussi une bonne raison de poursuivre le tout comme un 
but. Dans les cas de masochisme contextuel, qu’ils soient rationnels ou pas, les gens 
recherchent des douleurs désagréables qui sont des parties essentielles d'un tout. 
Cependant, le fait que la douleur ne soit pas recherchée comme un but, toute seule, mais 
comme une partie essentielle d'un but plus large, suggère que les douleurs impliquées dans 
le masochisme contextuel sont désagréables. Il n'y a pas aucune raison de douter que ces 
douleurs sont désagréables. Il existe différentes raisons de rechercher ces douleurs, mais 
aucune ne semble impliquer qu'elles soient seulement agréables.	
Klein (2014) propose un autre type de scénario masochiste. Selon lui, certaines 
expériences telles que la douleur peuvent être à la fois agréables et désagréables. Klein 
appelle ces cas plaisirs masochistes. Klein pense que les plaisirs masochistes, y compris la 
douleur, sont agréables en plus d'être désagréables et parce qu'ils sont désagréables. 
Différentes raisons expliquent pourquoi le caractère désagréable de la douleur peut aussi 
être agréable dans ces situations. Le caractère désagréable d'une expérience douloureuse 
supportable peut devenir agréable: i) s’il est nouveau, ii) si cela nous permet d'exercer un 
contrôle de nous-même, iii) si cela représente une intimité particulière avec quelqu'un, iv) 
si cela repousse nos limites et nous aide à grandir et à changer, etc.	
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Les plaisirs masochistes éclairent une raison différente pour laquelle nous pouvons 
rechercher la douleur : nous pouvons rechercher une douleur désagréable si son caractère 
désagréable est aussi, en plus, agréable. C'est à cause de ce plaisir qu’on peut expliquer 
pourquoi nous pouvons être motivés et même justifiés à nous engager dans de tels plaisirs 
masochistes. Si le plaisir tiré d'expériences douloureuses est assez fort, nous pourrions être 
justifiés à poursuivre des plaisirs masochistes, même s'ils entraînent du déplaisir.	
En conclusion, même s'il n'y a pas de cas concrets de douleurs non désagréables, pas 
même dans le masochisme, il semble au moins possible qu'il puisse y en avoir. Le fait que 
nous puissions concevoir la douleur comme n'étant pas hédonique suggère que nous 
devrions avoir une théorie du caractère désagréable qui permette d’expliquer cette 
possibilité.	
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CHAPITRE 7 : LA THÉORIE HÉDONIQUE DE DÉTERMINABLE-
DÉTERMINÉE 
 
Dans ce chapitre, je vais proposer une théorie qui a plusieurs vertus. Cette théorie 
maintient l’intuition que le caractère désagréable est quelque chose de ressenti, quelque 
chose de phénoménal; elle peut expliquer la possibilité de douleurs qui ne sont pas 
désagréables; elle peut rendre compte du cas du Ploner, un exemple où une expérience 
désagréable est dépourvu de son aspect phénoménal de douleur; elle peut expliquer 
comment deux expériences sensorielles peuvent varier de façon hédonique seulement, 
c'est-à-dire, l'une étant agréable et l'autre désagréable; enfin, cette théorie est capable de 
rendre compte de l'hétérogénéité des expériences désagréables. C'est la théorie hédonique 
de déterminable-déterminant (THDD).	
Cependant, THDD doit faire face à deux difficultés. Premièrement, elle doit rendre 
compte de la variation phénoménale parmi les différentes façons d'être désagréable. 
THDD est capable de rendre compte de cet aspect. Deuxièmement, il n'est pas évident 
comment la propriété phénoménale d’être désagréable implique d’être mauvais en soi. 
Cependant, même si THDD n'explique pas pourquoi une expérience désagréable est 
mauvaise en soi, cette théorie est dans une meilleure position que les théories discutées 
dans les chapitres précédents. 
 
7.1 La théorie hédonique de déterminable-déterminant 
Voici ce que THDD propose pour rendre compte des expériences de douleurs 
désagréables : 
Théorie hédonique de déterminable-déterminant du caractère 
désagréable de la douleur	
Une expérience de douleur désagréable a deux propriétés phénoménales : i) la 
propriété phénoménale d'être une douleur, et ii) une propriété phénoménale 
déterminante (u1, u2, u3, etc.) de la propriété déterminable du caractère 
désagréable. 
De cette façon, nous pouvons facilement rendre compte de la possibilité pour les 
asymboliques d'avoir des expériences douloureuses qui ne sont pas hédoniques. 
Autrement dit, ils auraient un état mental avec la propriété phénoménale d'être une 
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douleur, mais sans la propriété phénoménale d'être désagréable. Un autre avantage de 
dissocier la propriété d'être une douleur de la propriété d'être désagréable est que nous 
pouvons rendre compte des cas où, vraisemblablement, quelqu'un a une expérience 
désagréable, sans être une douleur ou une expérience phénoménale d'une autre forme 
sensorielle. Par exemple, certains chercheurs affirment que leurs « résultats démontrent, 
pour la première fois chez l’humain, une perte de la sensation de douleur avec un effet de 
douleur préservée »59 (Ploner, Freund, & Schnitzler, 1999, p. 211). Si ce cas est réel, où 
même possible, THDD nous permet d'en rendre compte.	
THDD a un autre avantage : nous pouvons expliquer comment différentes expériences 
sensorielles peuvent varier hédoniquement seulement. Nous pouvons expliquer comment 
le même type d'expérience sensorielle peut parfois être agréable et d’autres fois 
désagréable. Par exemple, nous pouvons avoir des expériences de goût de chocolat parfois 
agréables et parfois désagréables. Comment pouvons-nous expliquer cela ? L'expérience 
agréable de la dégustation de chocolat se compose de deux propriétés: i) la propriété goût-
de-chocolat, et ii) une manière déterminée d'être agréable que j'appellerai chocolat-
agréable. Ensuite, l'expérience désagréable de la dégustation de chocolat se compose de 
deux propriétés : i) la propriété goût-de-chocolat, et ii) une manière déterminée d'être 
désagréable que j'appellerai chocolat-désagréable. Deux expériences sensorielles 
différentes qui ne varient que hédoniquement ne sont pas des déterminants différents d'un 
déterminable commun. Les caractères agréable et désagréable de ces expériences 
sensorielles agréables et désagréables sont des propriétés déterminantes.	
Finalement, nous devrions expliquer comment THDD résout l'hétérogénéité des 
expériences désagréables. D’après THDD, le caractère désagréable est phénoménal, mais 
il n'y a pas un sentiment unitaire du caractère désagréable car les différentes façons d’être 
désagréable varient de manière non additive. THDD est cohérente avec l'intuition qui 
soutient le problème de l'hétérogénéité. Plus précisément, toutes les expériences 
désagréables sont considérées comme telles en vertu de leur propriété déterminable d’être 
désagréable. Toutes les expériences désagréables sont désagréables d'une certaine 
manière, u1, u2, u3, etc. et chacune de ces manières d'être désagréable, chacun de ces 
caractères désagréables, varie par rapport aux autres d'une façon qui n’est pas additive. En 
d'autres termes, u1, u2, u3, etc., varient à travers les mêmes dimensions essentielles. Une 
fois que nous considérons qu'être désagréable est une propriété déterminable, nous 
pouvons expliquer comment les douleurs désagréables varient en fonction de leur 																																																								59 Traduit de l’anglais. 	
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caractère désagréable, même s'il n'y a pas un sentiment désagréable unitaire qui est partagé 
par toutes les douleurs désagréables.	
 
7.2 Deux derniers problèmes pour THDD 
Afin de donner une explication plus substantiel de THDD, nous devons clarifier comment 
nous pourrions savoir quelles sont les dimensions essentielles du caractère désagréable. 
Cela expliquerait comment des expériences désagréables partagent une propriété 
phénoménale commune, même s'il y a tellement de diversité concernant les différentes 
façons d'être désagréable. Comment pouvons-nous savoir quelles sont les dimensions des 
propriétés phénoménales? Pour répondre à cette question, nous pouvons faire appel à la 
notion d'espace qualitatif (voir Rosenthal, 2015).  
En postulant un espace qualitatif, nous pourrions découvrir les dimensions essentielles des 
propriétés déterminables phénoménales. D’après Rosenthal (2015), nous pouvons utiliser 
la même méthodologie pour différentes modalités sensorielles. Par exemple, la même 
méthodologie a été utilisée pour essayer de créer un espace qualitatif pour les expériences 
olfactives (Young, Keller, & Rosenthal, 2014). Nous pourrions appliquer une stratégie 
similaire pour construire un espace qualitatif du caractère désagréable, au moins en 
principe.	Même si nous ne connaissons pas exactement quelles sont les dimensions selon 
lesquelles le caractère désagréable peut varier, nous pouvons accepter que ces dimensions 
existent. « Nous pouvons certainement être en désaccord sur la dimension déterminante 
d'un type particulier, mais pourvu que ce désaccord soit raisonnable, l'existence même 
d'un tel désaccord permet de confirmer que nous partageons une compréhension intuitive 
du concept de dimension de détermination et de sa découverte. » (Funkhouser, 2014, p. 
30)	
Le dernier problème pour THDD est particulièrement problématique pour les théories qui 
prennent le caractère désagréable pour quelque chose de ressenti. Le problème est 
d'expliquer pourquoi le caractère désagréable est mauvais d’une manière non 
instrumentale et, comment, si le caractère désagréable est phénoménal, cette propriété 
phénoménale implique qu’une expérience désagréable soit mauvaise en soi. Je ne vais pas 
expliquer pourquoi le caractère désagréable implique un tel mal intrinsèque. Je le conçois 
comme un fait brut que le caractère désagréable implique quelque chose de mauvais non 
instrumentalement. Les expériences qui instancient le caractère désagréable ont une force 
motivationnelle et normative parce que avoir ces expériences sont mauvaises en soi. 
Alors, comment THDD fait-il mieux que les autres théories ?	
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Premièrement, THDD est préférable aux théories du contenu concernant la structure du 
caractère désagréable, c'est-à-dire, en ce qui concerne l'hétérogénéité de ce caractère. 
D’après les théories de contenu toutes les expériences désagréables sont désagréables de la 
même manière, comme si le caractère désagréable était un sentiment unitaire, comme si 
c'était un ingrédient que possèdent toutes les expériences désagréables et seulement elles, 
y compris les douleurs désagréables. Ce n'est pas le cas, comme le montre le problème de 
l'hétérogénéité. THDD est meilleure parce qu'elle rend compte de l'hétérogénéité des 
expériences désagréables.	
Deuxièmement, THDD explique mieux la nature du caractère désagréable que les théories 
du contenu. L'un des principaux objectifs des théories du contenu, en faisant appel au 
contenu mental, était d'expliquer le fait que ce caractère est mauvais en soi. Cependant, on 
ne peut pas expliquer le caractère mauvais intrinsèque d'une douleur désagréable en 
fonction de quelque chose qui n'est pas mauvais, comme le montre le problème du meurtre 
du messager. Il est donc préférable de ne pas expliquer du tout ce caractère mauvais 
intrinsèque. THDD ne l’explique pas, mais n’entraîne donc pas d‘incohérences.	
Comparons maintenant THDD avec les théories du désir. Toutes sont capables de rendre 
compte de l'hétérogénéité des expériences désagréables. Alors, pourquoi devrions-nous 
préférer THDD? Je pense que nous devrions la préférer parce que cette théorie nous 
permet de garder l’intuition que le caractère désagréable est phénoménal, que c'est 
quelque chose de qualitatif, quelque chose de ressenti. Les théories du désir pourraient 
expliquer pourquoi il est instrumentalement bon d'avoir des sid-désirs en utilisant une 
explication évolutionniste et téléologique. Cependant, comme je l'ai expliqué au chapitre 
deux, il n'y a pas de raison motivante ou de raison non instrumentale de ne pas avoir de 
désirs pour des sensations de douleur hédoniquement neutres, car selon les théories du 
désir, une sensation neutre de la douleur n'a rien d’intrinsèquement mauvais. En revanche, 
THDD peut donner une explication assez simple à nos désirs concernant la douleur et son 
caractère désagréable. Selon THDD, nous sommes justifiés à désirer de ne pas avoir une 
douleur désagréable parce que le caractère désagréable est mauvais en soi, parce que les 
douleurs désagréables font mal. Le caractère désagréable d’après cette théorie est mauvais 
en soi et phénoménal.	
Finalement, THDD se trouve dans une meilleure position que toutes les autres théories qui 
considèrent le caractère désagréable comme une propriété phénoménale sans donner une 
explication réductrice. En comparaison à la théorie du sentiment distinctif, du Chapitre 3, 
et de la théorie de la dimension hédonique, du Chapitre 4, THDD peut rendre compte de 
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l'hétérogénéité des expériences désagréables. La version développée à partir de la 
proposition de Crisp était également capable de gérer l'hétérogénéité des expériences 
désagréables. Cependant, THDD est dans une meilleure position concernant la relation 
entre la douleur et le caractère désagréable. THDD est également capable de rendre 
compte de: i) la possibilité de douleurs qui ne soient pas hédoniques, ii) des expériences 
désagréables qui ne sont pas sensorielles, comme le suggère le cas du Ploner, et iii) 
comment des expériences sensorielles peuvent varier seulement hédoniquement. Je 
conclus alors que cette approche est la meilleure option disponible pour comprendre la 
nature de la douleur et du caractère désagréable.	
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CONCLUSION 
 
À partir des chapitres précédents, j'espère que le lecteur trouvera que THDD est la 
meilleure théorie disponible pour expliquer le caractère désagréable de la douleur. Selon 
cette approche, ce caractère est une propriété phénoménale qui implique d’être mauvais en 
soi. Les expériences douloureuses désagréables font mal, ce qui explique pourquoi nous 
sommes motivés et justifiés à éviter ces expériences. Le fait que les douleurs désagréables 
font mal nous donne une raison, et une bonne raison, de prendre un analgésique. Cette 
théorie nous permet d’expliquer la possibilité de douleurs qui ne sont pas désagréables, 
même si toutes les expériences douloureuses que nous avons semblent être désagréables. 
Cette approche nous permet également d'expliquer comment différentes expériences de 
diverses modalités sensorielles peuvent être agréables ou désagréables. Finalement, cette 
théorie permet de rendre compte de l'hétérogénéité du caractère désagréable.	
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Le	Caractère	Désagréable	de	la	Douleur 
Résumé 
 
La douleur est désagréable. Étant donné que la douleur est l'exemple paradigmatique d'une expérience 
désagréable, mon but est de clarifier ce qui caractérise la douleur et le caractère désagréable. J’essaie 
notamment de comprendre ce que peut signifier qu’une douleur soit désagréable et ainsi d’élucider la 
structure des expériences désagréables. Ce faisant, j’aborde plusieurs aspects problématiques de la relation 
entre la douleur et le caractère désagréable des expériences. Je fournis également une compréhension 
générale de ce que signifie pour une expérience non nécessairement douloureuse d’être désagréable. 
 
Cette thèse s’organise en sept chapitres correspondant à trois problématiques principales : i) qu’est-ce qui 
constitue le caractère désagréable de la douleur ? (Chapitres 1 & 2), ii) comment rendre compte de la 
grande diversité phénoménale du caractère désagréable des expériences ? (Chapitres 3 & 4), et iii) dans 
quels cas la douleur n’est-elle pas désagréable ? (Chapitres 5 & 6). Dans le dernier chapitre (Chapitre 7), 
j'offre une réponse générale aux trois problématiques principales en proposant ma propre théorie sur le 
caractère désagréable de la douleur. D’après cette théorie, une expérience désagréable est une expérience 
ressentie, le caractère désagréable est défini comme une propriété phénoménale des états mentaux, et cette 
propriété doit être comprise en utilisant la distinction déterminable-déterminant. Mon travail fournit ainsi 
une compréhension détaillée de la nature de la douleur et du caractère désagréable. 
 
Mots-clés : douluer ; désagréable ; hétérogénéité ; contenu ; désir ; déterminable ; déterminant ; 
masochisme 
The Unpleasantess of Pain 
Summary 
 
Pain is unpleasant. Given that pain is the paradigmatic example of an unpleasant experience, I aim to shed 
light on what pain and unpleasantness are by trying to understand what it means for a pain to be 
unpleasant, what the structure of unpleasantness is, and by tackling several problematic aspects of the 
relation between pain and unpleasantness. By doing this, I will also provide a general account of what it 
means for an experience that might not be a pain to be unpleasant. 
 
The thesis is organised into seven chapters and divided by three main themes: i) what the unpleasantness 
of pain consists in, ii) how we can account for the great phenomenal diversity among experiences of 
unpleasantness, and iii) which cases suggest that there could be pains that are not unpleasant. Broadly, the 
first two chapters deal with the first theme, the third and fourth chapter with the second theme, and the 
fifth and sixth chapter focus on the third theme. In the final chapter I offer a conclusion of the three main 
themes by providing my own view on the unpleasantness of pain. According to this account, an unpleasant 
experience is something felt, it is a phenomenal property of mental states, and this property should be 
understood using the determinable-determinate distinction. By doing all of this, this thesis will provide a 
detailed understanding of the nature of pain and unpleasantness. 
 
Keywords: pain; unpleasant; heterogeneity; content; desire; determinable; determinate; masochism  
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